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Abstract 
 
To what extent are the foundations of hegemonic power present in Contemporary China? This 
thesis addresses the question through the application of a two-pillar structural power 
framework. Prominent IPE scholarship on hegemony tends to privilege the internal or external 
foundations of hegemony and to privilege production and trade or financial development as its 
subject of analysis. Through the two-pillar framework, the thesis presents a comprehensive 
analysis of the internal and external dimensions of power in the realms of production and trade 
on the one hand and financial development on the other. Overall, this holistic account allows 
for a disaggregated and nuanced account of the partial rise of China to be presented. The thesis 
found that, in relations to the finance pillar, although having undergone a series of reform which 
have deepened its financial capacity domestically, China’s external engagement and influence 
within international financial institutions remains limited. In relations to the production 
structure, China has proactively engaged with resource-rich regions to secure a stable supply 
of key inputs but remains heavily reliant on external demand within its unbalanced domestic 
economy. Overall, the thesis suggests that uneven foundations of structural power present a 
constraint on the rise of China. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Napoleon once described China like the ancient sleeping giant (Kumar, DuFresne, and Hahler, 
2007). Having gradually recovered from the trauma of war, it is widely acknowledged that this 
giant is now waking up and has the capacity to exert increasing influence over global events. 
This thesis examines China’s rising power using a two-pillar approach developed from Susan 
Strange’s theory of structural power. Strange’s original theory introduces four dimensions of 
primary structural powers and four secondary structures, whereas this research focuses on the 
economic components of China’s structural power. By conceptualising hegemony and 
evaluating China’s structural power from the finance and production dimensions, this thesis 
provides a systematic analysis of the empirical case of China’s rising economic strength. It also 
engages with the latest statistics on several economic indicators and primary materials in 
Chinese, such as relevant governmental documents, to critically examine China’s economic 
performance and its hegemonic foundations. 
 
Deep social and economic changes have occurred in China over the past few decades, and a 
range of social and economic forces manifest evidence of growing unrest. The country’s 
political leadership is aware of the significance of its foreign policy, as a growing source of 
increasing global power. The overall aim of this thesis is to present an evaluation of the extent 
to which domestic transformation and external engagement constitute the foundations of 
China’s hegemonic power. 
 
There are reasons to view China as an increasingly active agent in world politics. As a rising 
power, China may be gaining the greater capacity to challenge obligations attained under rules 
and regulations set up by the West. The government of China is quite often ‘being accused of 
intransigence, resisting to respond to global crises proactively and innovatively’ (Chan, Lee, 
and Chan, 2008:15-16). It is also pointed out that tensions might arise if China acquires a 
certain ‘soft power’ to bend the pre-existing Western norms. The question of how an ancient 
power may be re-established as a globally significant figure in the contemporary global 
political economy is a fascinating and important topic. By drawing on concepts and themes 
from within the field of international political economy (IPE), this thesis aims to shed light on 
this question. 
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China’s rising power also reflects upon its relations with others, especially the existing great 
power. For example, when considering the context of hegemonic transition, some scholars have 
concluded that the relationship between China and the US can be termed as involving the 
‘frenemy’, a subtle description of being friends and enemies at the same time (Chaban, Bain, 
and Stats, 2007; Sverdrup-Thygeson, 2017). Since WWII, the US has established a dominant 
position via the worldwide financial regime. The Marshall Plan and abundant dollar output to 
Europe and Japan are able to safeguard a strong alliance between these countries and the US, 
while US troops in the Middle East and Africa also lead to the prime status of the dollar through 
providing security (Kindleberger, 1985; Helleiner and Kirshner, 2009). After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the political dynamics shifting drastically within a short period of time, 
the future of US hegemony becomes a lingering myth (Nye, 1990b), although some scholar 
believes the power and influence are ‘still without peer’ (Agnew, 1992:8). 
 
With China joining the list of top economies, it can now be assumed as a potential threat to the 
US. Due to the progress of globalisation, countries are becoming more connected and 
interdependent. From the monetary perspective, for example, if China dumped all the US 
treasury bonds it possesses, this would cause a huge impact on the US economy and the 
dominant role of the US dollar (Drezner, 2009). In this case, the US hegemony established on 
the widespread use of the dollar becomes vulnerable in the face of the growing Chinese 
influence. However, the debate asks whether China would take such actions and, if it would, 
under what circumstances? (Hung, 2013).  
 
Meanwhile, other players in the global arena are reacting differently toward China’s growing 
power. Developing countries, some affected by the competition caused by China’s exportation, 
and some benefiting from China’s economic development, may choose to join the US to 
counterbalance China’s power or to form a comprehensive alliance with China. The US could 
possibly provide certain Asian countries that experience territory disputes with China, with 
military support, thus putting pressure upon China; whereas, China has been economically 
allied with Pakistan and Iran, thus tensing the nerves of the Western regime. 
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1.1. Research Puzzle  
 
Discussion of the rise of China is often framed according to very broad questions. The popular 
commentary features reflection and prediction in relation to questions like ‘Can China change 
the world?’, ‘Is China becoming the next hegemon?’, and ‘How China will change the world?’. 
In order to gain analytic traction over these ‘big picture’ questions, it is necessary to be clear 
about the focus of analysis and the core concepts being used as foundations on which to 
evaluate China’s rising power. 
 
As Kang (2003) having pointed out, China cannot be explained by simply adapting existing 
Western mainstream approach because of its unique trajectory of social, economic, and 
political development. To understand this peculiar rising power, there is a need for an analytical 
framework suitable for the case of China.  
 
Kang’s opinion is confirmed by reviewing a vast range of literature on China’s rising power. 
As presented in Chapter 2, existing literature has drawn disparate conclusions regarding the 
rise of China, especially because of its highly ambiguous and hybrid character. This ambiguity 
stems from a lack of theoretical consensus about what ‘power’ actually is and how it can be 
measured. Besides, empirically, it is also because China’s development is highly uneven 
between outward and inward-oriented sectors.  As it is demonstrated through this thesis, by 
adopting a disaggregated approach to the study of power, it can be clarified that the rise of 
China is highly variegated across different sectors. While China’s trade becomes increasingly 
intensive and influential, its structural power stemmed from internal economic development 
remains inadequate; and while China’s financial sector has been expanding rapidly since the 
late 20th century and achieved significant outcome compared to its old self, its capital market 
capacity and global influence are limited as a potential hegemonic power. 
 
This thesis addresses two simple questions: 
1) How to gain analytic traction over the foundations of China’s rising power?  
2) What is the status of the foundations of China’s rising power? 
 
The first question is approached in the light of existing literature on the rise of China and 
hegemonic power. As is reviewed in Chapter 2, the existing literature presents contradictory 
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evaluations and points toward a variegated interpretation of China’s development. Chapter 3 
demonstrates that Strange’s conceptualisation of structural power can usefully disaggregate the 
foundations of hegemonic power and allow for a nuanced analysis on the foundations of 
China’s structural power under a hegemonic context. The second question is addressed through 
the empirical analyses in Chapter 4 to 7. 
 
1.2. Thesis Outline 
 
The thesis proceeds using the following structure. Chapter 2 reviews the state of the art of 
literature on the topic of ‘the rise of China’. This body of scholarship is organised around sub-
strands that prioritise the economic, security, and ideological dimensions of the rise of China. 
Overall, this literature remains quite disparate with divergent opinions on the rise of China due 
to China’s variegated and uneven development through different sectors. This shows that there 
is a lack of a systematic framework for analysing China’s rising power and potential move 
toward hegemony. There is broad agreement that the economic attraction posed by China 
represents the most potent component of China’s foreign relations, and it is repeatedly 
suggested that political hostility has become less important due to the mutual benefits to be 
gained from economic cooperation. This thesis aims to extend this literature by explicitly 
incorporating and extending Susan Strange’s concept of structural powers to the internal and 
external dimensions of China’s hegemonic foundation. 
 
Chapter 3 establishes the framework for this research by conceptualising hegemonic power and 
defining an analytical approach for this thesis. Predominant IPE literature has focused on 
hegemonic theory and power shift between big states, with studies having been conducted via 
both theoretical arguments and empirical case studies. These have given many explanations of 
the phenomenon of hegemony through their respectively different viewpoints. As these 
theories presents, hegemonic power is related to, for example, military strength, international 
stability, international cooperation, and ideology and cultural influence. These theoretical 
writings and existing studies on hegemonic transition have attempted to explore the 
phenomenon of hegemony, with relative economic performance often being located as a 
foundation of hegemonic position.  
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However, as is clarified through the review of existing literature in Chapter 2 and 3, the 
literature lacks a systematic understanding of the components and conceptualisation of power. 
By adapting Strange’s disaggregated conceptualisation of structural power and adding the 
analysis on internal and external dimensions, this thesis clarifies and explores the pattern of 
variegated development that is underpinning the rise of China. 
 
Susan Strange defines power as a compound of four dimensions, including finance, production, 
security, and intelligence. The original theory of structural power was expressed in the late 
1980s. As is noted in Chapter 3, Strange in her own analyses privileged the finance and 
production dimensions. In line with the predominant view within literature review in Chapter 
2 that these economic foundations represent the most salient components of the rise of China, 
through an analytic framework developed in Chapter 3 these finance and production 
dimensions are privileged. 
 
After reviewing existing literature on understanding hegemonic power, Chapter 3 then presents 
the two-pillar approach and the methodology of this research. The two pillars of finance and 
production structures are taken as the primary structures from Strange’s theory. Through the 
main body of the thesis, each of these two structures will be analysed from the aspects of 
internal development and external influence. Notably, the aim of the thesis is not to directly 
answer whether a hegemonic transition is indeed taking place between the US and China. 
Instead, it looks at the capability of China in terms of becoming a hegemonic power.  
 
To open the more empirically focused components of the thesis, Chapter 4 summarises the 
major changes that have happened since the late 1970s and the impact they have brought 
internally on the strength of the Chinese financial system. Through long-running financial 
reformation, the structure of China’s financial sector has changed drastically.  
 
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party took over from the Nationalist Party (the KMT) and 
thus put bureaucratic capitalism to an end. After suffering the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution, China started a series of socialist transformations under the rule of Deng Xiaoping. 
A long-term financial reform was put on the agenda and this is still running today. The reform 
resulted in a rapid increase in national wealth. In theory, the increasingly diverse means of 
financing, alongside the development of this sector, is able to greatly boost the emergence of 
all sized enterprises. So far, reform has included the transformation of the banking system, the 
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opening of the stock exchange, and a number of changes in monetary policy, as well as other 
related instruments such as credit rating.  
 
Chapter 4 concludes that on balance, China’s financial structure requires further reform and 
perfection of relevant laws. Through this chapter, new insights are presented in particular into 
China’s ability of generating credits and its ability of promoting the use of national currency, 
following Strange’s approach of examining finance structure. China’s financial reform focuses 
on an approach of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. It has a limited degree of openness 
in terms of the market, thus limits the credit generating ability; but on the other hand, relatively 
high central control helps with monetary stability and could avoid some critical situations that 
the Western neoliberal regime once faced. The series of internal development greatly promoted 
China’s economic power from the finance perspective but does not evidence that China has 
moved into a hegemonic position. 
 
Chapter 5 extends the analysis of China’s financial structure to the external dimension, 
specifically by exploring evolving interactions with international financial institutions. The 
People’s Republic of China became part of the IMF and World Bank in 1980 as a result of its 
reform and opening up. Gradually integrating with the international financial system, China’s 
status in these institutions changed over time as it became more capable of taking responsibility 
for development and stability. As well as joining these existing organisations, China initiated 
a series of institutions with its developing allies, comfortably taking the lead. 
 
Overall, Chapter 5 concludes that while China remains a relatively marginal figure within the 
‘old’ international financial institutions of the World Bank and IMF, it has taken up a clear 
leadership role within the ‘new’ institutions of the CMIM, BRICS Contingent Reserve 
Arrangement, the New Development Bank, and the AIIB. However, given that these new 
institutions remain broadly aligned to the goals and procedures of the old institutions, this 
leadership role does not constitute a clear move toward an alternative hegemonic order. 
Through this chapter, new insights are presented in particular in relations to the formal 
governance structure and China’s informal influence within the selected institutions.  
 
Chapter 6 looks at the developments in China’s production structure and makes a relevant 
evaluation. Whereas the financial reform started in the late 1970s, major progress in production 
started to materialise around the early 1990s. Since then, China has made a quantitative and 
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qualitative leap. Under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping’s theory and relevant policies, which 
encouraged the founding of small and medium private businesses, China’s sector composition 
was reshaped dramatically as the booming manufacturing industry led to intense GDP growth. 
Many reports and news articles have attempted to reflect on China’s rapidly multiplying 
productive capacity.  
 
This chapter seeks to systematise this body of work by evaluating China’s production in 
relation to sectoral composition, productivity, and export dependency. Overall, Chapter 6 
suggests that China’s production structure is relatively backward in terms of sectoral 
composition and productivity when compared to the standard of contemporary hegemonic 
power; furthermore, a heavy reliance on exportation can potential hinder China’s pursuit of 
fast-paced development in the production structure. 
 
Chapter 7 explores China’s resource diplomacy as the external aspect of production. To sustain 
rapid production progress, securing raw materials is the initial task. Meanwhile, the domestic 
overcapacity issue has forced China to transfer capacity beyond its border. When China’s GDP 
took off in the 1990s, so did its exportation. Importing natural resources and exporting 
manufactured goods has been one of the key strategies for China’s production structure. More 
recent evidence shows that the focus of China’s resource strategy is shifting to investment, to 
create stable environments and advantageous conditions for transnational business. The 
creation of a stable environment can attract investment and cooperation, thus leading to more 
frequent importing and exporting of products as well as co-invested projects. As a result, such 
changes could enhance both domestic productivity and wealth generation within Chinese 
society, and an international mutual benefit shared with many others.  
 
Overall, the findings of Chapter 7 show that China, demonstrating a good level of economic 
attraction, has been successful in developing trade partnerships and securing resources for the 
expansion of its production structure. New insights are presented in particular in relation to the 
institutional foundation of partnerships, trade volume, infrastructural development, and 
challenges to sustainability. 
 
Building on the framework introduced in Chapter 3 and the insights generated in Chapter 4 to 
7, Chapter 8 presents an overall reflection on the rise of China. It concludes that this thesis 
finds no sufficient evidence that China has constructed a solid economic foundation, despite 
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that a series of reforms of the finance and production structures since 1978 have directly led to 
China’s significantly strengthened economic power. China’s promoted status within global and 
regional financial institutions is based on internal development, but the incremental financial 
deepening means incremental global influence. The financial reform created new financing 
means for small to medium firms, private firms that boost production; but sectoral composition 
and productivity awaits improvement. Furthermore, the massive scale of production, especially 
manufacturing industry driven by the emergence of private firms, exposes vulnerability from 
external dependency, including reliance on overseas markets and overseas resource. 
 
Reform in China’s financial structure boosted domestic production and material capacity. The 
growing material strength allows China to participate more actively in relation to trade and 
global governance, and hence promotes China’s global influence. Overall, it is argued that 
while notable transformations have occurred specifically in relation to the internal finance and 
production capacity, China’s finance and production structures require further deepening and 
modernisation. From the external aspect, China’s economic growth faces heavy external 
resource dependence and limited influence within global financial institutions. As such, it is 
suggested that the economic foundation of China’s power shows an unbalanced growth that 
restrains China’s hegemonic rise. 
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2. Understanding the Rise of China: A Survey of the Field 
 
This chapter reviews the existing literature on topics on the ‘rise of China’, in order to situate 
the contribution of this study. The existing literature can be divided according to thematic and 
geographic focus. In terms of themes, significant reflections are provided on the economic, 
security, and leadership impact of the rise of China. In terms of geographic focus, existing 
literature explores the implications of these changes as experienced domestically and externally 
across East Asia, the US, and the rest of the world. Prominent discussion occurs regarding the 
power conflict between China and the US in particular, as is the impact on subordinate states 
and thus the balance of power throughout the global regime. 
 
The literature review below is arranged by geographic locations in each of the three dimensions 
are systematically reviewed. Literature focusing on the economic dimension of the rise of 
China, as experienced domestically and externally, is first covered, followed by literature on 
the security and the ideological dimensions. Overall, many useful insights are generated by this 
large swathe of literature. However, despite the intensive discussion on the implications of 
China’s rising power, conclusions of this literature remain much disparate. Most studies do not 
offer a precise conceptualisation of the ‘rise of China’, with much of the literature remaining 
at a high level of abstraction. This is because of a highly variegated nature of China’s 
development, where power and growth can be sourced from various dimensions. Therefore, 
this research will bring together this literature and a conceptualisation of hegemonic power 
drawn from IPE scholarship, which allows for a systematic analysis that considers the 
disaggregate internal and external dimensions of finance and production structure. 
 
Beyond this overarching incorporation of a clear conceptualisation of hegemonic power in the 
literature on the rise of China, there are additional components to the value-added from this 
project to the rise of China literature. This thesis provides a systematic analysis of both the 
internal and external dimensions of China’s evolved relationship with the production and 
financial sphere of the global economy. This is in comparison with the tendency in much of 
the literature to focus on one dimension alone.  
 
The research also provides new empirical evidence into these dimensions. Specifically, this is 
to introduce a large range of materials, both in English and Chinese, as well as updated statistics, 
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to best explore the momentum of China’s growing power. Official documents, statistics, and 
reports by the Chinese government are used to provide detailed information on the internal 
development of China’s financial and production structures, while the latest statistics extracted 
from databases of World Bank, IMF, the OECD, and the Observatory of Economic Complexity 
illustrates China’s trade activity with resource-rich regions and China’s influence within 
international financial institutions. 
 
2.1. Economic Transformation and the Rise of China 
 
The preponderance of the literature that considers the domestic implications of China’s 
economic transformation attempts to identify the factors responsible for rates of economic 
growth over recent decades. Some literature has flagged up problems lurking beneath the 
apparent prospect of the Chinese economy. Another group of literature points out the impact 
of China’s economic rise, both positive and negative, on neighbouring countries, developing 
countries, and the US. Overall, this project builds on this foundation and adds value by linking 
explicitly to the concept of hegemony, thus examining China’s capability of becoming a 
hegemonic power. The paragraphs below provide overviews of the main strands of this existing 
literature. 
 
China’s rapid economic expansion has become the foundation of many ‘hegemonic transition’ 
debates. Following market reform and opening up, China saw rapid improvement regarding 
many economic parameters. In 1995, its GNP was five times larger than at the beginning of 
the reform in 1978, and trade volume, which started from almost nothing, climbed to about a 
quarter-million USD for the same period. While population growth has gradually slowed down, 
life expectancy for the population has extended. China’s economic development also seems 
pleasing when compared to other countries during the same period of time, as never has a 
country been able to achieve so much in just a few decades. While the rise of China brings 
opportunities and prospects to both Chinese and foreign businesses, relevant literature has 
expressed worries about China’s huge demand for the raw resources and energy consumption 
that sustain this rapid economic growth (Kreft, 2006; Wang, Liu, and Qi, 2014). 
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A group of literature explores the result of China’s economic development and relevant 
contributing factors (e.g. Chen and Feng, 2000; Wang and Yao, 2003; Patten, 2010). Many 
studies in international relations summarise the early 1990s global pattern as trilateral or tri-
polar, as the US, Japan, and Europe took the leading position (Gill, 1991). Meanwhile, 
regarding market size and trade volume, China was seen to be becoming the fourth pillar. In 
the 1990s, the World Bank was already predicting that China would grow into the biggest 
economy in Asia (Kristof, 1993). It was also predicted that China could obtain 8-9% annual 
growth for the next 20 or 30 years if it became better at utilising resources and improving 
productivity (Lin, 2011, as cited in Wang, 2015:351). Although China’s economic 
development has slowed down in recent years, this is believed to be the ‘new normal’ rather 
than ‘the end’ of China’s power growth (Womack, 2016).  
 
China’s growth is attributed to reforms over enterprise ownership – decentralising the 
economic system without losing political control of the CPC, and gradually shifting away from 
communism or socialism at the economic level (Breslin, 2007; Sun, 2000). Because SOEs were 
mostly making losses due to overloaded bureaucracy, and private enterprises were not 
politically in favour, collective ownership, specifically township-village enterprises, became 
the leading contributor of economic growth during the early stages of China’s economic 
transformation (Weitzman and Xu, 1994). Between 1980 and 1994, the percentage of industrial 
output by SOEs dropped from 76.1% to 34.1%, and the share of private enterprises grew from 
0.4% to 25.1%; meanwhile, collective enterprises contributed 40.9% of the total output in 1994, 
in comparison to 23.5% in 1980. Later on, as economic reformation intensified, private and 
mixed ownership gradually took the lead as the mainstay of the national economy. While law 
enforcement awaited improvement and because political stability was at stake, the special 
township-village enterprises could not be less important to China’s economic reform and to the 
unprecedented economic rise of today (Bowles, 1998; Goodhart and Xu, 1996).  
 
Another study by Rosecrance (2006) expresses worry regarding the early stages of China’s 
growth model. Here, the emergence of township-village enterprises and private firms boosted 
manufacture, first fulfilling China’s domestic need and then turning China from a major 
importer to a major exporter. China’s expanding manufacturing industry consists of a great 
number of subsidiaries and joint-venture firms. Even though the world economic system has 
flattened, meaning more players can participate, the end product can only be integrated by the 
few. For example, while Chinese manufacturers are responsible for producing parts, the final 
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product, the iPhone, is assembled in the US. The value-added for Chinese and American firms, 
in this example, differs greatly. In the long term, it cannot be considered an advantage for 
China’s pursuit of rising power. For Rosecrance, seeking expansion in the pure manufacturing 
sector is not healthy growth. It also means that China’s economic rise should contain other 
aspects than merely production and export.  
 
Additionally, literature has developed critiques of the export-oriented and investment-driven 
economic growth of China during the late 20th century and the early 2000s. Hung (2008) noted 
that domestic over-investment and under-consumption consequently led to a new type of crisis, 
over-accumulation. Illustrated by the ratio between gross fixed capital formation and final 
consumption expenditure, China experiences a greater imbalance between investment and 
consumption than other Asian countries. The cause of this problem is the ‘debt-financed 
expansion of excess industrial capacity, asset inflation, and sluggish domestic demand’ (Hung, 
2008:165). Therefore, a warning of an impending crisis, similar to the Great Depression in the 
1930s US, lies behind China’s economic development.  Nevertheless, since the 2000s, China, 
previously a major recipient of FDI, started to shift into the position of a leading investor. 
Chinese outflow FDI increases each year, pushing forward the globalisation of Chinese firms. 
Doing so eases the pressure of weak domestic demand and allows for more active engagement 
with the international market (Yeung and Liu, 2008). This literature hints the heavy external 
reliance of China’s production structure which can be explained more explicitly with updated 
numbers. 
 
Much of this strand of literature flags the importance of China’s export and FDI to its economic 
growth. Surging exports were explained as being due to a series of institutional changes – that 
is, in terms of ownership and other policies, for example, reform of SOEs and the emergence 
of private enterprises boosting production (Liu and Li, 2001; Bai, Lu, and Tao, 2006; Sun, 
2000; Putterman, 1995). However, the 1970s economic reform was far more than just about 
SOEs and ownership. The way that all types of firms finance their operations has changed 
alongside financial reformation; the role of commercial banks are also overlooked in work 
presenting China’s economic growth. In fact, while China’s financial structure is becoming 
much more mature than in the Mao era, the implication of finance to China’s economic growth 
has not been explored properly.   
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Furthermore, contributions to this body of literature suggest that further problems are 
embedded in China’s economic growth. A major one is poverty and underdevelopment, largely 
due to over-population. In 2001, 211.6 million people lived below the poverty line of $1.08 
(1993 PPP) a day, while 593.6 million lived on less than $2.15 (1993 PPP) a day, from a total 
of 1.272 billion Chinese. Other problems have also occurred, for example, insufficient 
infrastructure in remote areas. Regional imbalance is another major institutional problem, with 
provincial governments adopting protectionism and blocking inter-regional trade, contrary to 
the picture of China as a whole nation embracing an international free trade regime. Despite 
the central government’s endeavour to redistribute wealth between regions, inequality between 
the underdeveloped and the more advanced east-coast provinces persists, causing cause a 
further policy barrier (Bardhan, 2006). For China to further pursue rising power, the issues that 
stem from a socio-economic dimension must be tackled.  
 
Overall, this body of literature highlights the factors of China’s economic growth, as well as 
critically evaluating the progress of China’s economic reform. While most literature focuses 
on the production structure, there lacks an explicit analysis of financial development as a major 
dimension of the rise of China. These themes are transposed into the analysis of China’s 
internal development in finance and production structures in Chapter 4 and 6.  
 
Another strand of literature explores China’s relationship with developing countries on the 
basis of China’s economic performance. For China’s neighbouring states in East Asia as well 
as other developing countries, the most concerning factor regarding China’s economic 
implications is trade. The focus of the debate is to what extent is China’s economic growth 
beneficial to others?  
 
China’s export surge began in the late 1970s, as mentioned previously. Overall, with the 
advantage of population size, China first emerged as a leading manufacturer of labour-intensive 
goods, and then soon extended its advantage to electronic and IT departments. Because of the 
cheap labour cost and increasingly open market, many multinational enterprises came to 
relocate their manufacturing units to China. Moreover, joining the WTO in 2001 granted China 
the ability to trade with further favourable conditions (Adhikari and Yang, 2002; Chen, 2009).  
 
China’s economic surge would not have existed without its biggest trade partner ASEAN as its 
significant material supplier, besides establishing a partnership with other places like Latin 
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America and Africa. The relationship with ASEAN was built up naturally upon geographic 
conditions; meanwhile, China’s investment and trade in Africa and Latin America hugely 
impacted the latter and their connection with the international community. 
 
Generally, with the process of political independence and economic development, China 
became the hub of trade, investment, and production in Asia (Bowles et al., 2016). While being 
the leading exporter in Asia, for example, taking over from the US, as the top trader with South 
Korea, China has become the most sought market for other Asian countries’ export goods since 
the early 2000s. During the same period, it also overtook the US and became the biggest 
attraction for FDI. As another instance, the China-Africa relationship can be dated back to the 
1950s, starting from purely diplomatic rapport building to more intense economic cooperation, 
China is described as winning market, heart, and minds in Africa. Indeed, economic 
cooperation with China has been sought by these countries, and while some suggest that the 
‘dumping’ of Chinese products harms other economies, others see opportunity in these 
circumstances. 
 
There has developed a fear among countries in similar stages of industrial progress that Chinese 
products would ‘crowd out’ the global market and diminish the survival of the former countries’ 
manufacturing sector. As for developed countries, another kind of fear has started to 
accumulate, with protectionism emerging against ‘Made in China’. However, by exploring 
China’s trade pattern, economists conclude that China’s trade advantage is still in its labour-
intensive industries, which affects mainly East Asian industrialised countries only. This is 
contrary to the most common belief that China took over market shares originally belonging to 
other developing countries; instead, the rise of China’s manufacturing industry has created a 
supply chain for the countries around it, with other developing countries able to become more 
specialised in terms of providing specific products and developing more advanced export 
advantages (Athukorala, 2009; Erturk, 2001). 
 
Moreover, activities carried out by Chinese businesses have also gradually shifted from raw 
material extracting to developmental investment. China’s cooperation with ASEAN and Africa 
extend to its infrastructural development and joint ventures. This relationship is thought to offer 
valuable experience and lessons for China’s other new partners, such as Latin America (Roett 
and Paz, 2008). China’s trade partnership with these regions can be generally considered as an 
area of interest. 
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Apart from the direct economic impact China creates for other economies, there is some 
specific focus on China’s growth model as a reference for others. In general, China’s grand 
strategy can be concluded as ‘keeping a low profile’ and ‘striving for achievement’, as 
introduced by the government and discussed by many Chinese scholars. Keeping a low profile 
allows China to establish a social foundation for stable economic growth while the achievement 
part refers to its increasingly proactive foreign policy (Yan, 2014).  
 
The implication of this strategy is two-fold as Li (2016) suggests. On the one hand, the rise of 
China and its global influence can be attributed to its top-ranking position in the global financial 
order as well as its ability to provide public goods for the international community; however, 
it is not a hegemonic power because hegemony should also contain social and political 
dimensions. As Chinese products face protests from Latin American farmers and 
manufacturers, the Chinese government must aim for socio-political development, and 
approach its trade partners with mutual interests beyond economic benefits, for example, value 
exchange and cultural communication. On the other hand, the model of China’s economic 
growth, its ‘keeping and striving’ strategy, can offer a valuable reference point for other 
developing countries who are also seeking an economic rise. This analysis hints the 
conceptualisation of hegemony as not only possessing material power but also having non-
material influence, however, is unsuccessful in explicitly justifying such concept.  
 
Although much attention has been paid to China’s trade partnership with others, financial 
cooperation between China and other developing countries is a much more recent phenomenon 
that awaits further exploration. While China’s economy keeps reforming into a more advanced 
form of industrialisation, from self-sustenance to leading manufactured goods exporter and 
then capital exporter, the pattern of China’s cooperation with others has also changed through 
time. Since there has been no synthesised study on China’s relationship with developing 
countries in terms of either trade and financial cooperation, and because circumstances keep 
changing across time, this theme remains an area of interest in terms of China’s rising economic 
power.  
 
Existing literature also focuses on the implication of China’s economic rise on the US in the 
context of regional economic structure and balance of power by its Asian neighbours and out 
Asia-Pacific countries. The rise of China concerns scholars as much as it concerns politicians 
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because of the discussion as to whether China will challenge the existing hegemonic regime, 
especially in the context of China-US competition.  
 
In terms of economic conflict, both the US and China, according to their current economic 
modes, have advantages over each other as well as facing challenges and different targets. 
While the US possesses more high-value-added sectors and syncretic innovation, China profits 
from mass production. Economic competition is a long-term phenomenon rather than a tipping 
point when one takes over another. Most importantly, analysis of US-China economic 
competition should regularly take the framework of ‘US + China + X’ to explore the effect of 
US and China on specific countries. However, the US economy also relies on China’s growth 
to a great extent, with bilateral economic cooperation beneficial to both parties. Therefore, the 
US-China economic relationship is a sustainable form of rivalry (Womack, 2016). From the 
‘US + China + X’, it can be inferred that the hegemonic competition between China and the 
US can be analysed through their economic implication to subordinate states, such as East 
Asian countries.  
 
There is a suggestion that the US should be more positively engaging with China’s economic 
activity regardless of the alleged hegemonic transition and power conflict. Most specifically, 
for the Asia-Pacific region, its regional structure has gradually shifted from Japan-centred to 
China-centred, the predominant influence of the US notwithstanding. Although from the 
perspective of economic development, the Asian regime seems to be China-centred, regional 
cooperation still faces several obstacles. The biggest one is the China-Japan relationship where 
nationalism sets the key tone – while Japan denies China’s regional leadership, it also feels 
impuissant as its strongest ally, the US, is excluded from most Asian economic cooperative 
agendas like the ASEAN+3 regime. Nonetheless, China would enjoy America’s company as it 
would bring an even bigger market for trading; therefore, the future for the East Asian regime 
should extend to the north, with China’s international influence being less relevant in a list of 
mutual economic interests (Ahn, 2004). 
 
By referring to Martin Wright, Clark (2011) argues that there is a distinction between 
hegemony and primacy – what China is pursuing may be primacy rather than hegemony, and 
military confrontation will be excluded from the rise of China. This view coincides with the 
‘peaceful rise’ argument presented by many Chinese academics (e.g. Zheng, 2005; Yan, 2014). 
What was observed as the US hegemony includes unprecedented material power, such as GDP, 
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military expenditure, reserve, and trade volume; although China is closing the gap in terms of 
these economic parameters. However, this does not equal China closing in as the next hegemon 
because it still lacks significant soft power. Furthermore, the remaining heat of US dominance 
persists, meaning that the US will maintain its primacy for another half-century.  
 
Overall, in this section above, the literature on the internal foundations of and external impact 
of the economic rise of China has been reviewed. Despite the intense discussion on China’s 
economic development and its implications, existing literature cannot decide in consensus what 
China’s development means to the world or how other countries should react to it. This may 
be mainly because of a lack of consistent understanding of the nature of China’s rising power. 
By framing my analysis of the rise of China in terms of core concepts from Susan Strange’s 
work on hegemony, themes and insights introduced through this literature are systematically 
brought together. While early work explored the factors contributing to the rise of China, such 
as manufacturing and trade, the increasing importance of financial aspects to continuing 
economic growth has not been stressed enough. Therefore, this thesis specifically develops a 
focus on China’s finance and production structures with a systematic analysis to provide a more 
up-to-date comprehensive understanding of China’s rising power in the context of hegemonic 
transition. 
 
2.2. International Security and the Rise of China 
 
A second prominent focus in the existing literature on the rise of China seeks to explore issues 
of international security. While most countries cut down military expenditure following WWII, 
China has been actively building up its arsenal, for example, independently researching and 
developing its own fighter jets (Ikenberry, 2008). The key debate in much literature over 
China’s growing military strength is what China intends to do next, and how others responded 
to this growing power. Against the backdrop of such mixed information, this thesis adopts the 
disaggregate approach to analyse the internal and external foundations of China’s growing 
power which its military and diplomatic strength rests upon. 
 
Amongst this strand of literature on China’s security, two aspects have been developed to 
examine China’s rising power – one looks at the extent to which China and the US influence 
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subordinate states, such as East Asia countries, and the other considers whether a direct military 
conflict will occur between the two. Each of these aspects is also written from the perspectives 
of different actors around the world, among which the most involved are the US and East Asia. 
The overall insight is that economic factors have been playing an increasingly important role 
in other countries’ China policy. Although there used to be confrontation and although it is 
unclear what China’s intention now is, most contemporary scholars agree to emphasise the 
consideration of economic benefits over foreign policy and military action, both for great 
powers and subordinate states. Reviewing this strand of the literature reveals a relatively 
diminishing role of security in the study of hegemonic power and ambiguity in perceiving 
China’s rising military power. 
 
The majority of the literature studying the rise of China writes from the perspective of US 
foreign policy. The inevitable decline of the US alongside the relentless rise of China has led 
to military tensions which could potentially hinder the US-China relationship. The core of the 
debate over the China-US security issue contains two themes, a direct confrontation between 
the two and conflicts via agents such as other Asia-Pacific states. 
 
Looking back to the late 1990s, China’s military conflict with the US emerged as the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) carried out missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait and the US bombed 
the Chinese embassy in the former Yugoslavia. The two countries became bitterly hostile. The 
US government believed that rising China would be a long-term security threat to the 
hegemonic power of the US, and therefore, allied with Taiwan via arms transferring in order 
to check China’s forces. Publications by the Chinese PLA also showed that a plan was needed 
against the US (Johnston, 2003). He (2009) notes that despite the historical hostility, there is a 
dynamic balance between China and the US, with the US holding the initiative – because China 
is more concerned about internal unity and stability for economic development. 
 
Chung (2016) summarises a few schools of thought on the US-China relationship that hold 
different opinions on China’s intentions and whether a US-China confrontation is inevitable. 
At the moment, believing China’s rising power is leading to a more assertive China in the 
Pacific region, the US is seeking more active and frequent military deployment with Singapore 
and Australia, as well as deepening defensive cooperation with others like Japan and the 
Philippines. The US is also putting more of its budget and investment into weapons and the 
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army for a potential air-sea battle. East Asian countries’ fear regarding China and the US is, in 
fact, largely due to China’s unclear presentation of its intentions.  
 
As Chung (Ibid.) concludes, factors such as ancient China historically being predominant in 
Asia, China’s challenge over the South China Sea and Diaoyu Island, and China’s provoking 
projection of its military might, lead to the impression of an assertively rising China. Before 
China can prove its strategic intention and its official stance towards the international 
community, however, the future of Asia in the context of a rising China is uncertain. Yet, as 
the global environment is constantly changing, and with even greater potential economic 
interests at stake, the military conflict between China and the US is only part of the picture of 
the US-China relationship. 
 
While China is situated around neighbours who are not completely welcoming due to territorial 
and economic interest conflicts, the influence of the US military is often introduced to Asia by 
these neighbours to counterbalance China’s growing power. Furthermore, the US prefers its 
role unchanged as both a Pacific and Atlantic power. It is unwise for the US and China to 
escalate economic competition into political hostility, as the Brzezinski (2013) criticises the 
formation of TPP without China and RCEP without the US. Both the US and China should see 
the rise of China as an opportunity for further mutual benefits rather than an arms race or 
military confrontation.  
 
The fear that China will turn its economic growth into political and military power is reasonable. 
It can be explained by power transition theory and empirical studies on great power (Kennedy, 
1988). However, since 2001, the consensus on the security issue of anti-terrorism has put China 
and the US in the same interest group, with the Western emphasis on the ‘China Threat’ no 
longer a major issue. Meanwhile, China itself has repeatedly stressed its firm choice for a 
peaceful rise. Most importantly, the case of China’s rising power exposes an ambiguity of 
concepts in the field of international relations – how to define power, status quo power, 
revisionist power, and the international community. Studies on the rise of China should thus 
be conducted impartially and practically (Callahan, 2005).  
 
As for US foreign policy directed at the rise of China, offensive realist John Mearsheimer was 
criticised for his understanding of state behaviour and his suggestion that the US should try its 
best to prevent the rise of China because as soon as China gathers enough economic power, it 
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would transfer it into military might to dominant Asia (Mearsheimer, 2001). As it is difficult 
to determine China’s intention and to tell the difference between offensive and defensive 
military power, Mearsheimer (2010) insists that the US should spare the best effort to contain 
China’s growth. In response to his argument, Jonathan Kirshner (2012) stated that the 
theoretical foundation Mearsheimer based his argument on was fundamentally flawed – that is, 
offensive realism is merely normative, and the prediction does not match reality. The way great 
powers make choices is always uncertain and contingent, which allows room for manoeuvre. 
This means that the security strategy of great powers in the context of hegemonic shift can be 
extremely dynamic. 
 
Furthermore, China and the US are economically interdependent. In the end, military conflict 
is always balanced out by economic interest. Preventing the rise of China would also harm US 
interests. Rather, ‘the key lies in channelling the burgeoning Chinese economic clout into paths 
consistent with U.S. goals in the region’ (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, 2006:39). While most 
discussions focus on China’s exports and economic size, little attention is paid to the capacity 
and contribution of the Chinese import market. With all elements considered, a full-blown 
confrontation is a completely undesirable approach for the US to choose (Kirshner, 2012).  
 
Some scholars particularly seek answers through theoretical writings, specifically by turning 
to Power Transition Theory and trying to identify China’s role and intention in the China-US 
relationship dilemma. With the intellectual development and more complicated dynamics 
involved in the issue of rising China, there is no definite conclusion as to whether China will 
or will not become a security threat.  
 
In theory, if hegemonic war should take place, Power Transition Theory states that two 
requirements must be met – the emerging power’s growth should be driven by internal 
development and a global order that is shaped by the hegemon (Organski, 1958). These two 
conditions are questionable in the case of rising China. Furthermore, another prerequisite for 
war between hegemonic powers is the rising power being unsatisfied with the existing regime 
– a counterexample of this condition is the transition between Britain and the US (Lemke and 
Tammen, 2003), but it is unclear if China is a dissatisfied power, something which will be 
reviewed in the next section. Because ‘theories of hegemonic stability and power transition 
have been built on the largely unchallenged assumption that the United States acts as a global 
economic stabilizer in times of crisis’, the same theories may not be totally suitable for 
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analysing the case of rising China and its questionable hegemonic ascendance (Kim and Gates, 
2015:223). 
 
In addition, Chinese politician and scholars have stated that Chinese people rarely want to 
challenge the US for world supremacy; they merely hope that China can be rich and be 
respected by the international community, as is the US. The rise of China may make the Asia-
Pacific region more peaceful (Wen, 2003; Xu, 2004). After all, China’s intention is peace, 
because a vibrant economy can only thrive in a peaceful international environment. Contrary 
to what is generally believed, that is, that China is a security threat, Yan Xuetong argues that 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is the US that has become the unchallenged and 
uncontrolled superpower. The danger of this unipolar configuration is that the US is getting 
more impatient and want to solve things quickly by using military power, for example, is the 
1998 Iraq War. Therefore, China is a growing power that can constrain the excessive power of 
the US and thus maintain peace (Yan, 2001). 
 
Besides the discussion on US-China security conflict, the competition between China and other 
East Asian states composes another major interest in studying the rise of China, with some 
studies exploring security concerns over China from the perspectives of East Asia, including 
Northeast and Southeast Asian countries. The response from East Asia, as secondary states in 
the existing regime, towards China’s growing power can be very different from that of the US.  
 
If war is inevitable, it is likely to occur between China and its neighbouring countries, and erupt 
over disputed territory, such as Diaoyu Island, the South China Sea, and the Southwest border. 
Furthermore, China has been suspected of irresponsibly selling weapons to countries that 
include Pakistan and Algeria, which could destabilise certain regions. On the other hand, it is 
understandable why China is behaving so assertively. China was once great and ancient, 
however, in the intervening centuries following the Qing Dynasty, it has suffered great losses 
in terms of lives, materials, and territory. Considering the social dimension, even if the Chinese 
leader decided to let go of all its territorial claims, the Chinese people are unlikely to swallow 
such bitterness (Kristof, 1993). The ambitious nation of China flags a destabilising future that 
follows the pattern of previous hegemonic transitions (Organski, 1958).  
 
In theory, smaller states respond situationally to a rising power, according to traditional realist 
and neo-realist approaches, while others argue that secondary states are likely to balance any 
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rising power because of the archaic nature of international politics. There are also opinions on 
state alignment as a factor that affects secondary states’ choices, meaning that ideology, 
multilateral institutions, and common cultural influences, apart from economic and material 
interests, determine if secondary states perceive the rising power as a threat. Johnston (2008) 
notes that, following a constructivist approach, socialisation and social interaction can affect 
an actor’s interests and hence determine China’s behaviour. 
 
Overall, although East Asian states are more dependent on China’s economy, countries like 
Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore, are strengthening military cooperation with the US 
(Ross, 2006). Furthermore, zooming in to regional power distribution, specifically in the case 
of Japan, capacity, referring to national power, and intention are the major two influential 
factors. This is because Japan, similar to the US, has a leadership conflict with China, existing 
at the regional rather than global level. Nevertheless, from the bigger global picture, the US-
China relationship has emerged as a stabiliser for the China-Japan relationship (Lee, 2015).  
 
The overall observation of East Asia is that, first of all, regardless of China’s intention, the 
Asian region undeniably engages with and relies heavily on China’s deepening market, looking 
for the equilibrium between economic gain from China and security gain from the US. 
Secondly, countries choose differently when determining where the equilibrium sits. For more 
advanced countries, like Japan, Taiwan and Mongolia, they are tactically allied with the US as 
balancing China’s growing power, whereas for some developing states, such as Laos, North 
Korea and Myanmar, ‘bandwagoning’ with an emerging power to challenge the existing 
hegemon seems to be a much more preferred option. There are also a number of nations staying 
delicately in the middle, like South Korea and Australia, adjusting their stances according to 
the actual circumstances (White, 2005; Kang, 2007).  
 
This difference is due to the various extent of security concerns a country has in relation to 
China’s rising – those with long-standing territorial and political disputes often choose to ally 
with the US and those countries with fewer disputes but more trade dependency choose to 
cooperate. Lastly, the relationship between China and the US, whether turning more hostile or 
more cooperative, can greatly change the dynamics that exist between China and East Asian 
countries, even across the whole Asia-Pacific region (Chung, 2009).  
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Other articles see China’s growing military strength through the dramatic growth of economic 
capacity and are concerned with the security issues related to China. Banlaoi (2003) argues that 
China’s rising power is a threat to US national security, whereas some believe that it also has 
great implications for other countries and regions, such as Southeast Asia. For example, the 
relationship between China and ASEAN is described as one between partners in competition. 
China is deemed as a great economic opportunity for ASEAN, but on the other hand, is also 
believed by the ASEAN leaders to be seeking military expansion in Asia. Security concerns in 
Southeast Asia are mainly caused by ideological disagreements between China and ASEAN, 
as well as territorial disputes. However, this article does not explain in detail the competition 
surrounding influence and the military that exists between China and the US or local 
government over Southeast Asia, neither does it give clear implications regarding the rise of 
China to Southeast Asia security issues, instead merely stating that China plays a significant 
role in these issues. 
 
As is evident from the volume of literature on the topic, the security and military dimensions 
to the rise of China has attracted significant scholarly attention over recent years. However, 
underpinning much of this literature there is a common opinion that economic interest can 
counterbalance concerns over military and security issues. With much more interests from 
multiple aspects involved, states tend to approach security with cautions, using diplomacy to 
avoid direct conflict (e.g. Brzezinski, 2013; White, 2005; Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, 2006). 
For the case of China, economic strength determines military strength, while, mutual economic 
and financial benefits reduce military conflict (Breslin, 2007). This study follows other work 
that privileges the economic foundations of the rise of China. Indeed, as is made clear in 
Chapter 3, this is a privileging that is present in IPE literature on hegemony, including in Susan 
Strange’s work around which the later analysis is framed. 
 
2.3. China as a Global Leader 
 
The third strand of literature on the rise of China explores the topic of hegemonic transition 
more critically by turning away from economic and military factors to identify China’s role in 
international regime building. Commonly, this literature explores the topic by offering a 
comparison between the government of China’s approach to global governance and ideology 
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on the one hand, and that of the US and contemporary Western-dominated system. This strand 
of literature shares a common interest in China’s participation in the international community 
and global governance, but the conclusions vary as different definitions of hegemony, implicit 
or explicit definitions, are adopted.  
 
Overall, across this literature, it is suggested that there is a decreased emphasis on military 
power and the fading prospect of full-scale hegemonic war; this is because globalisation brings 
countries closer to each other via economic activities, such as trade, and capital flow. Other 
elements like communication, culture, and global challenges such as the environmental issues 
also urge countries, especially those competing for great power status, to cooperate for mutual 
interest through the structure of international institutions. Meanwhile, the hierarchy within 
international institutions reflects power conflicts and struggle between states – for example, 
the dominant state can often insert its universal values and ideology into the structure of an 
institution. This has especially caught academics’ attention as China has been intensively 
pushing its ‘belt and road’ initiatives in recent years (e.g. Ferdinand, 2016; Callahan, 2016; Li 
et al., 2015; Huang, 2016; Fallon, 2015). With these insights in mind, this research extends 
Strange’s original conceptualisation of structural powers to include the external dimensions 
where interactions among states, as well as between states and inter-state institutions, are 
examined.  
 
Direct comparison between China and the US can often be found in many pieces of literature. 
For example, Hu and Men (2002) and Hu et al. (2015) put forward the concept of 
‘comprehensive national power’ attempting the make a holistic evaluation. This approach 
included 17 elements from 8 general perspectives while each element is given a specific weight. 
The conclusion unsurprisingly stated that China is been increasingly closing the gap between 
itself and the US; however, the selection of elements leaves many open questions, as 
‘comprehensive national power’ by Hu and his colleague focuses on strategic resources. It has 
not explored how efficiently and effectively a state can utilise the resources, what can be the 
performance outcome of such resources, and, most importantly, there is no theoretical 
foundation of IPE scholarship to validate this approach. 
 
Some of the literature considers that China’s embedded role in the global economy makes the 
prospect of a peaceful transition highly possible. With China being an increasing heavyweight 
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in the global economy, its activities concern the whole international economic regime, 
especially in terms of its participation in many organisations.  
 
As China’s intense trade and investment makes it highly influential in terms of the development 
strategy of almost all developing countries, Gu, Humphrey, and Messner (2008) analyse 
China’s engagement with the WTO to seek the patterns behind China’s behaviour within 
international organisations. It is concluded that China’s interest in the WTO is to access the 
global market, make use of the dispute settlement mechanism, and build its international image. 
It shows little interest in siding with anyone or contributing to the improvement of the regime, 
even though the WTO expects that China, as the biggest emerging market, could play a more 
active part in coordinating negotiations between developing and developed countries during 
the Doha round. Scott and Wilkinson (2013) drew to a similar conclusion that China shows 
little interest in altering the existing WTO structure; instead, it is an advocate of the status quo. 
Bishop and Zhang (2019) also pointed out that China is relunctant to lead the WTO, despite its 
assertive behaviour in other regimes. They added that this is because of the decline of 
multilateral trade system, and the fruitless Doha Round further disillusioned developing and 
emerging countries.  
 
Nevertheless, the arena of the WTO is rather inclusive with countries of all levels cooperating 
for common institutional building. China’s participation in the WTO shows that the rise of 
China is inevitable, which is same as it is in other international organisations. In the context of 
globalisation, old and new great powers can align their interests and agree on the elements of 
a new international order (deLisle and Goldstein, 2017). The existence of international 
intuitions has now become a major approach in terms of coordinating between countries, 
especially between great powers.  
 
Many others discuss China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy using the case of ‘One Belt 
One Road’ (OBOR) – Ferdinand (2016) comments that apart from securing trade relationship, 
the OBOR initiative is also an ambitious infrastructural development plan for the relatively 
poor west China and outside China, a ‘Marshall plan’ for China. Geopolitically speaking, the 
OBOR also establish rapport with strategic allies and promote China’s naval power. Callahan 
(2016) believes that the OBOR initiative is to integrate Eurasia, the South Pacific, and East 
Africa into a China-centred community of common interests, a supra-regional regime under 
Chinese hegemony.  Sit et al. (2017) interpreted the OBOR initiative from a finance perspective, 
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suggesting that the founding of AIIB and the funding of infrastructural development abroad is 
China’s strategy of outputting excessive capital, resolving overcapacity, and establishing 
China-led international financial regime. Sit et al. also expressed worries on the similarity 
between OBOR and pre-WWI Europe where stronger states try to dominate others industrially 
and militarily.  
 
However, according to the existing literature on OBOR, it is not completely clear what OBOR 
refers to – as the name indicates that it is an initiative, not a specific project. It is 
multidimensional, as existing literature tend to analyse it from production, trade, infrastructure, 
finance, culture, environment, and security aspects (Li et al., 2015; Swaine, 2015; Wang, 2016; 
Rolland, 2017; Du and Zhang, 2018). As a focal point of China study, the OBOR attracts 
attention from scholars and contributes to a vast range of literature. There is also more literature 
focusing on assessing OBOR – whether it is ‘successful’ from many different perspectives for 
different players (Casarini, 2016; Huang, 2016; Herrero and Xu, 2017; Lee and Kim, 2017). 
To unpack the multiple dimensions of OBOR and to truly understand China’s foreign policy 
under the Belt and Road initiative, it is necessary to look at the foundations of China’s structural 
power where the OBOR initiative is laid upon. As this thesis will study China’s power from 
the finance and production structure, the elements of the OBOR initiative, namely the AIIB 
and China’s trade and infrastructural development scheme, will be included in the 
corresponding chapter as part of China’s disaggregated power. 
 
The literature on this theme also points out China’s allied role with developing countries in 
global governance and its capability to shape a new world order (Breslin, 2011; Kupchan, 2012; 
Lanteigne, 2005). For example, the formation of G20 creating a new balance of power between 
developing state and developed ones. During the mid-2000s, the term ‘Beijing Consensus’ was 
put forward against the backdrop of the disillusioning ‘Washington Consensus’, because when 
global crises occurred during the past few decades, China’s hyper economic growth mostly 
went uninterrupted. It is considered that China’s ability to withstand crises is attributable to its 
political and economic structure where a level of central control persists in order to avoid an 
over-liberalised economy (Hung, 2008; Bowles, 2014).  
 
To raise the issue to a higher level, some scholars try to explore the world-system paradigm 
based on Giovanni Arrighi’s influence (e.g. Arrighi, 2005a; Arrighi, 2005b; Arrighi and Silver, 
1999). It is concluded that China’s development follows a completely different set of values 
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than the West. Unlike in the US with hegemonic power rising from the capital and energy-
intensive sectors, China possesses a historical ‘Industrious Revolution’ growth model. 
Although nowadays China actively engages in the global financial system, its market economy 
and initial rise of power were birthed through labour-intensive manufacturing. This 
fundamental difference in growth model determines that China’s rising power can never rest 
upon on the same value system as the West. Arrighi states that capitalism is a representation 
of a particular social class, but that a market economy is determined by the state, making it a 
political decision taken by the government. The type of economy does not definitely coincide 
with the ruling class. China is an example of a non-capitalist nation embracing market economy, 
without capitalists being the dominant social class (Robinson, 2011). This example shows that 
the choice of transforming into a market economy represents the interest of the state but not a 
particular class. While the West retreat from the predominant economic position, China’s 
development model can be referred to for other developing countries with a historically non-
capitalism-oriented economy. 
 
The ideological and social dimensions of China’s rising power have drawn significant attention. 
Shambaugh (2013) has argued that China’s hegemonic presence is paradoxical; although 
economic and military seem to spring up, its diplomatic influence is not growing 
correspondingly. When it comes to presenting leadership, China is self-interested, risk-averse, 
and reactive. As Shambaugh agrees that China is indeed a global economic power, 
conventionally evaluating from the aspects of China’s global trade position, its role in energy 
markets, its outward direct investment, and its development assistance, he attributed China 
failing to be a global leader to ideological factors relating to willingness to lead, and internal 
conflicts. Shambaugh’s studies focus more on the social-political dimension while overlooking 
the ever-changing foundational elements of China’s power. Furthermore, recent statistics prove 
that China’s economic power is, in fact, more vulnerable than what Shambaugh believed.     
 
Shambaugh (2014) also argued that China’s rising power is merely a ‘paper tiger’ due to 
internal weakness. Similarly, another article by Shambaugh (2015) focuses on the ‘soft’ aspect 
of power and states that this area of development is very unbalanced which hinders China’s 
pursuit of big power status. Shambaugh’s approach is to examine China through overall five 
areas – international diplomacy, military capacity, cultural presence, economic power, and 
domestic elements; and in regard to each of this pillar, he argues that China is not demonstrating 
leadership. For example, one of these arguments on China’s cultural output failing to set global 
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cultural trend is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, big-name Hollywood productions are 
now being acquired or partially acquired by Chinese investors. When commenting on China’s 
economic growth, the article relies upon a broad-based claim that China focuses on low-end 
consumer goods manufacturing rather than technological innovation and investment. The 
argument lacks a degree of nuance in its treatment of the empirical subject. In addition, 
conceptually, we are not provided with a detailed framework for analysing power and power 
transition.  
 
Shirk (2007) argues China is a fragile superpower. Heavily focusing on the ‘soft power’ 
dimension and social factors, she acknowledges the economic and military strength of China 
but considers the fragility comes from internal social stability. Chinese leaders have a deep 
sense of domestic insecurity. Echoing this opinion, Callahan (2015) suggests that China’s 
weakness as a global power is due to its negative soft power and people’s doubt in their identity. 
This argument is true in a way, however, does not capture the full essence of China’s leadership 
status. The Communist Party secure its leadership by buying people off with rapid economic 
development, meaning that as long as the economy goes on well, the regime would most likely 
remain stable (Dickson, 2016). As China keeps shifting, transforming, and reforming its 
economic policies and structure, one would have the reason to believe that this country is 
resilient and adapting quickly to contemporary conditions (Shevchenko, 2004). Therefore, the 
internal instability argument is only valid on the basis of China’s economy failing. This 
research will conclude in the later-on chapters that the economic strength of China is still the 
major reason China yet to reach its hegemonic peak.  
 
While scholars mentioned above remain doubtful on China’s non-economic power, Beeson 
(2009) argues that China can add value to the existing global order by comparing China’s rising 
power with the nature of US hegemony. Beeson defines the key to US hegemonic success as 
American ideas and values, all widely distributed through the establishment of the global 
financial regime. It is the repeating emphasis on these values via formal and informal 
institutions, such as Bretton Woods institutions and the ‘Washington Consensus’, that 
consolidate US hegemony. Using a similar approach, China’s growth is not limited to its 
material power – it is also actively seeking influence through its foreign policy and regime 
building, although in a much ‘softer’ way. For example, China has engaged with ASEAN 
regarding agendas to establish a free trade network and partakes in other indigenous forums.  
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Yan (2011) compliments this opinion by arguing that China’s rise received an extra boost 
during the 2008 financial crisis because it showed superior ability in withstanding such a 
disastrous impact. If China keeps up the momentum for continuing economic growth, it will 
be capable of leading the world out of the current crisis (Bowles, 2014). Yan predicts that China 
may surpass the US in terms of economic size by 2025, and by 2050 catch up with the US 
regarding comprehensive national power; therefore, a change in international norms may 
happen between 2026 and 2050. However, Beeson still concludes that China has little impact 
on the current US hegemonic regime nor is a hegemonic transition likely to take place. This is 
because China has, in fact, abandoned ‘socialism in all but its name’ (Beeson, 2009:108) and 
instead adopted the capitalist economy, which marks out the US hegemonic power; the so-
called ‘Beijing Consensus’ is merely a blurry vision without ideological or coalition support.  
 
There is clear evidence that China is catching up with the US regarding technological 
advancement and GDP at an incredible speed. China’s predetermined agenda and intentions 
are shaped by the social group in power, and as China’s power continues to grow, its ambition 
will correspondingly expand. This means that the US should not only be concerned about China 
from an economic perspective but also from an ideological one, in terms of its foreign policy 
(Art, 2010). However, it is unclear if China is committed to Western liberalism – this is back 
to the discussion on ‘intention’. To get back to the basic elements, the rise of China does not 
necessarily mark the end of US leadership, as long as the US can work on strengthening the 
existing liberal global order and embrace globalisation. China may take over the US and 
eventually become the largest economy, however, it is much harder for China to overtake the 
whole Western regime on its own (Ikenberry, 2008). Similar literature also reflect on China’s 
participation in current international institutions, arguing that China should not be simply 
identified as a status quo or revisionist state due to insufficient conceptualisation. In some case, 
China is identified as reform-minded status quo country (Ferdinand and Wang, 2013). Neither 
is there clear evidence that China’s foreign policy endeavours to create a multipolarity 
international community to replace US unipolarity (Johnston, 2003). Ideas in this strand of 
literature conflict each other, yet again, due to the blurry definition of ‘hegemonic power’ and 
the conjecture of China’s ‘intention’, which, therefore, should not be considered as a reliable 
variable to measure China’s rising power. 
 
Overall, literature on China’s engagement in constructing global order points out the role of 
international regimes and institutions in relation to the power conflict between China and the 
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US. The US still maintains its leadership on behalf of the West via the establishment of Bretton 
Woods institutions and liberal-capital values. The US has the ability to shape the global 
political regime, where the ascending China has to react and make strategic choices. Therefore, 
the US could manipulate the current international regime, making it ‘easier to join and harder 
to overturn’ through the building of institutions. By welcoming China into this liberal regime, 
the result could be that China shows great interest in accessing the global capitalist system as 
well as desires to maintain this system; this is because its own interests are protected by these 
norms, for example, trade rules and monetary policy. This theme is transposed into the analysis 
of China’s engagement with international financial institutions in Chapter 5. 
 
2.4. Summary 
 
The existing literature shows a complex picture of the rise of China with many mixed messages. 
Three areas of interest are explored surrounding this issue, with the scholarship focusing on 
economics, security, and global leadership. The general observation of this chapter is that there 
is widespread disagreement in the existing literature on the rise of China, with competing 
interpretations of the extent and nature of China's contemporary power.  
 
The existence of these competing interpretations suggests that developments in China may be 
variegated, with differential patterns across different sectors and different aspects. Debates 
persist, exploring whether China’s economic growth is sustaining or worrying? Whether China 
is a status quo or a revisionist? Whether China challenges or commits to the existing global 
regime? Further to this disagreement, much literature develops arguments taking ‘the rise of 
China’ as a prerequisite, without clearly defining and evaluating relevant terms such as ‘power’, 
‘hegemony’, and ‘leadership’. This lack of shared concepts and approach helps explain why 
these studies often reach competing conclusions. Hence, it is necessary to conceptualise 
hegemonic power in a disaggregated manner to construct a more comprehensive understanding 
as to what actually compose the rise of China.  
 
Literature on economic rise usefully focuses on production structure, with individual 
contributions typically emphasising internal foundations (e.g. Wang and Yao, 2003; Patten, 
2010; Putterman, 1995; Breslin 2007) or external impact (e.g. Adhikari and Yang, 2002; Chen, 
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2009; Bowles et al., 2016; Ahn, 2004). There is a broad-based agreement that China’s power 
initially rose from the economic pillar. This thesis develops these focuses by systematically 
framing the analysis using Strange’s approach of conceptualising hegemony and structural 
power. This thesis also introduces an extended focus on finance, which is driven partly by the 
gap in the existing literature and partly by the analytic approach of Strange on which this thesis 
draws. The analysis of China’s economic performance will also present updated statistics and 
information to accurately depict the current status of China’s rising power. 
 
Literature on security points out that conflict and confrontation is not the key theme of China’s 
rising power. Shirk (2017) notes that provoking a trade war, an arms race, or even a military 
confrontation means a great loss to both China and the US. The significantly common opinion 
in this strand of literature is that the benefit of China’s rising economy can change other 
countries’ attitudes and foreign policy towards China (Brzezinski, 2013; White, 2005; Nanto 
and Chanlett-Avery, 2006; Kirshner, 2012). This strand of literature is more convinced of the 
idea that China is more an opportunity than a threat. Although China indeed poses a security 
challenge to other countries, contemporary IPE issues are privileging the effect of economic 
interests on foreign policy. This thesis incorporates this insight by refining Strange’s four-
dimension structural power into a two-pillar approach which better serves the particular case 
of the rise of China.  
 
Literature on global governance and leadership focuses on debating whether China will commit 
to or challenge the current Western-oriented international regime, without pinpointing the link 
between hegemonic rise and international regime (e.g. Robinson, 2011; Hung, 2008; Beeson, 
2009; Ikenberry, 2008). While the topic of China’s participation in and influence on global 
governance remains an area of interest, this thesis incorporates the systematic analysis of this 
topic under the analytical framework of economic power with a clear conceptualisation of 
hegemony. 
 
While much of the existing literature tends to focus on a specific dimension or theme of China’s 
rising power, this thesis adopts and extends Susan Strange’s framework of structural power to 
include a systematic study on the internal and external dimensions of the foundations of 
China’s rising power. 
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3. Understanding Hegemony and Hegemonic Transition: a 
Two-Pillar Approach 
 
The issue of hegemonic transition has attracted much attention and debate in the field of 
International Political Economy. With early work focusing on hegemonic cycles associated 
with British and American leadership of the global economy, attention has recently begun to 
explore the issue of the rise of China. Although a vast majority of the existing literature has 
analysed US hegemonic decline, seeking evidence for hegemonic transition, until very recently, 
fewer have shed light on the other side, the growing power of China. The thesis overall aims 
to present a systematic analysis of the rising power of China, exploring the nature of China's 
economic power in the context of hegemonic transition. The main question asks, what, 
ultimately, is China’s rising power when put in the context of ‘hegemonic transition’, and 
applies an analytical framework based on Susan Strange’s approach.  
 
This chapter presents a review of key literature on understanding what hegemony is and how 
to conceptualise power in a way suitable to study the rise of China. Overall, it is suggested that 
although there exists a vast range of literature on a hegemonic theme, the conceptualisation of 
the nature of power remains vague and ambiguous. There is a need to build up an analysis to 
refine the understanding of power, and hence, provide analytic traction over the ‘rise of China’ 
and to critically evaluate China’s hegemonic ascendancy. By building upon Susan Strange’s 
theory of structural power, this thesis develops a two-pillar approach and apply this to the case 
of rising China. 
 
The structure of this chapter is developed through seven sections. The first four sections review 
the popular theoretical foundations for understanding hegemony through existing literature. 
This includes a basic introduction and interpretation of hegemony through the mainstream 
approaches of international political economy and corresponding empirical studies.  
 
The first section is a review of the relationship between hegemony and military power, using 
Spanish hegemony and Pax Britannica during the Age of Discovery as illustrations. The second 
section looks into hegemonic stability theory that suggests hegemony has the power to provide 
stability, especially from an economic aspect. This section will include a review on literature 
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focusing on US hegemony as supplementary material. The third section discusses the liberal 
term of complex interdependency which stresses states’ freedom of choice to reach an optimal 
result. It also suggests that power is a combination of hard and soft, whilst hegemony is 
sufficient but not necessary to form transnational cooperation. A case considering Japan’s post-
war reconstruction will be introduced to illustrate this liberal stance. The fourth section 
introduces the interpretation of power in critical theory. Scholarship in critical theory argues 
that power rests within ideology and values. Critical theory also advocates that states are not 
entities that possess power, but instead this is held by the social classes.  
 
The fifth and sixth sections move on to discuss Structural Power Theory by Susan Strange and 
the analytical framework developed for this research which is based upon it. Although 
hegemony theories in the previous sections have identified several manifestations of 
hegemonic power, they cannot construct a practical approach to operationalise this study.  
Structural Power Theory is a more resilient and empirically focused approach suggested by 
Strange to analyse power where power is disaggregated into different dimensions for 
examination and evaluation. Strange also advocates that for every different case, there can be 
a different set of structures applied. 
 
Adhering to this principle, this chapter introduces a two-pillar approach to the study of China’s 
rising power, which represents an operationalisation of Strange’s theory. This two-pillar 
operationalisation provides an analytic tool to comprehensively analyse and measure the 
uneven status of China’s power. This framework consists of an analysis of China’s finance and 
production structures which underpin the controversial status of China’s hegemonic rise. Each 
of these dimensions is examined via their internal aspects and their external implications. 
Finally, this chapter will offer an explanation of the methodology of this research.  
 
3.1. Early European Hegemony and Military Predominance 
 
A vast range of existing literature have put effort into exploring the issue of hegemonic 
transition; in particular, some have taken the example of major power shift cases to identify 
the component of hegemonic power, which provides a valuable reference for this research. 
Within literature exploring hegemony and international political economy, a prominent strand 
aims at using studies from the period of European expansion (from the 15th century) to draw 
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insights into the topic. These literature are briefly reviewed below. While usefully highlighting 
the destabilising consequences that can accompany hegemonic transition and pointing in 
general terms towards the importance of domestic capacity as a foundation of hegemonic 
emergence, the pre-eminent importance placed on military capacity reduces the direct 
relevance of this literature to this study of the hegemonic rise of China. 
 
Paul Kennedy (1988) considers the fate of Spain as a hegemon was secured by two major 
reasons – one being the costly wars between European countries and the other that the 
Habsburg family had too many enemies. To further explain this argument, Kennedy suggests 
that the transition between Spain and its successor was determined by the economic 
performances of them both – and this applies to other rising and falling hegemons in history as 
well. This explanation quite obviously confirms the approach of a realist theory whereby 
economic and military powers, also known as hard powers, are the decisive factor (although 
Kennedy never claims himself to be a realist). The Armada was the key to Spain’s success 
against other European economies, and the silver plundered from the American continents 
continuously sponsored the expansion of the Spanish navy. Based on this interpretation of 
history, it is straightforward that Spanish hegemony was built upon military predominance and 
the subsequence accumulation of resources.  
 
On the other hand, the reason for this hegemony transiting to Britain is also largely related to 
the military. Hegemons should be aware of the ‘imperial overstretch’ when excessive 
expansion overseas finally bankrupts the country.  Excessive expansion brought about the 
heavy burden of maintaining both the empire’s internal and external structures. Signs of decline 
appeared when production could no longer keep up with the Spanish military operation, and 
royal-funded British pirates made the situation worse for the hegemon. Therefore, based on 
Kennedy’s justification, military strength, as well as the economic capability supporting it, is 
considered a key factor in hegemonic power during earlier centuries. 
 
Geoffrey Parker criticises Kennedy’s suggestion, stating that Spain’s failure was ideological. 
The Spanish king was obsessed with religion and dynastic aims that were soon exhausted by 
the huge amount of wealth collected from the colonies (Parker, 1998). Adding to Parker’s 
argument, Tenace writes: ‘Philip II lost sight of the big picture and the Armadas became 
nothing more than unnecessary and wasteful diversions’ (Tenace, 2003:882). In contrast, the 
British monarch enforced more pro-capitalism policies which enabled the quick takeover of 
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the hegemonic position. It can be argued that it was strategic choices of the two countries that 
determined this transition, and the choices of that time were based on ideologies and the 
personal belief of the king or queen. Moving on to the present time, a new voice can be heard 
criticising Kennedy’s ‘realist’ analysis of the rise and fall of power, arguing that there should 
be more factors such as national identity taken into account (Nau, 2001). However, very little 
information could be found on this topic. Rather, most empirical studies on hegemonic 
transition show an interest in more recent shifts involving the US.  
 
In short, it is fair to argue that, to a great extent, the success of both the Spanish and the British 
regime could be directly attributed to profound military strength, but military is not the sole 
factor to determine hegemony. More recently, as historians explore further into the social and 
political complexity of the era, other correlated factors have been discussed. Overall, as 
historical evidence of this period suggests, there were multiple reasons, including the 
acquisition of resources and advanced economic structure, that led to such rapid growth in 
military forces, and which ultimately resulted in the power surge of states (Glete, 2002; Bonney, 
1995).  
 
While some contributions direct attention to the underlying socio-economic foundations of 
hegemony, this literature on early European hegemony tended to privilege the military and 
security dimensions. However, along with the changing global order and the dynamic roles 
played by states and markets, the emphasis on the military as a decisive factor of state power 
has gradually shifted away with more consideration of economic and financial dominance, as 
hegemony appears in studies focusing on more recent times. This is not to say military strength 
is no longer an element to be taken into account, but it is always accompanied by factors such 
as economic strength; the emphasis on this aspect has reduced as other dimensions take more 
weight in the overall evaluation of power. As in the following section, attention on the 
economic dimension increases when considering the literature on later hegemonic. 
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3.2. Hegemony and Economic Stability: Pax Britannica and Pax 
American 
 
Another strand of the literature conceptualises the role of hegemony in relation to the whole 
international arena in a more contemporary context, by examining the different natures of the 
post-war US hegemonic regime and its predecessor, the Pax Britannica. Initially suggested by 
Kindleberger and extended by a number of IPE scholars, this literature flags up the importance 
of a preponderant power as the stabiliser and provider of the international economic and 
financial order. It emphasises the relationship between the hegemon and the global order, rather 
than just focusing on hegemonic power.  
 
Another value of this strand of literature is the strengthening the importance of financial 
structure to power analysis, which becomes one of the rationales this thesis used when choosing 
the dimensions to examine in the research. Yet, as is demonstrated below, this literature 
presents a rather static picture of hegemonic power. It shows how power can manifest as the 
result of established hegemony rather than the dynamics of a power shift. It does not explore 
what elements power consists of, and neither is it able to provide a feasible approach to evaluate 
power as per Strange’s approach. 
 
To identify hegemonic power, this strand of literature first paves the way to understand the 
nature of the global system. As significantly flagged in neo-realist theories, hegemony is 
defined as the sole dominating power within the global economic system and is based on the 
realist belief that the nature of the international environment is anarchic. Here, states are the 
essential players in the system and they are always rational and self-interested, seeking the 
maximum benefit. States are also fearful of threats over being defeated and perishing. 
Therefore, the primary concern is surviving and self-helping (Baylis, Smith, and Owens, 2011). 
Kenneth Waltz (1979; 2008) believes there is no harmony under anarchy. In such an anarchic 
environment, it seems to realist's eyes that the difficulty of reaching agreement and cooperation 
becomes magnified. Thus, in the early 1970s, hegemonic stability theory, developed by Charles 
Kindleberger, suggested that hegemonic power is the key to the stability of the world economic 
system.  
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Kindleberger believes in a positive correlation between hegemony and economic order. When 
the hegemon becomes predominant, the economic order within the international system would 
also seem to be in good condition. By contrast, if hegemonic power declines, such a regime 
will become disordered and eventually collapse, with the eventual complete failure of 
hegemony (Kindleberger, 1981). Therefore, the existence of hegemony is vital to a global 
economic regime.  
 
The more in-depth reason for the importance of hegemonic stability is that the hegemon is able 
and willing to take over certain responsibilities, for example, being the coordinator of an 
international system or regime as well as providing certain public goods for the system 
(Kindleberger, 2013). In order to achieve cooperation and stability, there needs to be a hegemon 
playing the role of coordinator and stabiliser. Kindleberger states that in order to create and 
maintain the stability of the international order, there must be one, but only one, hegemonic 
power. The hegemon can either positively or negatively make use of its influence, regardless 
of whether it forces other subordinate members within the order to obey. 
 
Advocators of hegemonic stability theory believe that it is necessary for an international regime 
to have a hegemonic power because of the connection between hegemony and public goods 
(Wohlforth, et al., 2007). It is widely acknowledged that an open market economy contains a 
particular kind of goods known as public goods or collective goods, for example, highways, 
and lighthouses. Public goods are non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. One’s consumption of 
public goods does not decrease the amount of the same product that others can enjoy.  
 
However, because the consumption of public goods is usually free of charge, the goods are 
often insufficient and scarce unless an agent is willing to be responsible for providing a greater 
share of the costs of such goods. Alternatively, some organisations, for instance, a 
governmental department that is able to force consumers to pay for public goods, can also avoid 
the shortage of public goods. In the context of IPE, public goods exist as well. The rules and 
regulations of economic organisations, such as free trade regimes based on the principle of 
Most Favoured Nation; stable international monetary regimes that benefit all transnational 
commercial activities; and international security treaties on chemical and nuclear weapons, can 
all be considered as public goods within the domain of the international economic system 
(Kindleberger, 2013). As long as there is a stable and peaceful international order, any country, 
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regardless of it contributing money and efforts to the establishment of this order or not, can 
enjoy a peaceful and favourable environment of foreign relations and domestic development.  
 
According to Kindleberger, only a hegemon has the willingness plus the ability to provide 
public goods, including international security, a free trade regime, monetary stability, and so 
on. The country with hegemonic power prefers and guarantees to provide public goods that are 
considered as too excessive a responsibility for other countries to bear. Thus, the economic 
performance of the hegemonic country is of great concern to the functioning of the world 
economy.  
 
The hegemon is able to use its prestige and reputation to set up rules and regulations within the 
regime, defining lawful and illegal behaviour while resolving the issue of free-riding (Pedersen, 
2002). Both the Gold Standard in the late 19th century and the post-war Bretton Woods System 
are presented as powerful examples that support this explanation of hegemony. The existence 
of Britain and the US as hegemonic powers during those certain periods continuously provided 
the world with new public goods and maintained the stable liquidity of capital while forcing 
free-riders to compensate. With these efforts, hegemonic countries, performing as stabilisers 
according to this strand of literature, are able to maintain the stability of the world economy.  
 
In the early 20th century, the US dollar joined the international financial system as the US 
ratified and became a member of the Gold Standard in 1900. President Taft implemented 
‘Dollar Diplomacy’, pushing forward the strategy in competing for global monetary and 
financial hegemony across the whole American continent (Leuchtenburg, 1952; Rosenberg, 
1998). While the US had surpassed Britain in GDP, the US dollar did not affect the role of 
sterling due to the large scale of trade settlement around the world. 
 
During the interwar period, chaos and the Great Depression occurred due to Britain’s inability 
and the US unwillingness to maintain international financial stability (Kindleberger, 2013). 
After WWII, order had been restored when the US hegemony and dollar hegemony came into 
clear existence. By being geographical far away from the main battlefield, the US suffered 
much less damage from WWII compared to Britain. Moreover, by the end of World War II, 
the US accounted for producing half of the world’s manufactured goods and more than one-
third of foreign trading, with around 59 per cent of gold reserves among all countries (Cohen, 
1977). 
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The US had also become the biggest creditor in the world after WWII and finally established 
a solid foundation for the development of dollar hegemony. Backed by its economic strength, 
the US continued promoting the dominance of the dollar as an international currency and 
eventually built up the Bretton Woods system by the end of the World War II, initially taking 
it one step further and approaching world monetary and financial dominance. 
 
In general, the hegemonic shift between Britain and the US after the Second World War 
occurred for complex reasons. Ikenberry (2001) suggests the war was a direct cause of this 
transition. Being at the frontline of the European battlefield, the British nation was devastated 
when materials and resources were drained. This was the same for most other European 
countries, and therefore no one was able to take the responsibility as a hegemon and to provide 
order. The advantage of the US became extremely obvious at this time. While the war could 
be perceived as a destabiliser, a state which was able to restore or rebuild global order can be 
considered a hegemon.  
 
Meanwhile, the establishment of the IMF was in favour of the expansion of US foreign trade. 
The massive output of goods and capital led to a huge surplus of US payments with a deficit in 
other countries (Eichengreen, 2011). The dollar became extremely popular in the world 
resulting in a worldwide dollar shortage. This shortage symbolised the flourishing nature of 
dollar hegemony, and also marked the dollar as fully able to establish its hegemony within the 
world’s monetary and financial regimes. 
 
Additional insights into the role played by the hegemonic state as a stabilising force is provided 
by Helleiner and Kirshner (2009). For these scholars, hegemony also requires military power 
as a way of safeguarding economic interests, especially when economic and financial interests 
are so vital that they become the basic national value. In other words, military strength 
somehow determines whether a country has control over all the tangible and intangible 
resources mentioned above. An example of the US launching wars against oil-exportation 
countries in the Middle East can illustrate this opinion. On the other hand, the US military 
protecting allies from the Soviet threat during the Cold War also enhanced and maintained 
economic cooperation between these countries; although this military strength does not 
necessarily need to extend to worldwide dominance. 
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Literature on hegemonic stability outlines the important role played by a hegemonic state and 
outlines some mechanisms of stabilisation. It stresses the significance of hegemony in the 
stable global order as a manifestation of hegemonic power, however, it fails to suggest factors 
that can contribute to ascendant or descendant hegemonic power. The stability theory itself 
focuses on explaining the function of hegemonic power and how power is manifested, but not 
what elements make up that power. Supplementary literature besides Kindleberger’s original 
theory add that profound economic strength, military power, and the establishment of 
institutions could be factors determining the dominant position of the US dollar which 
ultimately brought some financial stability to the global regime. However, this vast range of 
literature has not reached any agreement or formed a realist approach to provide an analytical 
framework for this research. Lastly, the foundation of hegemonic stability theory itself was 
questioned and challenged recently by liberal scholars, which will be presented in the next 
section. 
 
3.3. Power and Complex Interdependence: Post-war Japan 
 
The third strand of literature explores the interplay between markets and states as an important 
dynamic in the global economy, especially as globalisation progresses. It develops on the basis 
of a similar global environment as the neo-realist hegemonic stability advocator but interprets 
states’ behaviour in a different way, the liberal way. The main idea is that the coercive power 
of a hegemon is no longer the sole element shaping international regimes; instead, cooperation 
and coordination are the key factors due to interdependency between all types of states, 
hegemonic and subordinate. There is always a certain level of instability in the contemporary 
global structure regardless of the presence of a hegemon, and the parts played by emerging 
powers and small states should not be overlooked. This literature provides the rationale for a 
more dynamic interpretation of power, however, once again it fails to clearly identify its 
composition.  
 
While Kindleberger was working on stability theory back in the 1970s, Keohane and Nye, in 
the liberal camp, introduced the idea of ‘complex interdependence’ for analysing power and 
interdependence in a global economy (Keohane and Nye, 2011). Complex interdependence is 
defined as containing three main features: multiple channels of communications, an absence of 
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hierarchy among issues, and a diminished role for military force (Cohen, 2008). In contrast to 
the approach used in hegemonic stability theory, liberals believe that there are multiple 
channels in an international system. Nye disagrees with realists by particularly noting that 
military strength is not so necessary among alliances due to the changing global environment, 
though he does agree that it is important in considering relations with a rival bloc (Nye, 1990a). 
The complex interdependence idea stresses the significance of the interaction between states. 
This opinion implies that the state power or the state-centred paradigm determines the pattern 
of the international economy. Thus, the correlation between hegemony and the international 
system is weak, or at least not as strong as the realists believe.  
 
Hegemony, as previously introduced, is understood as a single dominating country. However, 
interdependence is not solely determined by state power. The sole hegemonic power, in fact, 
cannot always be decisive regarding everything within the global system. As to hegemony, 
Keohane does not deny that it can bring cooperation but argues that it is not a must-have in the 
system. Countries are like players in a game theory model. They can value the pros and cons 
of each option and make a decision. He argues that hegemony can indeed facilitate cooperation, 
but it is neither a necessary nor sufficient factor in terms of creating and maintaining that 
cooperation.  
 
Pursuing mutual benefits or common interests, states are willing and more likely to cooperate. 
Even though a regime is created under the influence of a hegemon, it does not require 
hegemonic power to keep it running. Once the rules and regulations have already been set up, 
the regime can keep benefiting the members within it without much maintenance effort from 
the hegemon. Therefore, post-hegemonic cooperation is possible (Keohane, 2005). Specifically, 
Keohane uses game theory to explain why hegemony is not a vital component in achieving 
cooperation.  
 
Following Keohane’s idea, Oye introduces more detailed examples by categorising 
international cooperation via four different forms, for example, two actors adopting strategies 
to either cooperate or not. Liberals believe that driven by the maximising benefits, players are 
more likely to collaborate. Taking the model of stag hunting, as an example, hunters collaborate 
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because of the tempting outcome that benefits all (Oye, 1986). 1 Realists often oppose this idea 
by saying that due to an anarchic environment, the uncertainty of another player’s choice often 
leads to a self-interested situation. For instance, fearing the risk of betrayal, states rather go for 
a less beneficial choice but one with a guaranteed prize. Contrarily, liberals suggest that 
because the international environment is a multi-play model instead of a single round, states 
can learn from previous results, and thus be more willing to cooperate, with or without a 
hegemonic coordinator.  
 
Keohane partially agrees with the realists who assert that states are essential players in the 
international system and are always rational, but he suggests a promoted position for 
international institutions. Cooperation and coordination can be achieved under a guild of 
institutions. That is also the reason some people think of Keohane as a ‘liberal institutionalist’. 
He considers that hegemon and cooperation are not alternatives, but instead hegemony may 
foster cooperation, while cooperation can make and enforce rules for the hegemon. Cohen, 
referring to Keohane’s ideas, writes: ‘States might still be central actors in international affairs, 
but with the expansion of the global marketplace they could no longer claim sole authority to 
determine outcomes’ (Cohen, 2008:28).   
 
After all, during the post-war period, realist and liberal theories in IPE represented the majority 
in terms of understanding, when taking on Anglo-American hegemony as a role model; holding 
similar beliefs regarding many of the basic guidelines and sharing recognition of the 
international environment. The difference is that, while realists believe in mighty and coercive 
hegemonic power, liberals focus more on freedom of choice and the interaction between 
players. Hegemony is not the absolute decisive power – instead, if one wants to build up an 
international order, it should attract other players rather than coerce them. The significance of 
liberal theory in understanding hegemony is its suggestion that power can be made up of ‘soft 
power’, in contrast to the realist ‘hard’ version of power (Nye, 2004). By using soft power, 
states can reach cooperation using foreign policy as the method and benefit from a growth in 
state power. One example of this statement is the growth of post-war Japan. 
 
1 Stag hunting is a classic game theory model including at least two hunters as the players. If 
all the players spare their efforts on hunting stag, the outcome will be obtaining a stag in the 
end (the biggest achievement). If one hunter decides to hunt hare, he can obtain one hare in 
the end (still better than getting nothing) while other hunters will receive nothing at all (the 
worst outcome). 
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During the late 20th century, the title ‘hegemonic transition towards the East’ started to appear 
frequently, with the ‘East’ referring to Japan at that time. In the 1990s, some scholars 
questioned whether Japan was ‘an imminent hegemon’ (Taira, 1991). Many have described the 
development of Japan as ‘the Japan miracle’ because the country suffered a significant 
downturn after World War II. Though the ‘Japan hegemony’ myth was eventually busted, its 
dramatic rise in power was fearsome to many Americans.  
 
The reasons that post-war reconstruction went so smoothly and quickly are mainly threefold: 
the setting up of a market economy system following the Western-style; giving priority to the 
development of basic raw materials including iron, steel and coal, as well as the power industry, 
as the breakthrough point for economic development; and the prosperity brought by the 
Koreans which allowed Japan to profit by selling wartime goods (Smitka, 1998). In other words, 
there were both internal and external factors that supported and enhanced the Japanese 
economic reconstruction, including a more dynamic relationship between economic factors and 
power. 
 
Notably, in 1949, the Japanese government created the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) as a connection between internal development and the tide of globalisation. It 
was set up when Japan was facing increasing inflation and insufficient productivity. The 
purpose of setting up the MITI was, apart from dealing with exports and imports, to provide 
and implement guidance on industrial activities. It also filled in the gaps left by other business 
and economic related departments. Johnson describes the position of MITI as being equivalent 
to the Ministry of Defence, instead of any commercial related department (Johnson, 1982).  
 
It is reasonable to think so, as the MITI was de facto concerned about strategic policies, which 
reflected in the domestic industry. It played a role as a bridge between foreign affairs and 
internal construction, for example, adjusting foreign exchange to enhance exportation and 
publishing over-loaning policy to control commercial banks. Johnson also points out that the 
uniquely formed social ideology adopted during wartime had also enabled Japan and its people 
to keep economic development as the first priority.  
 
Besides the contribution of internal institutional architecture, the prosperity of Japan is 
inseparable from the assistance of globalisation and an international environment. The Japan-
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US relationship is highly strategic and geopolitical. The US has given remarkable support to 
the recovery of the Japanese economy by providing large amounts of capital and material to 
Japan. The US troops stationed in Japan also insured local social stability (Krauss and Pempel, 
2004). When Japan's economic strength continued to increase, the trade friction between Japan 
and the US-led Western countries also began to grow. In addition to the United States taking 
up a trade protection policy to suppress Japanese products, in 1985 it united other developed 
countries to jointly sign the Plaza Agreement, forcing the sharp appreciation of the yen. 
Nonetheless, this prompted Japanese companies to accelerate the pace of technological 
innovation, moving to an overseas production base, as well as improving the advantages of 
energy-saving, automobile, electronics, and other fields at the same time (Nakamura, 1981).  
 
On the other hand, it was also Japan’s geopolitical and strategic reliance on the US that made 
it impossible for Japan to overtake as hegemon. Despite miraculous advancement and growth, 
Japan could not compete with the US on making and enforcing rules for the international 
economic system, not to mention its ability of replacing the dollar as a key currency or 
providing a last resort open market (Calder, 2005). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Japan’s 
power surge can be attributed to its choice in transforming the domestic market and subsequent 
international market participation, as suggested by complex interdependency theory.  
 
Notably, the complex interdependency argument has flagged the significance of the interaction 
between states using the market mechanism and foreign policy as major tools. This dilutes the 
role of hegemonic power, hinting that the foundations of power are complex and involve public 
and private dimensions. However, this perspective does not provide any insights into the 
composition of power. Despite its proposal regarding the concept of ‘soft power’, it fails to 
clearly identify what constitutes such soft power. A number of recent theorists criticise the 
ambiguity of early liberal literature on identifying the distinction between soft and hard power, 
as well as pointing to the impossible ‘complexity’ of interdependency. Overall, the complex 
interdependency still cannot provide a comprehensive analytic framework to operationalise 
this study. 
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3.4. Hegemony in Critical Theory: Social Class Struggle 
 
Besides the mainstream approaches mentioned above, there is a particular strand of literature 
on the critical theory of international relations that also contributes to the study of power. 
Marxist dependency theory provides an alternative explanation of hegemony, moving away 
from the debate between realists and liberals. It develops a system-based analytic framework 
that explores the existence of stable hierarchies within the international political economy. 
However, although this literature generates a number of critical comments on the mainstream 
approach and suggests an alternative definition of power, critical theory is a marginal approach 
still under development. Furthermore, scholars advocating critical theory have also very 
divided opinions among themselves; therefore, critical theory will not be applied as the main 
guideline for this study.  
 
The work of Gramsci informs the conceptualisation of hegemony within this strand of critical 
theory. In Gramscian theory, hegemony particularly represents the dominance of ideology that 
reinforces social orders. Putting such a term into the international environment, hegemony 
becomes one of the elements that impose global governance and international orders (Cox, 
1983). For Gramsci and Gramscian scholars, there is a broad agreement that hegemony 
constitutes those ideological structures through which leadership is maintained. At different 
times and in different places, varying combinations of intellectual and moral leadership and 
more repressive forms of domination can be used by elites to maintain order (Litowitz, 2000). 
 
Marxists and Gramscians suggest that the subject of power can be social classes, ethnic groups, 
or political parties, besides states. Therefore, Gramscian hegemony suggests there are various 
entities of hegemonic power. Hegemony is not only exercised as state power, and more actors 
and entities that should be taken into account (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971). In fact, 
hegemony involves the ideology of the whole society. Gramscian hegemony is a cultural and 
institutional hegemony instead of a purely economic one, despite the fact that this form of 
cultural power could eventually exert influence on economic performance. 
 
Along with the development of democratic politics, Stephen Gill argues that liberal governing 
receives pressure from the grassroots, as neoliberal leadership often adopts a ‘top-down’ 
approach and mainly emphasises market civilisation (Gill, 1995). Here, leadership represents 
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wellbeing and the need for stability by the wealthy and entitled members of society. However, 
Gill states that nowadays neoliberalism and the form of leadership under its control are badly 
in crisis (Gill, 2012). Hegemony, according to critical theory, is built upon the condition of 
material. A change in material condition thus changes the status of leadership. 
 
Gill also points out that Kindleberger’s opinion on the significance of both the capability and 
willingness of hegemony is quite narrowly concerned. Instead, a Marxist explanation of 
hegemonic stability considers the US as the super-imperial power that facilitates global 
cooperation. However, the nature of capitalism deems to generate crises due to the excessive 
amount of capital and under-consumption. Sklair (2001) classified the causes of these crises 
into two, including a wealth-gap crisis and an unsustainable situation leading to social crises. 
Gill emphatically states that global leadership exists to serve history, because after all, as 
Gramsci argued, power is possessed by historical blocs, and conflicts over interests are 
conceptualised as clashes between classes. 
 
As for the determination of transnational actions, Robert Cox (1981), a representative figure in 
this area, concludes that three factors are involved: material capability, institutions, and ideas. 
These factors decide whether states choose to cooperate or act against each other. Cox (1993) 
describes the international environment whereby the US and other Western states are identified 
as the core, operating heavily under a discipline of neo-liberalism, with the global periphery 
composed of non-Western or even anti-Western political economies. Gill compliments this 
opinion by explaining the trilateral relationship that exists between North America, Europe, 
and Japan (Gill, 1991). These new elements are considered social forces in Gramscianism and 
avoid the disagreement between realist and liberal schools. Critical theory also provides 
another angle and viewpoint on international relations by historicising the phenomena of power, 
agency, and structure (Cox and Sinclair, 1996).  
 
Gramscianism and Marxism introduced the epistemology of historical materialism into the 
conceptualisation of hegemony and, more generally, international and transnational relations. 
Critical theories have proposed consideration of new elements when studying power. There is 
an increasing weight of intellectualism involved in the balance of interests and risks, thus 
determining all kinds of social behaviour and even international activities. Meanwhile, these 
theories have also weakened the natural role of states and government. For example, Marxism 
particularly failed to explain the internationalisation of international economic activities, 
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especially following the 1960s (Gill, 1994). Over-emphasising the capital and the material 
would not be comprehensive enough to allow for studying the contemporary issues of IPE.   
 
Similar opinions are found in a range of literature. Many believe that global leadership is on 
the edge of a power shift, and there are certainly potential alternatives for the pre-existing US 
hegemony. However, the immaturity and limited acceptance of these critical theories fail to 
provide a clear and accurate evaluation of the actual conclusion of shifting power, despite the 
fact that critical theories are being used more frequently for particular case studies these days. 
 
3.5. Strange’s Conceptualisation: Structural Power Theory 
 
While others tried to conceptualise hegemony and power, Susan Strange brought forward the 
theory of structural power, providing the idea of analytical technique and the four components 
of power. Rather than being a formalised theory, Strange’s conceptualisation of structural 
power is a practical guidance and an approach. It provides a flexible and operational method 
for examining hegemonic transitions when compared to classic theories. Indeed, analytic 
flexibility is a central feature of Strange’s work, given her attempts to broaden the focus of the 
discipline away from an abstracted focus on states as unitary actors toward a consideration of 
the multiple and interacting foundations of power (Strange, 2015b).  
 
Although Strange’s work advocates going beyond a focus on traditional forms of power such 
as military power and material capacity, Strange does not deny the roles played by the control 
of such resources. Rather, her opinion is that ‘the world has changed’; that is, with the 
competition between states becoming more about the competition over wealth and states’ 
choices of economic-related policies, indeed with these having begun to override foreign or 
defence policies (Strange, 1976). Power, therefore, should not be conceptualised in terms of 
diplomacy and balance of military power, as these aspects are thought to be of decreased 
significance within the contemporary international political economy and hence within the 
framework of structural power.  
 
To answer, ‘Where does authority lie?’ and ‘What is the source of power?’, Strange suggests 
four primary structures: including finance, production, knowledge, and security. These four 
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primary structures each represent an aspect that examines power, together they form a pyramid-
like power structure. This section will briefly review Strange’s rationale for these four 
structures comprising the composition of power. 
 
Security is considered the most basic human need. In the definition of security given by Strange, 
security is one’s ability to protect citizens from both sudden and slow death (Strange, 2015b). 
Sudden death implies wars or any other form of direct military conflict as a kind of traditional 
security factor. More importantly, slow death signifies unnatural death caused slowly by under-
production, famine, and fatal diseases, although in most cases it is ignored or forgotten.  
 
The stress in this dimension, apart from the traditional forms of direct violent conflicts, is that 
economic security should be considered in regard to the overall concept of security. Thus, the 
definition of security becomes the ability of states to protect citizens from any potential threat 
to life, as well as the ability to maintain social order; this is because stability is vital to persistent 
economic development. Although she points out that production might be the most important 
structure of all, Strange does nonetheless state that without the safeguarding provided by 
security it would be impossible to achieve development and improvements to production 
(Strange, 1987). 
 
This production structure is the dimension of the wealth-creating process in the political 
economy. It includes both the objects and subjects of production activities. It is the continuous 
process of adding value to existing materials. Notably, production structures do change from 
time to time, and these changes have significantly impacted the way wealth is created and 
gathered in human society. Historically, as Strange concludes, two major changes to the 
production structure have happened worldwide.  
 
The first one was when machines were invented, and mass production came into existence. The 
emergence of capitalists and the market greatly enhanced overall social production. More 
importantly, production activities were guided by the demand-supply relationship within the 
liberal market (Strange, 1987; Strange, 1996; Stopford, Strange, and Henley, 1991).  
 
The second major change was the expansion of the market from domestic to global, as 
nowadays almost all giant businesses are multinational. Evidence shows that states’ policies 
can greatly influence the performance of international businesses. In addition, Strange 
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considers the dimension of production the most heavily weighted of all. As concluded, a stable 
production structure gives strong backing to security and prosperity in other structures because 
it is the most fundamental aspect of wealth generation and social construction.  
 
Starting with the creation of credit, Strange stresses the significance of the financial structure 
to the contemporary IPE context. Compared to the production structure, finance is a more 
advanced and recently developed dimension. This structure consists of two subfields, including 
the capability to create credit between states and banks following the rules and regulations one 
makes for the other, as well as the communication between different governments, markets, 
and currencies, namely the exchange system. The existence of banks and credit allows for the 
industrialisation of production by providing loans and funds to companies.  
 
Historically, a primitive economy shifting into an advanced financial structure reflects on the 
increasing use of currency and the prosperity of institutions such as banks and stock exchanges. 
As the financial market develops and matures, governments and states became more 
responsible for regulating domestic financial activities besides carrying out fiscal policies 
(Strange, 1975). Through such regulatory actions, states are able to provide public goods and 
welfare to society as well as redistribute social wealth. In her later work, Strange provided 
powerful critiques of the destabilising effects of financialization (Strange, 1998; Strange, 
2015a). However, an important feature of Strange’s work remains an acknowledgement that 
an appropriately developed financial sector provides a significant pillar of structural power.  
 
Meanwhile, along with the progress of globalisation, maintaining the stability of both domestic 
and international financial systems is one of the conditions of continuous economic growth. 
On the other hand, finance may be problematic as it can lead to higher degrees of inequality 
and fail to coordinate the global financial system as a whole. By analysing the dollar crisis in 
1971, Strange points out that the four propositions of political economy – domestic politics, 
international politics, domestic economic management, and international economic 
management - are all intertwined and interacting, either directly or indirectly (Strange, 1972). 
Overall, the financial structure is an organic component of domestic and international 
economic management that eventually becomes influential to political decision making and 
political activities. Therefore, the study of financial structure is necessary and meaningful for 
an understanding of power. 
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The knowledge structure is the most ignored in the traditional studies of power. Moreover, 
power within the knowledge structure is intangible and extremely vague, as knowledge can be 
any kind of information and the way the information is conveyed or denied. Strange concludes 
three changes occur in the knowledge structure from the state’s perspective in IPE. They are – 
control and regulations over information; the use of language and form of communication; 
changes in basic beliefs, value judgements; and understanding the ways in which human 
society functions (Strange, 1987).  
 
This structure can be conceptualised by defining the discoverer of knowledge, the receiver of 
it, sometimes the media of storing knowledge, and the means by which it is passed on. Power 
derived from this structure is rarely similar to those in other structures. It is comprised more of 
consent than coercion. Partially coinciding with the critical theories, the authority of the 
knowledge sphere comes from shared beliefs or values among individuals (Strange, 1996). 
Similarly, on the wider stage of global governance, mutually recognised consensus and value 
judgement grant international entities, such as states and international organisations, authority 
over certain issues. 
 
Besides the four primary structures, Strange also mentions another four secondary structures, 
including transport, welfare, energy, and trade. The four primary structures come together to 
construct a pyramid-shape composition of power, which ultimately supports the authority of a 
legitimate state government, while the secondary structures somehow fall within the domain 
of the four major ones (Palan, 1999). Furthermore, the four primary dimensions of structural 
power are interlocking and interact with each other. Notably, Strange points out that the 
structural powers are dynamic instead of static. Through the progress of human society and 
international affairs, it is possible to forge changes within these structures. 
 
Overall, then, through her writings, Susan Strange provides a conceptual framework for 
understanding the foundations of structural power. This framework provides a flexible and 
explicit template, that can be built on to assess the foundations of hegemonic power; however, 
Strange’s focus on measuring each specific structure and the issue of hegemony remains under-
defined. The following section provides an overview of the manner in which this framework 
is built out from, through which Strange’s four main and four subordinate sources of structural 
power and transposed into two overarching themes around which the analysis of the rise of 
China is structured. 
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3.6. The Two-pillar Approach 
 
On top of the four broad traditions identified within IPE literature on hegemony, part of the 
contribution made by Strange through the conceptualisation of structural power was to 
disaggregate the concept of power, and to do so in an empirically focused manner. 
This disaggregated approach allows for the apparent pattern of variegated development in 
China to be effectively probed. As presented in Chapter 2, the rise of China is a very complex 
phenomenon with the uneven development of different sectors. Empirically, Strange's 
framework provides an approach with which to create a disaggregated analysis of the rise of 
China and allows an account to be constructed that identifies and explores the foundations of 
this variegated development. 
 
On the back of this chapter, in applying the concept to this case, the two economic pillars of 
structural power are focused on to explore the contemporary politics surrounding the rise of 
China. These two pillars consist of the internal transformations in financial sector development 
and the production structure of China, as well as their external implications in terms of the 
wider international political economy – a total of four areas of interests, as a development of 
the original Structural Power Theory.  
 
Table 3.1 Analytical Framework 
Foundations of Economic Power Criteria of Evaluation 
Financial power (internal) Depth of financial system; 
Productive enterprises’ access to credit; 
Internal financial stability;  
Financial power (external) Role within state-based regional and global financial 
organisations; 
Productive power (internal) Production volume; 
Productivity; 
Prevalence of inward FDI-supported production 
Prevalence of exportation-supported production 
Productive power (external) Trade volume, 
Outward FDI and infrastructural investment, 
Depth of institutionalisation of trade and investment 
relationship 
 
 
Table 3.1 presents a brief overview of the factors explored in each of the four areas. The thesis 
prioritises the economic structures of China’s power following Strange’s argument that market 
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and economy play an increasing weighted role in politics as opposed to conventionally defined 
state power (Strange, 1996; Strange, 2015b), while acknowledging the importance of  the other 
two structures. 
 
The financial structure follows largely Strange’s suggestion of evaluating through the state’s 
ability to generate credit and its monetary power. The production structure examines the 
outcome of value-adding activities. To enrich Strange’s conceptualisation of finance and 
production, each empirical chapter includes an operationalisation section at the beginning of 
the chapter, using the predominant existing literature in each field to give guidance on how to 
evaluate that aspect of China’s economic power. 
 
On top of that, this thesis adds to Strange’s theory an approach of ‘internal and external 
dimensions’, following insights from the relevant existing literature. Although Structural 
Power Theory lay special emphasis on the internal components of power (Strange, 2015b), 
Cohen (2001) points out explicitly that power exists in the internal and external dimensions of 
power. While the internal dimension of power “corresponds to the dictionary definition of 
power as a capacity for action,” the external dimension of power “corresponds to the dictionary 
definition of power as a capacity to control the behaviour of others” (Cohen 2001: 433). 
Evidence of power stem from the external and internal factors can be found throughout 
predominant IPE literature. Krasner (1978) specifically focuses on the production-foreign 
policy point of view, using the US hegemonic power as the instance and suggesting that 
production structural beyond the national border is equally vital to the big state’s pursuit of 
power. Ikenberry (2008; 2017) points out that external elements that international order and 
regime building are also components of hegemonic power. Keohane and Nye (2011), from a 
neoliberalism perspective, have added that the measuring of power cannot be separated from 
interdependence under the contemporary global structure, coinciding with Ikenberry’s 
comment on power-order/regime interaction. 
 
By developing this disaggregating approach to studying power, the resulting analysis can 
engage with the multiple strands of literature reviewed above. While drawing primarily on 
Strange’s conceptualisation, the two pillars have been designed to integrate analytical focuses 
that feature commonly across the existing works reviewed above. 
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The structural power of finance and production are typically privileged by Strange in her own 
work, where she explores the declining role of the conventionally conceptualised state and the  
increasingly influential position of market and economy (Strange, 1991; 1996; 2015a; 2015b), 
and are areas that China appears to exhibit variation in development. As Strange points out, 
powers are dynamic. The process of refining the understanding of power is to continuously 
question existing theories and engage with the contemporary context. Three decades have 
passed since the theory of structural power was first suggested, and the context of international 
relations has changed during this period. The two-pillar approach designed for this thesis draws 
heavily on Strange’s theory of structural power while retaining additional insights from earlier 
work on hegemonic stability theory and critical literature. The following paragraphs will 
introduce the two pillars chosen to be studied in this thesis – finance and production, and the 
reason for choosing them.  
 
Fundamentally, the assessment of financial power focuses on a system about credits – financial 
deepening and reforms that enabled the creation of credits while maintaining stability 
throughout the reform. The finance pillar, as Strange concludes, contains an entity’s ability to 
generate credit. Credit is a modern development but has no less significance for a state. Besides 
the argument built by Strange, many also believe that financial development has a positive 
effect on the levels of economic growth (e.g. McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Drake, 1980; 
Levine, 1991; King and Levine, 1992; King and Levine 1993), consequently leading to the 
growth of power. As Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) present, the financial sector is a source 
of power and as a key causal force for domestic and international economic outcomes.  
 
With a particular focus on the housing finance system and comparative politics, Schwartz 
points out that ‘financialisation’ can either generate or cause great damage to a property market 
and social wealth, using the US as an example and analysing the relationship between crises 
and financial systems taking a macroeconomic perspective (Schwartz, 2009). Regulatory 
failure, loose monetary policy, and global imbalances can, therefore, cause a financial crisis 
and economic recession, for example, the recent Subprime Crisis in the US and the subsequent 
global crisis (Allen and Carletti, 2010). Tracking back to an earlier age, Skidelsky (1976) 
examines the fall of British hegemony, pointing that its hegemonic decline was directly the 
result of declining economic strength and lack of regulation. Keynes, as rephrased by Skidelsky, 
believes in taking the fiscal approach to solve financial struggle and to stimulate consumption. 
Failing to understand the post-war global situation and its inadequate financial policies finally 
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led to the end of Britain’s hegemony. In short, the financial structure, consisting of rules for 
regulating financial institutions such as banks, as well as financial instruments, is an influential 
dimension for a modern country aiming to achieve economic growth.  
 
On the other hand, a country’s finance structure also has external implications. In Strange’s 
words, it has the ability to shape and influence the international monetary regime. Such an 
ability is undoubtedly determined by a country’s internal finance structure, particularly the 
ability to manage monetary stability. International institutions are a modern creation now 
playing an important role within the global financial system. 
 
In After Victory, Ikenberry describes a post-war situation with the winners facing three choices 
– dominate, abandon or transform. He stated that states usually prefer the last option (Ikenberry, 
2001). The so-called transforming decision, according to Ikenberry, refers to transferring 
power and building up regimes. Realists believe that such international regimes, in other words, 
norms, rules, and regulations, are a reflection on the interests of hegemonic power (Keohane, 
2005). The Bretton Woods system and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) established 
under US hegemonic power are vivid illustrations of the significance of international 
institutions to power. If it is to support the argument of rising China, there should be evidence 
that China is either taking increasing responsibility for existing international financial 
institutions or building new institutions to reshape the balance of the current regime. 
 
To a certain extent, the early literature on China’s financial structure explored China’s financial 
reformation following the founding of the People’s Republic. More recent work has also 
explored further changes to China’s capital market and monetary policy (see Bowles and White, 
1992a and 1992b; Laurenceson and Chai, 2003; Mehran, 1996), while a relatively small 
number of studies have been done to correlate China’s financial reform with its growing power 
under the context of a hegemonic transition. Hence, Chapters 4 and 5 will conduct an analysis 
of China’s financial structure.  
 
Chapter 4 evaluates China’s financial deepening. As it identifies, the concepts of 
financialisation and market were first introduced to China in the late 1970s. Banking reforms 
took place followed by the emergence of a series of financial instruments, such as stocks 
exchange and credit rating. All these new introductions freed up credits to be borrowed by 
individuals and private firms while maintaining the stability of the financial market throughout 
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these drastic changes. To date, China is still undergoing an increasingly diverse financial 
deepening. Policies and regulations play a significate role in the evolutionary transformation. 
Chapter 4 explores how relevant elements, since the late 1970s, cement the result of China’s 
financial system today and evaluates the economic power from this strand. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the external achievement of China’s financial structure as the subsequent 
result of a series of domestic reforms. It aims, in other words, to evaluate China’s influential 
role in the international financial system through its engagement with international financial 
institutions. Having gone through decades of reform, China’s financial capacity is raised to a 
much higher level than prior to the reform. As a result of the internal development, China’s 
financial structure started to manifest its influence on the external sphere, namely the 
international level of monetary and finance regime. Besides participating actively in pre-
existing US-led institutions, a few China-led regimes have sprung up promoting China’s 
capital-output following the OBOR initiative. Chapter 5 examines the extent to which China’s 
external influence could reach as the result of economic reform which started to materialise 
since the 2000s, as the chapter fines. Jointly, Chapter 4 and 5 provide a comprehensive 
understanding of China’s rising power from a financial perspective.  
 
The second pillar focuses on the structure of production and also consists of two aspects – 
internal development and external implications. As production is fundamentally the process of 
generating wealth, it is a prerequisite for big states who are looking to exercise diplomacy, 
provide security, or even progress in scientific advancement. In other words, by adding value 
to and selling products and services, the rewards can be used to invest in further production 
and other structures including finance, security, and knowledge, thus comprehensively 
strengthening state power.  
 
Historically, all hegemonic states have been leading countries in terms of production during 
their hegemonic eras. For example, the industrial revolution starting in the late 18th century 
changed Britain’s production in many ways, such as sector composition and labour distribution 
(Stokey, 2001). A drastic growth in production, reflected in GDP per capita and GDP growth 
being the highest among great powers, subsequently created the British hegemony of the early 
19th century (Maddison, 2007:92). This was a lead taken over by the US in the early 20th century 
when European countries became tired out from continually fighting each other (Ibid.).  
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The correlation between production and hegemonic power is certain. Furthermore, as reviewed 
in the previous chapter, the existing literature acknowledges that foreign policy, security 
concerns, and other dimensions of state activities, can often be affected by economic benefits, 
for example, through trade partnerships. The externality of its production structure can 
determine a country’s position in the global regime and its relationship with others. Therefore, 
due to the significance of production in relation to state power, it is a fundamental structure 
that needs to be examined in any analysis of power.   
 
As for the case of China, a great amount of literature has discussed the economic reformation 
on production structure, and it has also been reviewed in the previous chapter. The information 
from this literature is rather scattered. Besides the widely acknowledged soaring GDP number, 
many other elements should also be taken into account when evaluating production. In order 
to create a thorough comprehension of China’s production structure, Chapter 6 will analyse the 
current status of China’s domestic production by looking into several parameters selected based 
on the existing literature. Similar to what is examined in Chapter 4, for the content of Chapter 
6, policy changes play a vital role in the development of this structure, with some influential 
factors dates back to the late 1970s. Furthermore, because this research is to study China’s 
rising power in the context of hegemonic transition, Chapter 6 will also present some results in 
comparison with the US. Using the US, the current hegemon, as a reference, the chapter will 
ultimately provide an understanding as to how progressive China’s production structure has 
actually been. 
 
The external implications of production are mainly reflected through resource diplomacy, in 
other words, trade and cooperation, as suggested by Krasner (1978). In the case of China, 
constant high economic growth led to high demand for natural resources and saturation of the 
domestic market; thus, the country was urged to a seek solution to secure access to resources 
and to overcome over-capacity in order to continue the transferral of products into social wealth. 
A large amount of literature on OBOR as reviewed in Chapter 2 also put forward the 
significance of China's evolving trade relationships. This chapter provides material that is of 
relevance to this literature. Given the extended timeframe within my analysis, I do not 
explicitly frame the material presented in relation to OBOR. Nonetheless, empirical detail 
provided helps to demonstrate the institutional foundations from which the OBOR initiative 
emerged. This part of the analysis focuses on the case of changes in trade and cooperation-
related diplomatic activities with resource-rich partners. Chapter 7 will study the issue of 
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China’s resource diplomacy to explore how China can extend its production structure abroad 
and how it intends to acquire stable resource access to maintain its high-speed production rate. 
This chapter mainly focuses on the 2000s and onward. During this period of time, an 
increasingly frequent engagement between China and resource-rich regions is observed – 
cooperation framework being established and transformation in the pattern of engagements 
occurs as this chapter finds.  
 
Although Strange has categorised knowledge and security as two additional primary structures 
and undisputable these are an important set of issues, this research, in line with Strange and 
others, prioritises political-economic foundations.  
 
The security structure has been a key focus of political researches. A good number of previous 
studies are discussing China’s intentions in terms of territorial expansion and security concerns. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, China’s interaction with the US and APAC nations have been a 
dynamic process of seeking equilibrium between economic interests and security, even though 
Chinese governmental reports and official announcements have repeatedly emphasised the 
term ‘peaceful rise’, one that focuses on economic gains rather than coercion. It is necessary 
to acknowledge that security remains a valuable topic in studies about the rise of China, 
meanwhile, it is of lesser significance for this thesis. 
 
According to the World Bank, China’s military expenditure (% of GDP) remained below 2.2% 
since the millennia, especially since 2010 it has been under 2%. This is less than half than the 
amount the US is spending on military. In absolute number, China’s military expenditure is 
also much lower than the US. China’s general attitude towards military spending is that it is a 
demonstration of the ability of self-defence, to earn respect, rather than assertive or aggressive 
expansion of influence. The literature review also points out – many scholars suggest that 
military concern is no longer of urging importance due to the increasingly frequent economic 
cooperation. Both countries are equipped with nuclear warheads, and both countries are aware 
that a direct military conflict between big states is a zero-sum game. Assuming that states are 
all rational players in the global regime, certainly, a lesson of the cold war should be learned. 
 
On the other hand, Campbell and Ratner (2018) also argued that neither the US military force 
nor regional balancing has significantly removed China from its pursuit of global power. The 
deterrence of military might has diminished in the case of China. As mentioned in Section 2.2, 
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a contest between China and the US in terms of security power is keeping a relatively stable 
equilibrium. The US strategy is to welcome China to ‘play a constructive, peaceful role in the 
Asia-Pacific region’ to avoid direct conflict with China (Stewart, 2009 as cited in Acharya, 
2014:167). Part of China’s security interest is also aligned with that of the US when it comes 
to anti-terrorism (Callahan, 2005). Furthermore, although China is indeed placing more 
attention on developing its military strength to defy US influence in Asia, particularly in regard 
of Taiwan, South China Sea, and Japan, economic development is always a prerequisite of 
security strength – as President Xi noted in his speech, putting ‘becoming rich’ before 
‘becoming strong’ (Campbell and Ratner, 2018:66-67). Therefore, the security structure is 
sitting outside the focus of this thesis.  
 
For the knowledge structure, ‘knowledge’ itself is a vague concept; and there is limited 
literature on how to evaluate knowledge. Therefore, in reality, it is extremely difficult to define 
and examine power from knowledge perspective due to the lack of theoretical guidance.  
 
Knowledge can be defined as technology, literature, or any intangible power. If knowledge is 
to be defined as technology, undeniably, China has been promoting its power from this aspect, 
funding domestic technology firms for scientific innovation. This can be reflected in the 
production structure – while initiative for promoting knowledge power has been on the 
government agenda, China’s position in the global supply chain remains relatively low as 
Chapter 6 found. If knowledge is to be defined as cultural influence, there is also evidence of 
China strengthening its power by establishing Confusious Institutes worldwide. From the 
aspect of international relations, the knowledge-power can refer to ideologies and values; it is 
similar to the case of mutual benefits to overcome ideological disagreements, especially for 
China, a country rising on the basis of pragmatism. 
 
The conceptualisation of knowledge structure overlaps with the concept of soft power and faces 
the same problem as soft power is facing – what exactly is the term referring to. If to include 
knowledge in this thesis, this structure itself can constitute a significant length of 
conceptualisation and analysis due to the lack of a systematic approach to evaluate power from 
a knowledge perspective. Knowledge can eventually reflect into finance and production 
structure. For example, scientific breakthrough leads to production boost; changes in ideology 
introduce a new model of business that can improve efficiency. For the purpose of this study, 
knowledge and soft power are certainly relevant and significant factors to power but are not 
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necessarily the primary structures. While acknowledged to be one of the essential dimensions 
of China’s power, because this thesis prioritises the economic components of China’s power, 
knowledge structure is also set outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
Besides, Strange in her original theory privileged economic factors in the contemporary issues 
of IPE by emphasising the effect of market and non-state players (Strange, 1994; Strange, 
2015b). Although security and knowledge are intriguing areas to explore, they would probably 
lead to another piece of thorough research. In a realistic and pragmatic manner, this particular 
thesis considers the security and the knowledge issues secondary structures and instead focus 
on fundamental economic structures. It will not conduct direct studies on security and 
knowledge structures because of their relative complexity and insignificance in relation to the 
case of China’s economic rise. 
 
3.7. Thesis Research Methodology 
 
To carry out this research analysing how China’s power can be described as a ‘rising 
hegemonic power’, this thesis will contain several qualitative case studies of the four 
dimensions mentioned above. 
 
In general, the use of case studies in social science research can identify the operation of casual 
mechanism in individual cases, and also allow researchers to select variables most related to 
the case (George and Bennett, 2005). The case of China’s rising power contains a wide range 
of factors, and just as many historical events; the case study method allows the researcher to 
choose which event, which facet of the event, and which variables to focus on. As a few 
scholars have pointed out, China is a unique case in IPE from many perspectives (Frieden and 
Lake, 2002:377-381; Kang, 2003). China’s power should thus be studied in a way that is 
suitable for its variegated development pattern. Keeping this in mind, this research will be 
adding a rich and historically informed case study that sits alongside existing literature.  
 
Other advantages of using a case study include ‘developing historical explanations of particular 
cases, attaining high levels of construct validity, and using contingent generalizations to model 
complex relationships’ (Bennett, 2004:19). The advantages of giving an explanation and 
 69 
identifying complex relationships fulfil the aims of this research which is to explore the 
disaggregated foundations and composition of China’s growing power.  
 
Furthermore, the nature of development appears as continuous progress, not a static point on a 
historic timeline. To understand how China’s comprehensive power was promoted and how 
certain decisions changed the trajectory of China’s economic development, it is necessary to 
describe the situation and make casual inferences to the relationships between elements – 
especially when a case requires a strategy for accommodating different sets of conditions (Yin, 
1981). Moreover, according to Yin (2009) and Schell (1992), a case study is most suitable for 
answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions regarding a contemporary event without the need to 
control behavioural events. Therefore, it is necessary to make use of case study methodology, 
including a set of detailed methods such as process tracing, as the key instruments for carrying 
out this research.  
 
According to Yin (2003), the procedure for a case study contains the design of the case study, 
collecting data, analysing data, and presenting the result; in particular, the design of a case 
study should be carried out under certain theoretical frameworks prior to conducting the 
following steps. That is to avoid diluting the intuitive practice and thus the validity of the study. 
For this research, each analytical chapter can be deemed a single case study, containing, at the 
beginning of the chapter, an operationalisation section where the design and the analytical 
method of the case study are defined.  
 
In terms of collecting data, literature on methodology in the social science emphasises the 
importance of aligning method with research questions and aims. For instance, ethnographic 
or participant observer approaches are considered appropriate for developing a rich 
understanding of the functioning of an organisation or social group (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007). For another instance, Bennett and Elman (2007) and Wallace et al. (1999) suggest that 
when the focus is on understanding policy-making, policy implementation processes, or more 
broadly on understanding the role of particular individuals within processes of organisational 
or social change, interviews and archival sources are more valuable. Such method can be found 
used by Evangelista (1999) and Moravcsik (1998).  
 
This thesis follows Persaud’s (2010) broader definition of primary data, using published 
sources by states and international institutions for a first-time interpretation. Although Ritchie 
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et al. (2014) and Fontana and Frey (2008) have pointed out, within literature in the field of 
social science in general, interviews are commonly used as a means of generating insight into 
particular social change, policy shifts, and institutional developments (e.g. Yang, Wall, and 
Smith, 2008; Oi, 1992). However, in literature focusing on issues of hegemony, institutional 
change, and the foundations of state power with much greater time span, it is common for rich 
accounts to be derived from secondary literature and primary documents and data (e.g. 
Kennedy, 1988; Naughton, 2007; Maddison, 2007). Strange’s work on structural power (2015b) 
follows this methodological approach. In this application of Strange's framework to the 
analysis of the rise of China, this thesis draws extensively on secondary sources and primary 
documents and data. By including a broad range of Chinese-language sources, this thesis sheds 
new light on the four areas of empirical focuses. This will be done based on primary sources, 
including governmental regulations, official reports, statistics, and announcement by state 
departments, as well as secondary literature on the relevant topics. 
 
Furthermore, Schell (1992:6) points out that case studies should be ‘based upon the use of 
multiple sources of evidence (multiple triangulation)’ or ‘review of multiple case studies’ to 
enhance the validity of the data. The challenges of data collection from and about relatively 
closed political systems have been documented by Sadiq (2005) – quite often, an authoritarian 
state would suppress statistics that disagree with the desired political outcomes and realise 
modified numbers. This might be true for a study focusing on China, which is a subject with a 
relatively closed political system. The overall impression one may have over China’s official 
statistics publication is that it contains a concerning amount of falsification (Rawski, 2001).  
While there are dissenting voices, the balance of studies suggests that published official 
economic data in China suffers from problems of inaccuracy and can be the subject of 
manipulation. In line with such suggestion, these paragraphs, therefore, seek wherever possible 
to triangulate such data.  
 
Some countries are found embellishing its economic data strategically – China being one of 
them who overstated GDP while understating trade surpluses (Michalski and Stoltz, 2013). 
Early research believed that China’s official statistics were biased and generated through 
enumeration (Travers, 1982). This is entirely plausible when data is generated based on a 
political purpose especially in an authoritarian regime where transparency is questionable 
before the liberalisation of market. Later-on study about China’s official economic statistics of 
the 90s found that, for various reasons, some of these numbers are certainly erroneous and 
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poorly organised, failing to capture the reality of growth (Holz, 2008). Wallace (2016) suggests 
that there is a discrepancy between China’s economic data such as GDP and GDP growth and 
electricity consumption – normally, the two should be positively corresponding. Furthermore, 
such phenomenon occurs more often during politically sensitive times and at a provincial level. 
 
On the other hand, Chow (2006:396) believes that China’s official data is ‘by and large reliable 
and useful for drawing conclusions about the Chinese economy, but some statistics are not 
reliable’. Holz (2003) also suggests data falsification at a central governmental level is unlikely. 
In other recent literature, researches cannot find clear evidence that the numbers provided by 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) are full of manipulations: deviation could be 
caused by a different definition or a different method of calculation (Cai et al., 2013; Holz, 
2014). The central government has no intention or incentive to manipulate national data, 
whereas some local governments are motivated to exaggerate provincial data; but as long as 
NBS directly calculate local key indicators, interference by provincial officials can be 
minimised (Ma et al., 2014). Even if there is false reporting, the general trend of China’s 
GDP/GNP growth and sectoral value-added correspond to other economic parameters like 
price and expenditure (Holz, 2014). Other research supports the finding by stating that China’s 
growth is largely reflected by its official data while no evidence can be found proving that the 
published numbers are less reliable than usual (Fernald et al., 2013).  
 
While Chinese-language government sources and data constitute a valuable material, this thesis 
where possible triangulated against further evidence from independent sources, including 
English-language scholarship, documents, and statistics extracted from international 
organisations and research institutions. The data and resources used in this thesis consist of 1) 
statistics published by international organisations including the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and 
the Observatory of Economic Complexity; 2) statistics published by China’s Bureau of 
Statistics, Ministry of Commerce, and other relevant Chinese state departments; 3) official texts 
and documents published by international financial institutions including the World Bank, IMF, 
NDB, and AIIB; 4) official foreign policies and announcement made by the Chinese 
government; 5) official domestic economic policies published by the Chinese government.  
 
As George and Bennett (2005) also point out, a case study may lead to indeterminacy. To 
overcome this limitation, they suggest that a mixed method may be able to provide more 
explicit results, with the statistical method verifying undetermined inference. Hence, while 
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most of this research relies on the qualitative analysis of case study, it also includes the 
quantitative method as a supplementary tool when necessary – for example, when discussing 
productivity in Chapter 6 – in order to obtain a better understanding of this specific feature of 
China’s economic development. 
 
In addition to these explanations of the value of rich case study investigation as a source of 
insight, the empirical content of the thesis is structured in a manner that mirrors the approach 
that is evident within Strange’s own work. Strange advocated the use of the historically 
contextualised study of patterns of systemic transformation, following a flexible and practical 
approach. The aim of this study is to build on Strange’s approach to the generation of insight 
into power, hegemony, and IPE, by systematically applying to the study of the rise of China in 
the manner outlined above. 
 
3.8. Summary 
 
Earlier literature privileged military power as the dominant factor in hegemonic power. More 
recent studies pay attention to the economic basis but remain divided by contested definitions 
and measures. Nevertheless, Strange provides the case of China with a useful framework, 
which this thesis operationalises through a two-pillar approach. With this disaggregate 
approach, the internal and external dimensions of China’s production and finance structures 
are systematically explored, allowing for a comprehensive evaluation to be presented regarding 
the variegated hegemonic rise of China. 
 
Although discussed intensively in the existing literature, analyses of empirical case studies of 
power shifts can remain underdeveloped. Conventional IPE approaches often focus on a single 
element as the driving force of hegemonic power. Different scholars present very distinct 
suggestions due to the different entry points or aspects they work on. Hegemonic power can be 
related to military strength, economic performance, the establishment of international regimes, 
and dominant social classes. It also has many different manifestations based on these rationales, 
but there remains no consensus on this topic. Through the reading, it is noted that, in fact, these 
various factors have mutual effects on each other.  
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Furthermore, the existing IPE scholarship rarely explores the pheromone of a rising power; the 
analyses are mostly done on the basis of a static picture – an established hegemonic power, 
instead of a dynamic changing status. The state of the art in the field of hegemony studies is a 
live debate among contending scholars. To engage with this broad-based field, this study 
adopts a comprehensive and systematic framework for analysing of this issue.  
  
As is outlined in the closing paragraphs below, the ambition of creating a systematic analytic 
framework is reflected in three central elements of the approach to studying hegemony adopted 
through this work. 
 
Firstly, this research studies the rise of China following a clear conceptualisation of hegemony 
and structural power by existing literature and Susan Strange. By doing so, this research creates 
a theoretical rationale and defines the economic components of power that can be examined 
empirically. 
 
Secondly, this research introduces the two-pillar approach in order to enable a systematic 
analytical framework for the issue. Instead of exploring hegemonic power by focusing on a 
narrow range of dynamics, this chapter presents a framework with the two chosen pillars, 
including insights on internal developments and external implications regarding international 
political economy, therefore conducting a more systematic study of China’s rising power in a 
disaggregating manner.  
 
Thirdly, this thesis will extend the English-language literature on the contemporary politics of 
hegemonic transition by integrating a wide collection of resources in the Chinese language, 
providing new details from official reports, news sources, scholarship, and governmental 
notices that together allow more comprehensive insights to be developed. This collection of 
primary materials includes the official announcement, statistics, and reports by the Chinese 
government to illustrate the progress of China’s economic development. By looking at the 
fundamental elements of China’s growth via the two pillars of economic power, this research 
will conclude what China’s rising power ultimately means – what are the statues of China’s 
economic power in terms of international political economy, and what are the implications of 
this economic power to the changing global order? 
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4. Internal Development of the Finance Pillar: Banking and 
Investment Transformation 
 
This chapter explores the trajectory and dynamics of China’s financial deepening as the internal 
aspect of the first pillar. The focus is on the rapid expansion of the financial market and the 
growing variety of financial products associated with the development of China’s banking 
system, financial assets, financial intermediaries, and instruments. It aims to find out to what 
extent the transformations of the financial sector provide a substantial foundation of China’s 
economic power and, potentially, to the overall promotion of China’s role in the world’s 
financial development. 
 
Overall, it is confirmed through this chapter that a significant improvement has taken place; 
with the result passable yet also shallow and criticised. The modernised banking system’s 
provision of more free capital has become the essential means of financing all types of 
enterprises, while the emergence of the stock exchange and credit rating service has further 
boosted the comprehensive development of China’s financial market, although there is still 
room for regulation improvement. The modernised financial structure has promoted China’s 
ability to manage its monetary stability, including the special ‘dual-track’ approach to help 
withstand financial crises. The reform, then, subsequently consolidated China’s financial 
position among neighbouring countries and regions. Meanwhile, China’s currency, the RMB, 
is becoming increasingly internationalised, which is considered another significant 
achievement of China’s financial structure. Although it has been playing an important 
supplementary role in world finance, it is a very large distance from overtaking the dominant 
role of the US dollar.  
 
After in the first section below presenting the rationale for the focus of analysis adopted in this 
study of the internal development of the financial system, the second section of this chapter 
briefly introduces the historic foundation of China’s financial sector post-1949. This was when 
the state, being the only entity in all economic operations, strictly controlled all property and 
capital. The third section presents a review of 1970s financial reform. The core of this 
reformation was market liberalisation, transforming the planned economy into a market-
oriented one by separating out the role of financial institutions into administration and business 
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with a very clear line demarcating the two. The fourth section moves on to explore how China’s 
financial institutions managed national monetary stability, especially during the period of the 
wide-spread financial crisis. This is followed by a fifth section examining the progress of RMB 
internationalisation. 
 
4.1. Operationalising the Study of the Finance pillar: Internal 
Development 
 
The structure of finance, according to Strange (2015b:99-100), consists of two aspects, the 
aspect of generating credit and the aspect of monetary power. Together, these two aspects 
determine a state’s financial power. For example, historically during WWII, the US 
repositioned itself as the greatest creditor and was able to supply credit to other parts of the 
world. This strategy paved the way to a hegemonic peak. Additionally, it was the massive 
outflow of public funds and private capital from the US to the world economy that kept Bretton 
Woods, a monetary system, functioning in the early stages of the US hegemonic regime. Hence, 
applying that to analyse China’s rising power from the perspective of financial development, 
this chapter will look at both the abilities of credit generation and managing monetary issues. 
 
The measurement of these two aspects of financial power is straightforward. For the first one, 
Strange suggests that ‘no advanced economy can function without a system for creating credit’, 
no matter if it is a capitalist economy, a socialist market economy, or a planned economy 
(Strange, 2015b:101). Generating credit is the liability of states and banks; and therefore, one’s 
financial power can be evaluated through the ability to generate credit – the amount of funding 
that can be provided to all kinds of fiscal and business entities to facilitate investment. Besides 
the volume of credit, a set of detailed financial policies should be taken into consideration as 
the foundational factor affecting the overall financial structure.  
 
Other literature coincides with Strange’s argument on the financial structure being a key aspect 
reflecting economic power and supporting the argument that policy is a leading factor 
determining financial performance. It is suggested that the functionality of financial institutions, 
for example, banks, and a variety of financial instruments, such as stocks and securities, can 
‘facilitate trade in goods and services and… funnel resources from savers to investors’ (King 
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and Levine, 1992:1). Early empirical studies pointed out that government policies towards 
financial activities and financial instruments determine the extent of financial deepening. 
Furthermore, McKinnon (1973) highlighted the importance of capital market liberalisation, for 
example, how much freedom is given to banks by the state, and the role of the central bank of 
determining the interest rate. King and Levine (1992) also suggest factors such as investment 
volume as indicators of financial deepening.  
 
The case of China, complying with its special communist doctrine, has significantly close 
monitoring and exerts strong control over its banking system. The capacity of credit creation 
is borne solely by the state because all banks in China are state-owned, with heavily loaded 
bureaucracy in the pre-reform period. To understand how and to what extent China has 
launched itself from this rigid system to become today’s modernised financial structure, means 
looking at policy change, which is a significant area of interest in terms of the liberalisation of 
the market. This includes policies regulating the banking system, stock market, and credit 
rating system, which are considered major instruments in the Chinese finance structure. 
 
As for the management of monetary issues, Strange notably suggests this being determined by 
states and markets, while also being dependent on how much freedom governmental regulation 
gives to other actors (Strange, 2015b). While Strange’s notion of monetary power remains 
vague, voluminous amounts of predominant IPE literature about hegemonic power have made 
a connection with currency power or monetary power, mainly using the significant transition 
between Britain and the US as an example. Both hegemons were, first and foremost, powerful 
in managing their own monetary system, and subsequently were able to extend this power to a 
significantly larger structure where they could manipulate and control the international 
monetary system. Both regimes once possessed their own exchange rate system, namely the 
Gold Standard under Pax Britannia and the US-led Dollar-centred Bretton Woods system. 
 
Having its currency internationalised is often desired by great powers because it can greatly 
consolidate a state’s power from five aspects - reducing transactions costs while providing 
more international seigniorage, macroeconomic flexibility, political leverage, reputation 
(Cohen, 2012). In pursuit of great power, it would be a state’s interest the promote its currency 
status. Cohen (2014) also acknowledge the difficulty of measuring monetary power, but 
particularly under the context of hegemonic analysis or China’s rising power, Cohen believes 
one can simply look at ‘influence’ to determine a country’s monetary power (Cohen, 2014:24); 
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and China’s currency, being one of the most non-convertible currency, can be a great obstacle 
for the nation to pursue greater power. Holding a similar view, Victomov and Abramov (2019) 
suggest that monetary power autonomy, determined by liquidity, is a key component for 
emerging countries’ financial power, combining with macroeconomic policies, to encourage 
the use of credit. Enhanced liquidity of currency can strengthen a state’s ability to withstand 
financial crises and boost foreign trade and investment. Victomov and Abramov also point out 
that the study of banking reform is closely associated with changes in monetary policy and 
financial strength. 
 
At the same time, internationalised currency imposes policy responsibility to that great power. 
Kindleberger (2013) argues that the role of hegemonic power is to provide certain public goods, 
such as an exchange system, in order to maintain the stability and functionality of its regime. 
During the late 19th and early 20th century when London was the world largest market for gold, 
money, and capital, other players willingly adopted the monetary system advocated by Britain 
in order to lower transaction costs, represent creditworthiness, and respond to the financial 
policy made by states (Schwartz, 1996). This vis-à-vis approach stimulated the increasing 
consolidation of British financial hegemony. Similarly, and to a greater extent, the Bretton 
Woods system facilitated US hegemony, with countries participating in this system for more 
convenience in trading goods and dealing of financial assets. Kindleberger believes that a 
hegemon would, therefore, have the ability and willingness to bear such responsibility. The 
transition between Britain and the US fully illustrates this argument. The instability during the 
transition period was essentially caused by the inability of Britain and unwillingness of the US 
to play the hegemonic role (Kindleberger, 2013).  
 
Although it is difficult to measure ‘willingness’ to become a hegemon, from a straightforward 
point of view, to study hegemonic power and transition from a monetary perspective is simply 
examining whether an emerging power has the increasingly overwhelming ability to establish 
and maintain monetary stability. Furthermore, the ability of the leading international monetary 
regime should be established upon profound financial strength. If it is to bear the responsibility 
of maintaining global financial stability, a hegemonic power should be able to manage to 
balance its own payment problem so that the stability of international finance can be continued, 
particularly in the case of the US. That is to say, the US has been facing a chronic current 
account deficit due to the dollar’s role as a reserve currency (Triffin, 1960). The hegemonic 
decline of the US manifested when the pre-existing dollar-centred monetary system gradually 
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became inadequate to fulfil the needs of subordinate countries and has been attributed to 
catastrophic crises worldwide. Based on this rationale, a change of the hegemonic regime may 
take place if a rising power shows an ability to restore order and maintain currency equilibrium.  
 
The internationalisation of RMB, the Chinese currency, is closely related to the issue of 
convertibility. Due to political concerns and safeguarding China’s financial stability, China has 
been reluctant to fully liberalise its capital account. With the consequences of financial 
globalisation, currency internationalisation requires effective policy (Gao and Yu, 2011). This 
means responsive and sensitive polices need to be in place as the foundational and structural 
power of China’s finance.   
 
To simplify the issue, this chapter will focus on the degree of RMB internationalisation, the 
extent it has been used as reserve currency and in transnational clearing, as the indicator of one 
of the aspects of China’s financial power; whereas China participation and responsibility within 
the international financial regimes will be analysed in the next chapter on international 
institutions, in line with some further theoretical guidance.  
 
To sum up, the analysis of China’s financial structure will construct an understanding of the 
internal development of this structure, and subsequently, examine the outcome of this 
development in relation to China’s ability to manage monetary stability. This chapter focuses 
on the former aspect by analysing China’s ability to generate credit and its financial strength 
from the monetary aspect. It will explore the institutional arrangement of China’s finance pillar 
by reviewing relevant policies and reform outcome in several key areas, including the banking 
system, stock exchange, and credit rating system; meanwhile, it will also present a brief 
discussion on currency stability and the status of RMB internationalisation as a direct outcome 
of financial reform. 
 
4.2. The Early Foundations: Pre-reform  
 
This section briefly reviews the pre- and post-1949 financial structure of China, thus providing 
an overview of the structural foundation of China’s financial sector. The first part introduces 
the pre-1949 Nanking structure. The second part presents the changes made since 1949 under 
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the ruling of the Communist Party of China (CPC), followed by the third part showing certain 
detailed monetary policies and China’s attitude towards foreign businesses at that time. The 
overall message paints a picture of far-reaching central control for China’s financial sector, one 
established early on and which has had a covert influence on the trajectory of China’s financial 
development. 
 
The Chinese nation has a history of thousands of years, but China, as a modern economy, is 
conversely young and unstable. China’s history of modernisation can generally be divided into 
a few phases. Starting from 1912 till 1949, the Chinese mainland was under the governance of 
the KMT party after abolishing the monarchy; it was known as the Republic of China. Several 
civil and World Wars took place during that period of time, leaving the country in chaos. 
Problems were lurking within the Chinese regime throughout its years of development, mostly 
caused by mismanagement (Paauw, 1957). For example, continual wars drained the wealth of 
the nation and caused serious inflation. With the help from counterfeit money made by 
Japanese troops and the Silver Purchase Act implemented by the Americans, by 1945, the total 
issue of banknotes stood at 556.9 billion Yuan, which was more than 400 times the number of 
1.4 billion that existed in 1937 (Fan, 2008:4). Gross production failed to catch up at the same 
rate. 
 
Following 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was founded, the structure of the 
Chinese government changed completely, as did the financial system. As the Nanking structure 
had been accused of representing the ‘evil of bureaucracy’, it was completely abolished by the 
communist government following the establishing the People’s Republic of China. The post-
1949 structure, however, was essentially a transition. The new ‘Big Four’ system was set up, 
although the roles were perplexing. To maintain a high level of central control, the people’s 
government issued a whole new form of currency, while foreign business was strictly 
supervised by the People’s Bank of China. The nation again experienced unrest.  
 
The long-time focus of the country was on issues related to ‘class struggle’ under the rule of 
Mao. The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution greatly pushed back the progress of 
social development in China, as well as having a huge impact on the political system, and on 
technological and cultural development. During the Mao era, China’s system was one of a 
highly centralised planned economy. As political factors can highly affect financial and 
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economic progress, it was not until a few years after the Cultural Revolution and a change in 
leadership that China finally started reforming its economic structure.  
 
4.2.1. Post-1949 Banking Structure 
 
After the ‘War of Liberation’, the remaining structure of bureaucratic capital that had been left 
by the predecessor was repugnant to a new government under CPC leadership. A series of 
actions were quickly taken as soon as the People’s Republic of China was founded. The 
‘socialist transformation programme’ took place using a ‘Soviet style’. The People’s Bank of 
China, functioning as the central bank, was set up in late 1948 in preparation for the 
establishment of a new financial sector. It took over all bureaucratic capital banks at that time, 
placing a strong grip on capital control and investment (Zhang, Wang, and Wang, 2012). 
 
The Common Programme, serving as an interim constitution, was adopted by the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference on 29th September 1949. It announced that action 
would be taken to ‘assume control of the remaining bureaucratic capital’ in order to serve the 
communist ideology (PRC. The People’s PCC, 1949). By ‘assume control’, it meant more 
precisely confiscation. The Common Programme provided juristic support for the specific 
policies that came later, including, initially, closing down and liquidating the Central Bank of 
China, the Farmer’s Bank of China, and the Postal Remittance & Saving Bureau. Other minor 
commercial banks, such as Sin Hua and the Imperial Bank of China, which were once jointly 
owned by governmental officials and businessmen, were restructured into public-private 
partnerships. The role of the central bank was solely and completely taken over by the People’s 
Bank of China, previously established in 1948 and officially moved to Beijing in 1949.  
 
Meanwhile, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications (later renamed China 
Construction Bank)2 maintained most of their original function and business, although the 
board of directors was completely reselected and most of the shares were confiscated into 
public ownership.3 Along with these two banks, the Agriculture Bank (founded in 1951) and 
 
2 Later on, the Bank of Communications changed its name to the Constructions Bank of 
China, while a new Bank of Communications was founded in 1987. 
3 China’s party leaders described the political and economic system as ‘people’s democratic 
autocracy’. This term indicates that all rights of the nation belong to the people. The 
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the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (founded in 1984) came to constitute the ‘Big 
Four’ – the leading four state-owned commercial banks4 (Ho, 2012:293). These four banks 
have come to play a role as specialised banks in order to provide funding assistance to urban 
and rural constructions, transportations, business and merchandising, and industrialization. 
Meanwhile, the People’s Bank of China has come to work jointly with the Ministry of Finance 
on issues determining the direction of financial development (Okazaki, 2007:6). 
 
4.2.2. Post-1949 Monetary Policy and Foreign Business 
 
As stated previously, one of the biggest problems for the CPC to tackle was the high inflation 
level left by the nationalist party, KMT. This was mainly caused by a series of long-running 
wars and lack of financial experts during that period. In fact, there had even been more than 
one currency in circulation. Precious metals and foreign currencies flooded the market along 
with the Gold Yuan,5 whilst local banknotes6 also made themselves popular with citizens. 
It took a year for the CPC government to completely abolish the previous currency system. 
Besides legislatively recognised RMB as the only national currency, the CPC set up numerous 
exchange offices for citizens to get rid of the abolished currencies within a limited time, using 
a fixed local price for the Gold Yuan. For instance, the exchange rate of the Gold Yuan to RMB 
was 10:1 when the new government was founded in Beijing and this business lasted for 20 
days; later, when Shanghai was liberated, the rate was set at 100,000:1 and the service was 
opened there for merely a week (Yao, 2007:423). The short period and rapid devaluation of the 
Gold Yuan urged people to abandon the previous currency system. Meanwhile, laws and 
regulations were set up against the dealing of precious metals, especially speculative activities 
in silver and gold.  
 
 
government represents and is responsible to the people. Thus, public ownership is namely 
state ownership in China. 
4 Some scholarship considers the new Bank of Communications, re-established in 1987, as 
the fifth biggest state-owned commercial bank, which thus constitutes the ‘Big Five’, see e.g. 
(Dobson and Kashyap, 2006) and (Zhang and Ye, 2011). 
5 The Gold Yuan had been in use from 1948. Before it appeared, the Chinese Fiat was the 
official currency, from 1935 to 1948, see (Yao, 2007).  
6 From 1949, local banknotes gradually came to be retrieved, and at rates issued by different 
local banks. For example, banknotes in Southern Hebei at 1:100 to RMB; Northwest Farmers 
Banks at 1:2000; 1:3 in central China, etc., see (Yao, 2007).  
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Since the national currency market was centralized, the next action taken by the People’s 
Government was to strictly control foreign exchange and the ownership of foreign currencies. 
Individuals were completely forbidden to carry either national or foreign currency when 
crossing the border without being granted permission from the central bank (PRC. Government 
Administration Council, 1951).7 Citizens were also encouraged to give up ownership of foreign 
money in exchange for RMB.  
 
At the same time, foreign banks could no longer enjoy privileges within China. Those 
privileges included issuing currency and an FX franchise, which had been granted by the 
Nanking government. The People’s Bank of China then became the only institution responsible 
for determining the exchange rate of RMB against other currencies (Zhang, 1999). Besides this, 
it authorised the Bank of China as the operating and regulatory agency, as well as assigning 
several specific and reputable foreign banks as designated franchisers. The exchange rate was 
set according to a comparison method based on domestic and foreign commodity prices. 
 
For example, in 1952, the Yuan-dollar exchange rate increased from 800:1 to 42,000:1 because 
of domestic inflation in China and a crisis in the West (Yang, 2002:72). The exchange rate was, 
however, heavily based on governmental decision-making instead of market relations. In fact, 
this way of handling the exchange rate with strong central control somehow protected China 
from the heavy impact of some of the worldwide financial crises, which will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
 
The foundation of China’s contemporary financial sector retains similarities with these early 
foundations, for example, with four major commercial banks and the joint leadership by the 
Ministry of Finance and the People’s Bank of China. Other measurements were also taken into 
account along with China’s rapid economic recovery post-1949. This structure was efficient in 
controlling the whole situation after a series of wars and allowed the CPC to secure its ruling. 
Such a financial structure also enabled China to quickly recover and unify the financial market. 
 
These very detailed policies were very much influenced by communist and socialist ideologies, 
as well as the Soviet Union. However, they were also part of an inflexible structure – so highly 
 
7 The 1951 policy was replaced by Control Procedures of the PRC on Carrying the State 
Currency into or out of the Country on 1 March 1993. The latter allows movement of 
currencies under controlled method. 
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centralised that almost every economic activity would have to go through either the People’s 
Congress or the People’s Bank. Due to the political structure in China at the time, policies were 
made largely according to the personal will of the party leaders. In Chinese history, there have 
been several major mistakes in economic and political development such as the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Financial development was mainly serving political 
purposes and was off the course; therefore, a reformation was urged, with Deng Xiaoping 
pointing out that ‘finance is the core of a modern economy’ (Deng, 1993). Soon afterwards, in 
1978, financial reformation eventually took place, taking China’s economy to a new level. 
 
4.3. Post-1978 Internal Development and Reform 
 
Finance is one of the most important anchors for the national economy in a modern society. 
McKinnon (1973) points out the significance of a liberalised financial system to healthy 
economic growth. As mentioned multiple times previously, it is nowadays widely 
acknowledged that financial development has a positive effect on the levels of economic 
growth through the facilitation of production and trade.  
 
This section is divided into four parts. The first two parts introduce the changing role of the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC), commercial banks, and the banking system in general, with 
evidence of related laws and regulations. The changes eventually led to a more liberalised 
market and freer capital flow, which greatly promoted the country’s financial and economic 
performance. The argument then moves on to explore related aspects of symbolic financial 
instruments, including the emergence of credit rating standards, and the stock exchange. Both 
the rapid changes and the slow progress to date signify that despite the fruitful outcome of such 
reformation, China’s financial sector remains lacking in sufficient scientific regulation and 
might face fatal institutional and policy problems in the future. Therefore, there is still 
considerable room for improvement within China’s financial structure. 
 
4.3.1. Role of the People’s Bank and Monetary Regulation 
 
Starting in 1978, China was involved in a number of reformations, especially in the economic 
and financial sectors. Before that, the nation was for a long period of time utilising a planned 
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economic system. Banks were strictly centralised and controlled by the CPC government, while 
foreign exchange was supervised closely and only permitted via the People’s Bank. Such a 
financial system was described as ‘shallow’ (Naughton, 2007) until the decision to carry out 
financial reform in 1978. The commercialisation of banks started in the mid-1980s when the 
modern concept of banking emerged in China. The People’s Bank of China, as the central bank, 
gradually released specific banking business and a certain level of autonomy to newly 
established commercial banks (Okazaki, 2007). Bonds could be purchased privately. New 
intermediaries were gradually allowed and regulations for open market started to be set up (Xu, 
1996).  
 
One of the essentials of this reformation lay in identifying and clarifying the roles of a central 
bank and commercial banks. Complete separation of the Ministry of Finance and the People’s 
Bank in early 1978 marked the beginning of this financial reformation. It started as a slow 
process but gradually accelerated. 
 
In September 1983, the Decision on Functions of the People’s Bank of China taken by the state 
council symbolised the establishment of a regulatory role for the PBOC in terms of 
macroeconomic control. It no longer carried out saving function and credit business for neither 
individuals nor enterprises. Instead, there was a stipulation that the PBOC would transfer all 
its daily commercial business to the Industrial and Commercial Bank, and the PBOC would 
only carry out functions including: 
 
“Research and drafting of principles, policies, laws and regulations, the basic 
system, and their implementation of financial work; regulating currency 
issuance and currency market; unified management of RMB deposit and lending 
rates and the exchange rate…” (PRC. State Council, 1983) 
 
Beginning after this announcement was made, and over the next two years, the PBOC’s 
household saving business dropped away dramatically (Xu, 1996). Eventually, the People’s 
Bank was transformed into a non-commercial administrative-only institution.  
 
In 1986, Deng Xiaoping stated the importance of reforming the banking system as ‘banks must 
fulfil their role and function as banks’ (Deng, 1993). During the next year, the People’s Bank 
proposed four targets to achieve and a series of detailed policies. Yet, China’s financial sector 
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was liberalised to a very limited extent and still restrained under the planned economy. Banks 
were highly reliant upon and bound to the government while the market economy mechanism 
was still under construction.  
 
It was not until the end of 1993 when the government announced the Decision of the State 
Council on Reformation of the Financial System. This announcement clarified the four ultimate 
targets of financial reformation in China, which were namely: 1) establishing a strong and 
stable regulatory banking system based on the rules of a central bank; 2) implementing the 
separation between policy finance and commercial finance; 3) establishing an open, regulated, 
competitive financial market under the instruction of related laws; and 4) reforming the foreign 
exchange management system by coordinating foreign exchange policy and monetary policy 
(PRC. State Council, 1993a). Those targets correspond with the principles given by the World 
Bank – that financial systems should be able to make economic transactions easier, more 
efficient, and low-risk (World Bank, 1989).  
 
In 1995, the enforcement of The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank 
of China conferred official and legal protection to the PBOC’s nature as the central bank of 
modern China. Apart from regulating the whole financial sector in China, the PBOC also bore 
the obligation of maintaining currency stability and determining interest rates (Pei, 1998). As, 
since 1985, individuals had been permitted to hold and make deposits using foreign currencies, 
transactions involving foreign exchange began increasing every year. Following the trend of 
liberalising the exchange market, the PBOC firstly improved the relevant laws and regulations; 
secondly, it used its macro-control power to set up appropriate exchange rates and maintain 
currency stability. 
 
The Announcement on Further Reform of Foreign Exchange Management System8 by the 
PBOC in 1993 clarified that the long-term target of China’s exchange management system was 
to make the RMB a ‘freely convertible currency’ (PRC. State Council, 1993b). The prevailing 
circumstances were those of social transformation – from a planned economy to market 
economy (Qian, 1995). Thus, the Announcement put forward a three-phase plan: current 
account conditionally convertible, current account freely convertible, and finally capital 
 
8 This announcement was marked expired in 2009. 
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account freely convertible. A nationwide unified foreign exchange market was then established 
with the PBOC’s centralized management of foreign exchange reserves. 
 
 In 1996, the Regulations on Exchange Control of the Peoples Republic of China9 set up a legal 
framework on the foreign exchange of RMB current accounts. Meanwhile, the capital account 
was still under strict control (Zhang, 2006). Foreign exchange income could be saved in a 
special foreign currency account at designated banks but was not allowed to be converted into 
RMB without permission (PRC. State Council, 1996). The export of overseas investment and 
foreign investment capitals also required permission from the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange.  
 
As for the exchange rate, China adopted a unified exchange rates system, which means the 
domestic financial market exchange rate is consistent with the exchange rates of the 
international financial market. However, it was not completely consistent as, to a great extent, 
it was reliant on management by the government and the PBOC. For instance, the graph below 
shows a dramatic depreciation of the RMB in 1994, which was attributed to an aggressive 
exportation strategy (Huang, 2010).  
 
Figure 4.1 RMB to USD exchange rate, 1981-2014 
 
 Source: (PRC. National Bureau of Statistics, nd) 
 
9 This law has been revised in 2008. The new version allows certain types of currency 
conversion, for example for registered regular trade activities. 
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The devaluation of the RMB resulted in a much lower price for China’s export commodities 
when compared to local products of Western developed countries. This gave China’s 
manufacturing industry and economic growth a great advantage. It also impacted on normal 
people’s everyday lives as domestic pricing became unstable. Inflation began to increase 
sharply, from 6.3% in 1992 to 14.6% in 1993 and 24.2% in 1994, according to the World 
Bank.10 Thus, this system was criticized as a “mandatory FX settlement system” (Chen, 2003; 
Huang, 2004). Clearly, while a certain level of freedom was introduced into businesses 
involving foreign exchange, the system overall remains under strict control as the central bank 
retains a strong grip on convertibility in order to coordinate with China’s economic strategy 
and maintain monetary stability. This aspect will be discussed in further detail in the fourth and 
fifth sections. 
 
4.3.2. Liberalised Commercial Banks 
 
The second remarkable achievement in the process of financial reform is the liberalisation of 
commercial banks. This is a development of the second track – the emergence of market as 
coordinator of economy (Qian, 2000). Before China’s reformation, as mentioned previously, 
banks functioned as an economic lever following political orders. Sinclair described this as a 
worldwide phenomenon whereby ‘commercial banks used to be the institutions that 
corporations, municipalities, and national governments sought out in order to borrow money’ 
(Sinclair, 2005:3). It was the same situation in China, with strong socialist privilege favouring 
state-owned enterprises. The banking system, isolated from the external world, caused 
‘stagnant productivity, extensive inefficiency and waste, and low morale’ (Jao, 1991). In order 
to change the situation, progressive action was taken. In the paragraphs below, these actions 
are reviewed. 
 
Before 1979, credit management was mainly based on a ‘supply system’ – relying merely on 
governmental decisions (Leng, 2009). At the early stage of reformation, changes mainly 
targeted reactivation, reopening, and recreation. ‘Bank branches were encouraged to explore 
new ways of attracting savings and were given more discretion in the allocation of credit’ 
 
10 See World Development Indicators, Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) (World Bank, 
nd). 
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(Bowles and White, 1993:74). In 1984, the PBOC activated the interbank market mechanism, 
allowing more flexible credit allocation between commercial banks. Structural reform occurred 
at the same time. Major commercial banks converted from a state-owned to a shareholding 
framework. Thus, without the strong backing of the government, these banks were compelled 
to seek out new mechanisms for operating and showing responsibility to their stakeholders. 
 
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks was published in 1995 and 
has been constantly revised up until today, providing legal the basis and instructions through 
which commercial banks can operate; especially for the Big Four, the leading state-owned 
commercial banks, whose role changed from the ‘cashiers of government’ into independent 
enterprises (Fu and Heffernan, 2009). Gradually, starting with a few major cities, certain 
authority was granted to local government and PBOC branches in order to make flexible use 
of funds and credit.  
 
The relationship between the PBOC and other commercial banks changed in general, as 
commercial banks became relatively independent from the PBOC. Commercial banks gained 
a right to self-management, instead of receiving funds from the PBOC and taking orders from 
the state councils (PRC. People's Congress Standing Committee, 1995). This transformation 
encouraged commercial banks to initiatively attract and distribute capitals, which eventually 
led to the separation of policy and commercial finance. The concept of a ‘dual-track’ emerged, 
as both the administration and the market came to play equally matched roles in economic 
activities. Therefore, an era of ‘market socialism’ started in China. 
 
‘At the end of 2003, the four major commercial banks had a capital growth rate of 2.11%, but 
improved to a 13.17% accumulation rate by the end of 2007. Bad loans dropped from 16.84% 
to 2.81% in the same period’ (Hou, 2011:423). China’s central banking system was therefore 
reshaped following four basic principles, including unified planning by the People’s Bank; 
account division among specialised banks; fund and loan availability control and constraints; 
and interbank lending as cash-flow back up (CSRC, 1993:285, as cited in Lu and Yu, 2000:198). 
Yet, some have argued that banks were given more autonomy while remaining weak in 
imposing discipline on enterprises (Bowles and White, 1993). Mehran and Quintyn (1996) 
believe that the first ten years of reformation were wasted on institutional development instead 
of real market development. After all, the reformation was largely restricted under communist 
ideology. In comparison to the relatively more developed Western financial institutions, 
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China’s banking system still contains features of immaturity and rigidity, while the level of 
operational autonomy is limited (Tam, 1986).  
 
Overall, the independence and liberalisation of commercial banks, including both the Big Four 
and other smaller commercial banks of different types of ownership founded later on, greatly 
altered the way for businesses to finance their capitals. While some critique suggested that 
further reform and liberalisation are required, the liberalisation of commercial banks under 
China’s ‘dual-track’ system has led to the liberalisation of capitals, constituting one of the most 
significant components of China’s enhanced financial power. 
 
4.3.3. Stock Market Development 
 
Shareholding represents a significant mechanism for generating productive capital, and for 
storing and accumulating value by investors. While securities trading was stopped in 1952, the 
practice re-emerged in the post-1978 reform period. A number of SOEs started to raise funds 
by offering shares to the public. This action is most accurately characterised as emergence of 
corporate bond issuance than the emergence of stock exchange per se, due to the very limited 
scale of both market scale and participants. Nonetheless, this development represents a 
significant aspect in the deepening of the Chinese financial system and China’s strengthened 
ability of generating credit, which constitutes an emergent node of economic power. 
 
Six years after the financial reform officially initiated, in 1984, Feilo Acoustics Co Ltd became 
the first authorised company to openly issue shares on the stock market, when both the 
Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange started operation (Tang, 1999). Since then, freedom 
for exchanging and trading was given to the public, and the government began to work on 
improving its regulatory role in the stock market. In 1992, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) was also founded as an institute of the State Council, while the Interim 
Provisions on the Management of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks was published in the 
following year as the first regulation in relation to the stock exchange. The Interim Provisions 
set standards for procedures for stock issuances, exchanges, and most importantly, information 
disclosure, as well as investigation and punishment. For example, a: 
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“listed company shall provide the following documents to the Commission, stock 
exchanges to: (A) submit an interim report within 60 days after the end of the 
first six months of each fiscal year; (B) submit an annual audited report by a 
certified accountant within 120 days after the end of each fiscal year.” (PRC. 
State Council, 1993c: Art 57) 
 
Figure 4.2 Total stock market capitalisation, 1997-2017 (billion yuan) 
Source: (PRC. National Bureau of Statistics, nd) 
 
However, when implemented on 27 March 1995, it inevitably had some loopholes and defects, 
and scandals involving irregularity by several companies were exposed. Again in 1997, the 
Qiong Minyuan Case involving securities fraud was investigated as the biggest fraud case in 
China’s securities market history. Consequently, revision to relevant laws and regulatory 
practices were urged (Sami and Zhou, 2008). 
 
A study conducted by He and Pardy (1993) shows that based on data between 1978 and 1990, 
financial depth positively correlated with stock market development and market capitalisation 
as a proportion of GDP. The study also concludes that such a correlation can explain the reason 
why continuous foreign investment attracted markets with a more advanced infrastructure.  
 
Despite the obstacles encountered throughout the development process, China’s stock market 
has now been operating for 25 years and obtained some remarkable achievements. The market 
expanded dramatically, from 104.8 billion Yuan total market value in 1992 to the 37.25 trillion 
in 2014 which created a 355-time increase. At the beginning of 2015, the total share capital of 
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listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange was 27,09 million Yuan, while total market 
capitalisation reached 24.40 trillion Yuan, with a gross float market capital of 22.05 trillion 
Yuan. Until June 2018, the Shanghai Stock Exchange had a total of 1425 listed companies and 
1469 stocks (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2018). This is not to mention the amount of capital 
flowing in both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges together. 
 
Table 4.1 Annual transaction overview of A, B shares in Shanghai Stock Exchange  
 
Year 
Total Market 
capitalisation 
(Billion Yuan) 
Float market 
capitalisation 
(Billion Yuan) 
Number of 
Transactions 
(million) 
Total 
Turnover 
(Billion Yuan) 
Average 
Earnings 
Ratio (%) 
2017   2401.78 51124.28  
2016 28460.76 24000.62 2383.18 50170.04 15.94 
2015 29519.42 25412.78 5134.08 133099.21 17.63 
2014 24397.40 22049.58 1590.87 37716.21 15.99 
2013 15116.52 13652.63 1153.37 23026.60 10.99 
2012 15869.84 13429.44 925.55 16454.50 12.3 
2011 14837.62 12285.13 1273.28 23756.04 13.4 
2010 17900.72 14233.74 1661.49 30431.20 21.61 
2009 18465.52 11480.50 2142.61 34651.19 28.73 
2008 9725.19 3230.59 1278.84 18042.99 14.85 
2007 26983.88 6453.22 1617.33 30543.42 59.24 
2006 7161.23 1642.83 447.26 5781.66 33.3 
2005 2309.61 675.46 210.14 1924.02 16.33 
2004 2601.43 735.08 260.16 2647.06 24.23 
2003 2980.49 820.11 206.61 2082.41 36.54 
2002 2536.37 746.73 175.57 1695.90 34.43 
2001 2759.05 838.21 209.75 2270.93 37.71 
2000 2693.08 848.13 304.91 3137.38 58.22 
1999 1458.04 424.97 179.71 1696.57 37.09 
… … … … … … 
Source: (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2018) 
 
The Chinese Stock Market also attracted a number of foreign stocks and foreign investors.11  
However, the openness of the market is still very limited, with the degree of market 
liberalisation unable to catch up with leading Western countries. One major problem is the 
 
11 Catalogue A is stocks issued in CNY within China and trade among Chinese investors; B is 
stock issued in USD and HKD within China but subjects to foreign investors; H stands for 
stocks of Chinese enterprises issued in HKD and listed in Hong Kong stock market. 
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function of the stock market in relation to SOEs. The government still maintains a high degree 
of control over the market via the operation of SOEs. Backed by the state and able to bypass 
regulatory bodies, SOEs have been exploiting stock exchange as an easy financing instrument. 
It was advised, however, that this operation be avoided as a long-term strategy (Lin, 1999).  
 
In the early 2000s, a few state-owned giants appeared on the stock market. Those included 
monopolists such as China Sinopec and the Baosteel Group. As mentioned previously, the 
reform of commercial banks and the setting up of a credit rating standard made it more difficult 
for enterprises to obtain funds and investments from banks. That was mainly because of the 
rigid bureaucratic system within SOEs, as they were very used to being privileged and 
supported by the government. Therefore, SOEs chose to join stock markets as a way out. As 
soon as the more reputable SOEs had attracted enough individual investors, the price of each 
share went on a roller-coaster ride. There is evidence showing that China’s stock market is, in 
fact, the tool used by the government to make up SOEs bad debt or to provide temporary and 
superficial solutions to inflation (Chen, 2006).  
 
Additionally, as Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1 above show, during 2007-2008, the opening up of 
the stock market with the lack of an effective regulator led to serious instability. The stock 
exchange in China went on to become overheated, that is, from 2005 to 2007. The reasons for 
this are various. Combined with the data on GDP growth rate, which increased sharply from 
10.08% to 14.19% during 2004-2007 (World Bank, nd), the overheated stock market was due 
to the apparent prospect of the market and a rapid increase of spendable income of Chinese 
public.  
 
The apparent high return thus enhanced a stock market bubble phenomenon. In response, 
during 2007, the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation jointly 
announced an adjustment on the stamp duty for stock exchange transactions, an increase from 
1‰ to 3‰ (PRC. Ministry of Finance, 2007). The new policy caused an immediate effect the 
next day – prices of 853 stocks dropping by the daily limit of 10%. China’s stock market thus 
received a heavy blow and the tension was not eased until the next year. This adjustment 
eventually held back the unhealthy growth of the stock bubble, although it also seemed to be 
an improvised tool made and used by the government, and for which China’s stock market paid 
a high price.  
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The lack of scientific and effective regulation is also confirmed by the data of 2015-2016 (Tabe 
4.1 and Figure 4.2). Following an overheated market, early 2016, the CSRC introduced Circuit 
breaker to the Chinese stock market. Triggered twice in four days, the new mechanism was 
quickly abolished by CSRC, but leaving a 7.41 trillion Yuan loss of market capitalisation 
according to the BBC (Pramuk, 2016; BBC, 2016). Scholars, therefore, urged the government 
and financial experts to reconsider the condition of China’s capital market and manage 
‘scientifically’ (see Chen, Zhang, and Wang 2009; Jiang et al., 2010).  
 
In general, the accomplishment of building securities and a stock regime is remarkable in China. 
In comparison to advanced countries, it took much less time for China to achieve the same 
scale of market. Still, the size and transactions keep growing, and the gross value of stocks has 
multiplied dramatically. On the other hand, some have argued that the outcome of capital 
reform was disappointing because it is a problem by default to introduce the capital market into 
a socialist economy (Bowles and White, 1992b). The lack of thoughtful regulation and lagging 
policy indicate the still very immature Chinese stock market. It is a big step forward for the 
development of China’s capital market and for the strengthening of China’s financial power. 
However, because of the low starting point and inexperience, the outcome of this development 
remains shallow. The instability of the market and swinging regulatory decision are the major 
obstacle of China to pursue profound economic power through the instrument of the stock 
exchange. 
 
4.3.4. Crediting Rating 
 
As economic systems become increasingly complex, there is a need for credit allocation to 
move beyond personalised relationships between investors and investees (Sinclair, 2014). 
While the performance of credit rating agencies has been subjected to much scrutiny before 
and after the global financial crisis, such mechanisms constitute an important component of 
contemporary financial systems (Sinclair, 2010; White, 2010). In the paragraphs below, the 
relatively recent emergence of credit rating agencies in China is reviewed. 
 
In the 1980s, a crediting rating agency emerged in China, first as a department formed by the 
PBOC. However, it took a decade before this department became independent and other 
independent agencies started to emerge (Yang, 2002). Due to the openness and independence 
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of the banking system and the increasing volume of investment, the emergence of a credit 
rating system came to be of great significance for investors in the Chinese financial market 
looking to reduce risks and losses.  
 
In 1997, the PBOC identified nine rating agencies who had acquired qualification for engaging 
in corporate bond rating. After nearly twenty years of development and market testing, only 
four of them remain. The development of China’s credit rating system is simple and largely 
reliant on borrowing experience from the West. In December 2002, Measurements on 
Eligibility of Employees in Securities Industry issued by the CSRC required credit rating agents 
to hold certain qualifications and practice certificates. It was not until 2007 when the CSRC 
put forward Interim Measures Stock Market Credit Rating Business, which laid down more 
detailed rules regarding licensing, business rules, supervision and management, and legal 
responsibility for credit rating agencies. However, this document is fundamentally immature 
and limited, only regulating the credit rating for listed companies and stocks (PRC. CSRC, 
2007).  
 
In October 2016, the PBOC published a set of drafted interim regulations regarding the whole 
credit rating industry. Instead of putting it into immediate effect, the PBOC invited public 
opinion on the new regulations. The biggest contribution of this draft text was the clarification 
of basic principles and responsibilities, from aspects of management, use of personnel and 
procedure of operations to information disclosure and supervision (PRC. PBOC, 2016a). The 
industry is supervised by several government departments including the PBOC, CSRC, and 
National Development and Reform Commission while maintaining a high level of 
independence. It is also strictly forbidden for any agency to make any kind of promise 
regarding results in order to solicit clients. The draft text can be seen to provide a basic 
guideline on credit rating activities and, in principle, the ability to greatly reduce the chance of 
unqualified entities entering the financial market. 
 
However, at the same time, the CSRC rules are vague in term of the actual practice of credit 
rating. There is no detailed specification on the different varieties of bonds and credits. Multiple 
supervision and different regulatory authorities having different standards for approving the 
qualification of a credit rating agency thus resulted in a lack of unification and effectiveness 
for the regulation of rating agencies. In reality, two of the six agencies qualified by the CSRC 
failed to obtain qualifications for a corporate bond rating; another two were not recognised by 
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China Insurance Regulatory Commission; three of them were assessed as unqualified to carry 
out short-term and medium-term bonds’ ratings (Zhang, 2013b:79). 
 
Because the credit rating industry is still young and immature, data accumulation and database 
construction are still lagging behind due to limited development time. In particular, the lack of 
data on defaults makes it difficult to evaluate corresponding indicators such as probability and 
loss given default (LGD). In addition, China’s domestic macroeconomic and financial 
environment changes rapidly owing to fast-paced economic development and growth, thus, 
there can be deviations between timeliness rating results and the actual situation.  
 
Besides, a rating analysis can be a qualitative process. In the case where there is no specific 
legal provision enforced yet, various agents may give out various results on the same subject 
(Zhao, 2011). On the other hand, such defects have driven potential clients towards more 
reputable and trustworthy agencies abroad, for example Moody’s and Fitch Ratings in the US. 
This has led to a vicious cycle of stagnancy in China’s credit rating business. Scott Kennedy 
(2008) believes that China’s credit rating companies find it difficult to gain reputation and 
affect the decision-making powers of those entities that issue or invest. Moreover, Kennedy 
observes that though privatised, many credit rating agencies, as well as other financial 
institutions, are greatly dependent on a government mandate, rather than supported by the 
market.  
 
Overall, as a newly developed instrument, credit rating system can be a significant component 
to stabilise China’s financial structure and to boost liberalisation of capitals once the system is 
properly designed and regulated. While Chinese credit rating agencies tend to make their own 
rules under a loose governmental regulatory, their role is somehow weakened by the strong 
grip of central control. It is too soon to make the verdict that the Chinese credit rating system 
has already constituted an influential share of China’s financial power at this moment. 
 
4.3.5. Summary: Post-1978 Financial Development as a Source of Economic Power 
 
Besides the drastic reform in the banking section and liberalisation of capitals, Chinese 
government also gradually introduced other financial products, instutions, and measurements 
to further diversify China’s financial structure. Provencian and local state-owned banks 
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emerged as supplements to the Big Four to better serve people’s every-day life. Apart from 
stock exchange, other financial products, such as insurance, trusts, and growth funds, were 
made available for public to purchase with the corresponding laws in place to regulate these 
newly emerged industries12.  
 
Development in this area recently started to expand to overseas markets. Chinese commercial 
banks, since the 2000s, are seeking opportunities of expansion through setting up subsidiaries 
and merger and acquisition, and by 2011 these state-owned commercial banks are in control of 
270 billion USD worth of assets overseas (Zhang, 2013a). Although the internationalisation of 
Chinese domestic financial institutions going abroad is still at an early stage, this indisutry is 
developing quickly with new instutions mushroomed in recent years and relevant studies 
published since the late 2000s (e.g. Zhu, 2005; Wu, 2006; Hu, 2009). 
 
Chinese scholars are also looking at the internationalisation of China’s stocks market. Tian 
(2001) compared stock markets of various countries and concluded that the process of  
internationalising Chinese stock markets should follow ‘baby steps’ – slowly and graudually, 
because the impact of voluminous foreign capitals will greatly increase the risk and instability 
of the Chinese market. Similar researches followed, continuing to guide the process (e.g. Kang 
and Zhang, 2001; Yang and Huang, 2003; Wang, 2017), whereas other research has pointed 
out that the structural defects in China’s securities system and weakness from the legal 
perspective are the main restrain of the internationalisation (Li, 2017). 
 
By examining major developments in China’s financial structure, the general pattern of reform 
and transformation can be discerned, and reflection provided on the extent to which changes 
constitute significant foundations of economic power. The CPC leadership has determined at 
the constitutional level that China’s economy and property ownership is under stricter central 
control compared with Western regimes. On the one hand, financial reform, by reallocating 
responsibility and resources among different banks, indeed has generated and liberalised a 
large amount of capital. On the other, the modernisation of China’s financial structure remains 
problematic, especially in terms of the regulation of financial activities. The gap in 
policymaking can consequently lead to great losses within the financial market – for example, 
 
12 For example, Chinese Insurance Law was published in 1995 followed by the national Trust 
Law in 2001. 
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the stock market crashes that occurred in the late 2000s and 2016. Further reform is necessary 
to allow financial deepening to overcome this obstacle.  
 
Overall, the 1978 financial reform has fundamentally reshaped China’s financial structure from 
several dimensions, including reform of the banking system and the introduction of modern 
financial instruments. The banking reform is the predominant factor that enhanced China’s 
financial power, as this action has clearly separated the roles of different institutions and freed 
capitals from the previous rigid planned economy. China’s economic power has reached a new 
height compared to its old self pre-1978. Meanwhile, the development of financial instruments, 
including the stock market and credit rating system, is relatively recent. Because of the lack of 
scientific management and the fundamental ideological restriction, the increase of China’s 
economic power through this dimension is incremental. In general, while the reform has 
achieved great outcome providing meaningful foundation of China’s financial power, this 
outcome does not sufficiently indicate an economic power enough to become world hegemony. 
 
4.4. The 1990s: Crisis, Transition, and Monetary Stability 
 
Besides the liberalisation of the financial market, the ability to manage monetary stability is 
also considered a key function of a financial structure. This section examines China’s response 
to financial crises as the indicator of its ability to maintain monetary stability. Since the Third 
Plenary Session in 1978, the opening up of the financial market had also become a reform goal. 
Large scale communications and cooperation brought China a breakthrough in terms of 
international financial relations. While the market has become liberalised and open for more 
actors, including foreign institutions, to access, the impact from beyond the border has also 
increased. 
 
This section proceeds by first examining China’s reaction to the Asian Financial Crisis, and 
then moves on to discuss the transition process when Hong Kong was incorporated as a major 
milestone in China’s financial structure. Both cases suggest that the gradual transition into a 
socialist ‘dual-track’ financial system, has enabled China to withstand the impact of sudden 
change and avoid the vulnerability of excessive liberalisation; therefore, China possesses good 
capacity to manage its domestic monetary stability. 
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By the end of 1997, China had set up 687 financial institutions abroad, including 654 business 
institutions and 33 representative offices, operating across 24 countries and regions (Yao, 
2007:541). Foreign institutions started to enter China’s market progressively as well. Those 
institutions not only included banks, but also insurance agency and trust agency. At the 
beginning of 1999, Beijing cancelled the regional restriction on foreign financial institutions, 
allowing these entities to operate in all major cities in China. In February of the same year, the 
total number of foreign financial institutions reached 191, with a total of $36 billion assets (Wu, 
2008:488).  
 
China’s market has huge capacity and potential due to the large population and its own 
demands for development. It is certainly an attraction for all kinds of cooperation. Throughout 
the process of the market opening, the Chinese government continued to play its role as 
regulator, and from a micro-economic perspective, keeping the degree of intervention to a 
minimum. Echoing the view of macro-control, China insists on using the ‘market socialism’ 
principle as guidance.  
 
The East Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, starting in Thailand, before spreading through 
East Asian, and affecting cross-continents. The causes are many. Apart from the immature 
financial market within the majority of developing countries, the economic bubble and bad 
debt contributed a lot to the occurrence of such an incident (Radelet and Sachs, 1998). There 
are similarities among those who suffered the most in this crisis, from those who had their 
national currency pegged to the dollar, to the unregulated market and those experiencing less 
advanced risk management. 
 
By contrast, as the previous section pointed out, the Chinese government adopted a step-by-
step approach in liberalising the exchange of RMB with other currencies. Its capital account 
was not fully opened to free converting. The relatively low level of market liberalisation and 
relatively highly concentrated macro-control prevented the country from experiencing a 
devastating blow to its financial system. This was despite the huge pressure to prevent the RMB 
from depreciating. 
 
Internally, it had taken an effort to expand domestic demand and make policy to stimulate 
economic growth, as on 23 October 1997, the PBOC issued Notice of Lowering Deposit and 
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Lending Rates of Financial Institutions and Offshore Banking Administrative Measures. By 
the end of 1997, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council made an official notice 
regarding financial deepening and risk control. The notice pointed out the importance of risk 
management, stressed the need for strong macro-control, and expressed resolute opposition 
against speculation and other illegal financial activities (PRC. State Council, 1997). This 
attitude was able to maintain the operation of China’s domestic economy at a healthy and stable 
level, easing tensions around Asia, and promoting economic recovery.  
 
In addition, to ease the crisis, the Chinese government adopted a series of positive and proactive 
policies. Externally, it provided, through bilateral channels, a total of more than $4 billion in 
aid to Thailand and other countries in the framework of the IMF arrangements. It also sent out 
free emergency medicine plus import and export credit to Indonesia and others (PRC. Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, nd). 
 
Taking the crisis as an opportunity, the Chinese government, represented by Jiang Zemin 
during the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting of 1998, proposed the need to strengthen 
international cooperation, reform and improve the international financial system, and respect 
others’ choices in overcoming financial crises (PRC. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998). In 
other diplomatic meetings, China’s leaders pointed out and advocated for making the following 
a priority: strengthening regulation and supervision on short-term capital flows and 
encouraging communications between finance ministers and expert groups (Ba, 2003).  
 
Economists concluded that the financial crisis may have caused big damage for China’s 
economy and national wealth, but even greater was the political gain as the impression of 
China’s ability to stand fast against the crisis was created (Noble and Ravenhill, 2000). Despite 
heavy losses to national reserves and economic development, the ‘China mode’ won its 
reputation during the series of financial crises occurring worldwide. It was also at that point 
that the debate about the Washington Consensus and ‘Beijing Consensus’ began, as many 
believed that China’s use of macro-control would be superior to the highly liberal economic 
policy used in a US-oriented financial framework. 
 
Another major impact on China’s financial system in the 1990s was the handover of Hong 
Kong. Before 1999, Hong Kong was under the administration of the UK. The 1970s was an 
 100 
era of a rapid emergence for the financial industry in Hong Kong due to an improving 
relationship between China and the UK. The reformation in Mainland China provided huge 
business opportunities and strong backing for Hong Kong’s economic development.  
 
Hong Kong itself as an open harbour with access to the Chinese market attracted numerous 
financial institutions. The British Hong Kong government adopted high-level liberal financial 
policies, including the abolition of exchange controls, the importing and exporting of gold, and 
restraint on foreign banks. Though under the governance of the British Hong Kong government, 
the main target and dependent object of Hong Kong finance was China. The CPC did not 
recognise the Treaty of Nanking, the Convention of Peking, or the Second Convention of 
Peking, but insisted on the handover of Hong Kong to Chinese authority instead. As to the 
economic structure, privileges were given to Hong Kong to keep the status quo. Hong Kong 
Basic Law13 Chapter V Section 1 clarified that Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy 
in its financial sector: 
 
“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have independent finances. 
(Art. 106) 
… 
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide 
an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the 
status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre. (Art. 109)” (PRC. 
People’s Congress, 1990) 
 
As the Articles indicate, such policy was significant in maintaining the stability of Hong 
Kong’s economy, as well as its position as a pioneer with its open harbour and intermediary 
role in China’s external finance. It also guaranteed its role as a free port.   
 
Furthermore, the mainland and Hong Kong became each other’s biggest investor, with the 
latter providing strong financial and technical support to the former. Correspondingly, the 
PBOC promised to bear the liability of stabilising the Hong Kong dollar according to the 
bilateral agreement on repurchasing US Treasury Bonds signed by both in 1996 (Chen, 1996). 
This was a successful move, for as the previous section showed, China’s solid national reserve 
 
13 This law came into enforced on 1st July 1997 
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was able to reduce an Asian Financial Crisis impacting Hong Kong and preserve the stable 
value of the Hong Kong Dollar. Mutual benefit has been considerable throughout the 
development of Hong Kong. 
 
For China, incorporating Hong Kong into its financial structure was a huge step forward in 
terms of market reform. Meanwhile, the strategy of maintaining autonomy in Hong Kong and 
close macro-control in Mainland China proved to be effective, especially after the Asian 
Financial Crisis when Hong Kong was exposed to severe financial instability. In other words, 
if Hong Kong was subject to strict control as it was in the mainland, it would lose the advantage 
of being a free port and regional financial centre; on the other hand, while in need of integration, 
if the mainland market was fully liberalised, China would not be able to stabilise its domestic 
monetary system due to lack of regulation and the impact of global crises, not to mention being 
the regional stabiliser.  
 
Overall, the period of the late 1990s illustrates China’s enhanced financial power through the 
eruption of the international financial crisis and the handover of Hong Kong. While China had 
liberalised its financial market to a certain extent, a concentrated macro-control remains as the 
core of the Chinese financial system. The dual-track approach enabled China to withstand 
impact of international incident and maintain largely internal stability. 
 
4.5. RMB Internationalisation 
 
Due to the progress of globalisation, there is always a natural need for one currency to be the 
single common international denomination for all countries. If the world did not choose the US 
dollar, it would have chosen a currency from another country. As concluded by Helleiner and 
Kirshner (2009), the reserve currency usually has to bear several obligations, including the 
ability to exchange, store, and value, while, more importantly, act as an anchor for the world’s 
monetary system. These functions and roles can be reflected in several aspects of economic 
and political activities. Central banks of each country are not only economic entities but also 
governmental bodies. Monetary policy and currency, therefore, imply the status of markets, the 
instrument of certain authority, and the grand strategy of the whole nation.  
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As the market indicates, the reserve currency certainly has enough attraction towards players 
in international exchange. The sources of such attraction rely largely on the pre-existing market 
share of the currency, as well as in liquidity and a transactional network. Market share is a 
direct basis of currency hegemony. Until 2014, the US dollar maintained a share of around 60% 
in the foreign exchange market, with about 25% by Euro, whereas the RMB took up less than 
3% overall (IMF, 2016). Though occupying the majority position in terms of foreign exchange 
reserves, the US dollar still suffers negative predictions that it would endure as the world-
leading reserve currency eventually.  
 
An influential amount of existing literature has shown expectations for China’s RMB to 
dominate the market over time (e.g. Bowles and Wang, 2008; Cohen, 2012; Eichengreen, 2005). 
It is not necessary to elaborate on the point that dollar hegemony is challenged currently by the 
Euro, instead of the RMB. In terms of long-term analysis and prediction, the current statistics 
on market share are superficial, thus containing a natural defect. Over a longer period, there is 
the obvious downfall of the dollar compared to half a century ago.  
 
The Triffin dilemma has already been suggested as a major reason for this, for the unipolarity 
of the dollar was undoubtedly a failure (Triffin, 1960). The decreased occupation of the dollar 
was in fact due to an adjustment to the dollar hegemonic system itself, in order to maintain the 
dollar’s major sphere of influence. Though expecting increasing popularity, the RMB is 
actually falling far behind the US dollar while the latter is still the most favourable currency 
(Figure 4.3). From the perspective of market share and market dominance, there is a possibility 
for the RMB to outdo the dollar, however, it would be a significant and long process. Because 
of the lengthy and unpredictable upcoming timeline, in addition to both China and the US being 
active and dynamic actors on the world stage, the pattern of international finance would also 
be more dynamic than ever. 
 
Liquidity and convertibility are the other major aspects considered in terms of reserve currency. 
Liquidity stands for the scale of flow of a certain currency, especially the usage of the currency 
outside of the original country. Chen and Tian (2013), from China National School of 
Administration, state that the function of an international currency should not merely be about 
storage, but more importantly be reflected in the valuation, settlement, investment, and 
financing of businesses. Such functions should include the ability to open letters of credit, 
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guarantees, and honour checks regarding international financing. More specifically, to carry 
out financial derivative business corresponding to interest rates, exchange rates, stocks, and 
bonds. Thus, the status and influence of a currency can continuously improve and expand.  
 
It would be insignificant for an international currency to be kept in stock without any use. Chen 
points out that the direct output of capital in RMB should allow and support foreign institutions 
and individuals opening RMB accounts within their countries, so that the RMB could enjoy 
the national treatment of making deposits, finance, and various securities investment. Moreover, 
the liquidity of market investments must have sufficient security, timeliness and effectiveness 
(Chen, 2010). 
 
Figure 4.3 Market share of trade financing by currency, 2012 and 2013 
 
Source: (Deutsche Bank and PBOC, 2014) 
 
Thus, besides being held by countries as a reserve, liquidity is an additional parameter for 
reflecting on the acceptance of one currency by others. In the most simplified way, the wider 
use of this currency, the more liquidity it contains. Adequate liquidity usually creates enough 
trust in the currency, therefore making it more likely to be held and used, because it can help 
to minimise vulnerability to external shocks.  
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As Figure 4.3 and 4.4 indicate, liquidity of RMB is increasing, gradually taking over the 
second-place position, and keeping to a general trend of growth. The transactional network 
indicates the convenience of converting it. Namely, there is a need for a certain network to 
support transactional activities. With the support of a friendly network, convertibility can be 
greatly enhanced. An opened financial market and the stock markets in Shenzhen and Shanghai, 
as well as Hong Kong, have provided such a platform for transactions to be taken place in 
China.  
 
Figure 4.4 China cross-border trade RMB settlement by month (Jan 2012 – Jan 2014) 
 
Source: (Deutsche Bank and PBOC, 2014) 
 
In 2016, the RMB was determined to be a freely usable currency and will be included in the 
new SDR basket. This can be a great step forward for the internationalization of the RMB. It 
is supported by the massive size of the financial market inside China as well as the more 
frequent use of RMB outside its border. The market is free for entry and exit. This works the 
same for currency. Economic entities are free to choose the currencies they wish to use during 
a transaction.  
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However, from a governmental perspective, the major currency is determined by what tools 
and instruments are used at a political level. The extra grip of central control means China is 
unwilling to float its RMB exchange rate due to trade advantage and fear of absolutely ‘free’ 
currency market (McKinnon, 2013:162-169). Besides this institutional restriction, the 
international currency not only reflects the level of usage in trading and other financial 
activities but also the degree of recognition at a governance level. Thus, the dominance degree 
of national currency in cross-border transactions can also indicate political dominance, namely 
hegemonic power, that this obtains. China’s currency undoubtedly has its regional successes 
and is challenging the US dollar, but the disparity between them is so huge that it cannot be 
cleared up within a short period of time. A much more complicated question asks whether there 
will be a point of equilibrium between the currencies.  
 
Overall, it is certain that a long period of time is required before the RMB becomes truly 
international. The internationalisation of RMB implicates China’s much-improved ability to 
manage monetary stability while promoting the liquidity of its currency in general. It also 
means that China’s financial power has been remarkably enhanced in relation to the currency-
related financial power defined by Kindleberger and Strange. However, from the aspects of 
market share, convertibility, and liquidity, China’s currency-driven economic power maintains 
a relatively weak foundation.  
 
4.6. Chapter Summary 
 
To conclude, the internal reform of the financial sector has seen a deep transformation in the 
nature of banking and credit allocation in China. China has absorbed practices from the West 
and combined these with its own national institutional structures. The aim of the reformation 
was market liberalisation, which to a great extent has underpinned a period of rapid economic 
growth over recent decades.  
 
The separation between administrative and financial roles of institutions provided a clearer 
division of obligations and liability for governmental offices, central banks, and other 
commercial banks. The People’s Bank of China, which is liable to make macro development 
policies, handled the overall trend of development independently, using a dual-track 
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framework. It also adopted a series of monetary policies to correspond with the ‘market 
socialist’ approach. Besides institutional change, the market economy was established as well.  
 
A gradual but slow and trimming reform was introduced to commercial banks and other 
financial institutions. The liberalisation of capital flow, cash flow, and the concept of credit 
became accepted. The result of this turned out to be fine, with the reformation allowing for 
higher efficiency when performing economic activities. The central bank focuses precisely on 
adjusting the national interest rate and exchange rate, while commercial banks were freed from 
being linked to state-owned enterprises. Firms of all kinds are able to borrow credits from the 
commercial banks if meeting certain requirements. The introduction of stock exchanges further 
allows businesses to utilise available funds from the public. Although still in development, the 
credit rating system has come into shape to safeguard the interests of investors. Players in the 
financial market have thus achieved a state of healthy competition compared to the past.  
 
At the same time, the openness of China’s financial market exposed it to the impact of the 
international regime. Nevertheless, China’s reform strategy was fit for its time, and the Asian 
Financial Crisis provided a chance for China to show off its abundant national reserve and the 
advantages of powerful central control. It caused a discussion on whether the Beijing 
Consensus is superior to the Washington Consensus, as well as improved the relationship 
between China and others, especially Hong Kong SAR and some developing neighbours. 
 
As the progress of development speeded up, expanding economic growth in China was seen to 
stimulate external cooperation and vice versa. The People’s Bank is now also working on 
promoting the international status of the RMB, which recently joined the SDR basket. The 
RMB has thus become the sixth most used currency in the world, and its status will improve in 
the future, backed up by continuous economic growth. 
 
Nonetheless, China’s financial structure is, at the same time, problematic. The transformation 
from highly concentrated central command to a free market is a lengthy process. The 
reformation and opening up of China’s financial sector is still less than half a century old, and 
it faces similar problems to the old Nanking government, with a lack of experience and experts.  
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First of all, much policy-making aims superficially to solve the surface phenomena, ignoring 
the actual problem. This kind of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’ solution intensifies internal 
instability and inequality. Major policies have been made that focus on institutional and 
structural change, with little detailed guidance on the operation of various financial institutions. 
The space left blank leaves the government with an opportunity to explain and modify 
regulations based on the state’s need.  
 
Secondly, the degree of market freedom remains shallow. As stated before, reform is a long 
process, and a free market mechanism cannot be built in one day. To have a mature and 
complete financial regime, there needs to be a sound regulatory and legal system, as well as 
effective implementation. It will take more time for China to establish both of these. Before 
that, China’s finance structure would remain operating under the high level of governmental 
control and the majority of financial institutions would be guided directly by the state.  
 
Arguably, China’s style of financial reform and governance has its advantages, stimulating 
discussion on whether the ‘China model’ is better than the American liberalised economic style. 
Nevertheless, purely focusing on financial liberalisation and financial deepening is not useful, 
instead, further reform and improvement will be needed over the forthcoming decades so that 
China can level its power with leading Western countries. The task for China is more difficult 
than it was for the West, because while continuing the process of liberalisation, vulnerability 
and stability must also be taken into account.  
 
Overall, China’s financial power has been notably strengthened due to the rapidly expanding 
internal financial market and stable monetary management since the 1978 financial reform. 
Banking reform introduced credits into China’s socialist market economy. State-owned 
enterprises and private firms can further seek capitals via the stocks exchanges with the 
emerging credit rating system reducing risks. On the other hand, A strong government control 
over financial instruments aims to safeguard stability against the dropback of opened-up market. 
However, as mentioned in the paragraphs above, the reform is superficial and restricted by 
‘ideological doctrine’ – a paradox for the Chinese government at the moment. Thus, the 
foundation of China’s economic power in relation to the internal aspect of the finance structure 
is insufficient to be defined as a source of hegemonic power. 
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5. External Development of the Finance Pillar: Engagement 
with International Institutions 
 
This chapter examines the pattern of China’s engagement with international financial 
institutions and how effectively China is inserting its influence into the international financial 
regime. Two manifestations of China’s engagement are explored, with its evolving role in the 
IMF and World Bank being considered alongside recent attempts to create new organisations 
in the spheres of financial stability and development finance, respectively.  
 
The general observation is that China is relatively passive within existing international 
institutions, but proactive in creating parallel institutions that nonetheless are supportive of the 
existing order. China is becoming more proactive than it has previously in terms of 
participating in predominant global financial institutions, with its overall status being promoted 
alongside its improving economic performance. Although China shows increasingly intense 
engagement with existing US-led institutions, its increased power within those institutions is 
incremental and limited in comparison to the deeply rooted dominance of the US. Meanwhile, 
China, with its emerging and developing allies, is perusing a regional influence by setting up 
new institutions side by side with those that predominate (Kupchan, 2012). Such a move poses 
a significantly enhanced Chinese economic power to the US in relation to the leading role in 
coordinating the international financial system, although it also compliments the system that 
exists.  
 
This chapter first presents the rationale for the focus of analysis adopted in this study of the 
external influence in institutions of international financial governance. Then it analyses each 
case in the following order – first, China’s engagement with the IMF and the World Bank as 
the existing international institutions under US hegemony, followed by the case of the BRICS 
Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and Chiang Mai Initiates Multilateralization (CMIM) 
as emerging institutions for the purpose of financial stability, and finally, the New 
Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) as emerging 
equivalents of the World Bank. The overall conclusion delivered through this chapter is that 
China’s economic power manifested from this external aspect of finance structure is 
insufficient to move towards a hegemonic status. 
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5.1. Operationalising the study of the Finance Pillar: Engagement with 
International Institutions 
 
The topic of hegemony and international institutions has received substantial attention over the 
years. Seminal scholarship suggests that establishing international institutions can be a key 
mechanism through which a rising power serves to lock-in its position of relative advantage 
(Ikenberry, 2001). There is a broadly shared interpretation that the post-1945 architecture of 
international institutions was, to a notable extent, founded on the basis of US power, and aimed 
to facilitate the promotion of US preferences and interests through the international system. 
This chapter explores the changing relationship between China and a selection of existing and 
more recent international institutions involved in monetary and investment regimes. 
 
A number of the existing literature have explored the relationship between hegemony and 
international institutions. This section provides a synthesised overview of the contemporary 
understanding of this relationship, including theoretical writings on this topic and some 
empirical studies, before presenting the organisation of this chapter. 
 
The existing literature has suggested that international institutions interact with states in a 
contemporary IPE structure (e.g. Keohane, 1998; Milner, 1997). A substantial body of work 
explores the ways in which hegemonic power uses and structures international organisations, 
and a more modest body of work explores the relationship between changing the distribution 
of power and the performance of international organisations. If a hegemonic regime or balance 
of power is to change, it will manifest such change through the operation of its international 
institutions. Overall, it is confirmed that power can manifest through states’ performance 
within international institutions and can be examined through aspects of the formal governance 
structure, informal mechanism of influence, and institutions’ balance of power. 
 
International institutions are widely acknowledged as possessing two key features – being 
intergovernmental and having determined rules. Being intergovernmental determines that the 
mechanism of international institutions is state-based, where states are the actors in relevant 
activities. This feature distinguishes international institutions from other non-governmental 
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organisations and civil societies, which do not directly reflect state interests.  Meanwhile, with 
legally binding rules and regulations, international institutions represent relatively formalised 
spaces within the international political economy (Duffield, 2007). Since WWII, international 
institutions, as specialised agents, have been effectively undertaking the task of transnational 
problem solving (Zamora, 1980). 
 
Existing studies suggest that international institutions can function as a form of hegemonic 
power in contemporary international politics. While Kindleberger (2013) clearly points out the 
role of a hegemon in establishing order through international institutions, as demonstrated by 
the case of the US, Keohane (2005) consider the establishment of institutions an instrument for 
the hegemon to extend its reign when entering the phase of hegemonic decline.  
 
Regimes and institutions appeal to the hegemon’s agenda to pursue optimal interests. The 
establishment of international institutions reduces transaction costs by building up economic 
cooperation (Keohane, 2005; Betts, 2017); meanwhile, from the aspect of policymaking, 
international institutions can also reduce the cost when one intervenes into another’s domestic 
law. This is particularly true since the global environment has changed so dramatically since 
the great wars. Interdependence between states has gradually become stronger and peaceful 
development has become a key theme worldwide. Power is interpreted not only through the 
material aspects, but also has become structural, institutional, and intangible. Conventional 
international relations literatures have also largely agreed that in history the establishment of 
certain international institutions, through the process of the formation and the legally binding 
operating rules, symbolise the emergence of hegemonic regimes, as well as its weakening and 
collapse when some institutions fail to maintain the global order as designed (Ikenberry, 1999; 
Krisch, 2005; Kindlerberger, 2013).  
 
It is widely held that international institutions are a major instrument in the construction of 
global order and are typically used to support the interests of the great power (e.g. Keohane, 
1988; Keohane, 1998; Bohle, 2006; Hurrell, 2001; Bieler and Morton, 2004). In the 
contemporary structure, the hegemon would prefer to achieve the goals governing international 
regimes through institutions, extending its influence over subordinate players and 
consolidating its interests worldwide. The Gramscian approach has particularly highlighted 
that the role of materials – market and capital, as the social forces of the dominant capitalistic 
class – are taking increasing control of political decisions, and as a result, economic and 
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finance-related international institutions have been largely aligned to promote free trade and 
free flow of capital as their core agendas (Gill and Law, 1989; Cox, 1981).  
 
In the current global environment, this means US hegemony, as international institutions ‘are 
deeply influenced by US power, [and] US power also rests in large part upon the ability to 
influence international organizations’ (Stone, 2011:3). From the financial aspect, the existence 
of international institutions, namely the IMF, provides conditions and resources that need 
coordinating among countries with various domestic laws, especially in the vital circumstances 
of crisis.  
 
In short, the reason for a hegemonic power to create multilateral institutions can be concluded 
as being so ‘that institutional agreements can lock other [weaker] states into a relatively 
congenial and stable order’ (Ikenberry, 2003). This allows the hegemon to insert its core values 
and interests as principles; such a congenial and stable order can thus provide the conditions 
for both strong and weak states to pursue their maximum and mutual benefits in the long term.  
 
To sum up, current IPE theories deem international institutions as instruments, especially at 
the moment, or following the birth, of a hegemon, for achieving global governance based on 
the hegemon’s self-interest. International institutions have a direct link to hegemonic power 
and can often indicate the status of that power. 
 
Much literature on hegemony and international institutions looks at the role played by the 
current preponderant power in international institutions (Keohane, 2005; Young, 1986). In this 
regard, typically contemporary literature focuses on the US and contemporary architecture. 
This literature highlights the importance of formal governance structures, informal 
mechanisms of influence, and balance of power (e.g. Stone, 2011; Woods, 2003; Keohane and 
Nye, 1974). The main body of this chapter uses the concepts of formal and informal 
mechanisms of governance to explore the role played by China within existing and emergent 
structures of global governance. In the paragraphs below, existing literature that explores 
formal and informal mechanisms of governance are reviewed. 
 
One major strand of empirical studies focuses on the formal and informal governance of 
institutions. It is suggested that the US engages with international financial institutions, namely 
the IMF and the World Bank, via a formal power structure and informal mechanisms of 
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influence (Woods, 2003). These two kinds of structures justify the leading state’s power 
embodied in the institutions.  
 
Other literature also supports the suggestion, presenting that US structural power and its 
influence on the IMF are reflected in forms of formal and informal governance. More precisely, 
formal governance usually refers to formal rules containing standard operating procedures, 
including ‘voting rules, property rights, and a status quo distribution of costs and benefits’ 
(Stone, 2011:13); whilst informal governance is inexplicit and varies according to different 
contexts, allowing powerful states to extend their own interests as long as they are not explicitly 
forbidden. Stone also points out that the building of an institution is about the balancing of 
interests via formal and informal governance. While weaker members safeguard their interests 
through consensual formal rules, powerful states enjoy more benefits via informal governance, 
besides the mutual interests set by formal rules (Stone, 2011). 
 
The formal structure of international institutions manifests largely in the formal consensual 
rules that facilitate interaction. The formal design of the institution and its written standard 
procedure is acknowledged as the source of an institution’s legitimacy and reason for its 
participation (Hawkins et al., 2006; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001). The most important 
element of this formal structure is the voting mechanism which grants members the authority 
and power to make decisions. A state’s formal power within an institution includes ‘voting 
rights, veto power, membership on committees, or other control rights that are legally assigned 
to members’ (Stone, 2013:125). It is an explicit concept. The formal rules of an international 
institution can specifically point out the agenda, core interest of the institution, and operational 
method, regardless of coinciding with the leading state’s interest or not; and among these 
mechanisms, voting shares can be mathematically measured to present the general picture of 
power distribution among member states (Martin and Simmons, 1998).  
 
Meanwhile, informal governance is the other structure used by international institutions in 
parallel to the formal rules. It concerns one’s structural power which is ‘outside options of the 
leading state and the externalities that its participation generates for other members’ (Strange, 
1988, as cited in Stone, 2011:33). Informal governance can be any practices that are outside 
but not forbidden by formal forms of governance and written rules of the standard procedure. 
States with stronger structural power are more capable of exercising their power outside the 
rules. Informal forms of governance within international institutions are more likely to be 
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powerful players’ instruments and designed to maximise interest, because small states are often 
underrepresented and decisions of a global institution, for example, the IMF are often made in 
the Executive Boardroom with little transparency (Clegg, 2012; van Houtven, 2002). Despite 
being inexplicit, informal practices feature manipulation through transparency and information 
asymmetry (Stone, 2011; Stone, 2013; Christiansen and Neuhold, 2012). 
 
Other empirical studies focus on the ‘balance of power’ in international relations, following 
Keohane and Nye’s initial suggestion. Institutions are found to not always represent the sole 
interests of the most powerful states, because if not offering enough to the weaker actors, the 
design would be unable to attract enough participation and hence its effectiveness would 
diminish. As a result, big states may, for example, sacrifice dominant voting shares to maintain 
the legitimacy of the situation and compensate by exerting power in marginal areas. The 
balance sought is to firstly maintain the accountability and credibility of the institutions 
themselves; then to maintain the stability of an international system by showing consideration 
to both the great power and the subordinate players, often in the form of shaping agendas 
(Keohane and Nye, 1974; Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose, 2007).  
 
Some reflection on the relationship between hegemonic transition and international institutions 
are offered in the existing literature. Specifically, it is suggested by Stone that when an 
institution becomes out of control of the hegemon, the great power may choose to marginalise 
or abandon them, meaning they no longer reflect the leading state’s core interests as they did 
when they were initially built (Stone, 2011). Such examples include the partial failure of 
Bretton Woods, the US bypassing the UNSC on the Iraq War decision, and the WTO after the 
Doha round (Glennon, 2003a; Glennon, 2003b; Mercurio, 2007). However, it does not 
necessarily mean that the hegemon or the institution has failed completely; instead, it is in the 
process of seeking a new equilibrium and rebalancing power. 
   
To explore China’s shifting relationship with international institutions in the broader context 
of hegemonic transition, this chapter focuses on two dimensions: firstly, examining China’s 
behaviour within pre-existing institutions that have previously been dominated and controlled 
by the US; and secondly, studying China’s participation in some newly established institutions 
that have overlapping functions like those US-led institutions and are arguably challenging the 
role of the latter in current global governance. As Heep (2014) points out, a country in the 
position of a creditor can often allow it to exercise direct press on other states.  
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Because the focus of this thesis is the transition of power, the context of this study should stress 
a new rising power entering a realm where a predominate power already exists and is in charge. 
Therefore, inside the long-standing US-led Bretton Woods institutions, a clear power contest 
can be captured between China and the US. China’s interest in these institutions is worth 
discussing as China’s international status promotes simultaneously with its economic growth. 
On the other hand, the world has been seeing a growing number of institutions founded in 
recent years. Some newly-established institutions, where the US does not participate, can be 
considered as agencies of emerging markets and developing countries (EMDs) in the same 
field as the Bretton Woods institutions, with China actively engaging with, and pushing for, a 
new global equilibrium.  
 
In other words, to picture the external effect of China’s engagement with international financial 
institutions as evidence of its hegemonic rise, the most likely approach is to evaluate the extent 
of China having influence from within US-led institutions; and considering the significance of 
other similar but non-US institutions within the overall regime. The second point is to identify 
to what extent the international institution in question can instrumentally affect the global order 
as a manifestation of the hegemonic (or leading state’s) power. The first point looks at how 
state powers are distributed within an institution – in other words, to what extent can the leading 
state exercise its power to control the institution, because despite being created or led by a 
certain great power, an institution might not always turn out to serve its tentative purpose. 
 
Most specifically, the corresponding cases applying this approach include the IMF and the 
World Bank, which date back to Bretton Woods and can be considered representatives of US 
hegemony (Kindleberger, 2013); and their China-led or China-participating equivalents – 
namely, the BRIC Contingent Reserve Agreement and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateral, 
corresponding to the role of the IMF, the NDB and the AIIB, and serving a similar purpose to 
the World Bank. 
 
The CRA and CMIM are regional and multilateral contingent swap arrangements. Their 
purpose is to minimise the impact of the financial crisis as well as maintain financial stability, 
which falls in the same category as the IMF. Although they do not have a specific governance 
body or appear to have an organisation, they fulfil the criteria for institutions defined previously, 
that is, being state-based, intergovernmental, and having formal rules of operation.  
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The NDB, also known as the BRICS Development Bank, and the AIIB, invest in infrastructural 
projects in BRICS countries and Asian-Pacific developing countries. They possess a similar 
agenda to the World Bank. These two institutions, China-proposed and China-led, are believed 
to embody China’s interests in several different respects. Scholars believe that the design of 
these China-led institutions can reduce the international financial system’s dollar dependency 
and the impact of American-oriented financial crises (Abdenur, 2014). Furthermore, these 
institutions can also promote Chinese currency and outflow investment (Ren, 2016) and relieve 
China’s overcapacity of production structure (Cheong, 2016). This will potentially lead to 
increasing rapport with developing countries as well as spread counter-American ideology. 
These impacts hint at a potential hegemonic conflict between China and the US, and therefore, 
these institutions are chosen to be the cases this chapter will examine. 
 
To sum up, although various strands of the existing literature have studied different forms of 
international institutions, looking at various aspects in various contexts, there is a broad 
consensus that international institutions always represent and reflect hegemonic power within 
an international regime. In prominent literature, a suggestion is made that, to an extent, 
hegemonic power is demonstrated through the control of international institutions. For example, 
according to Kindleberger (2013), US hegemony was formalised through the establishment of 
institutions. Keohane (2005) argues, in the context of declining hegemonic power, that 
institutions are the mechanisms for maintaining a hegemonic regime and for continuing to fulfil 
the interests of the hegemon. International institutions can consolidate hegemonic regime even 
when the relevant power is in decline. Existing literature has also analysed hegemonic power 
through formal and informal mechanisms, stating that a new balance of power and new 
institutions may emerge at the point of hegemonic shift (Stone, 2011). In light of these 
rationales, this chapter explores China’s engagement with international institutions, focusing 
on formal and informal aspects of power, and on these particular existing and new arenas below. 
 
5.2. China and the Existing Order: The IMF 
 
As a centrepiece of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the symbol of US hegemonic 
establishment, the IMF is a long-standing financial institution tasked with maintaining global 
financial stability. This section examines China’s formal and informal engagement with this 
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foundation of the Bretton Woods order. After presenting a brief overview of the history of 
China’s engagement with the IMF, dynamics surrounding governing bloc with aligned interests, 
quota allocation, and staff activity are reviewed. Overall, it is suggested that China’s power 
within the IMF, although improved, has grown incrementally compared to the US dominant 
formal and informal control over the IMF. Therefore, China’s economic power has not yet 
formed enough influence in this case. 
 
Alongside the internal development of the financial market, China seeks more intense external 
activity to further boost its economic and political capacity. Since re-joining the IMF in 1980, 
China’s status has been promoted dramatically due to its rapidly growing economy. As 
institutions are believed to reflect interests of great powers, China’s engagement with the 
international financial institutions – the IMF in this case – can be interpreted as the external 
aspect of China’s growing financial power.  
 
China’s changing role within the IMF consists of two themes. First, as China has become the 
second-largest world economy, joining the G20 elites, it has developed a deep interest in seeing 
the IMF effectively support a stable global economy (Bryant, 2008:14). Second, China has 
become a significant representative of the EMD, considering promoting the wellbeing of the 
poor as an important endeavour. It is this unusual and unique position that is driving China’s 
activity within these institutions.  
 
Since the 2000s, China’s position gradually shifted from sole borrower to lender, and 
accordingly, its financial interests aligned more with the US and other developed countries. In 
the area of transnational investment and global financial stability, there is some alignment 
between the preferences of China and those of other leading OECD countries (Wang, 2005; 
Christensen, 2015), because, just like every other country in this world, China has no immunity 
against worldwide financial crises. When a crisis starts elsewhere, it quickly undermines the 
wellbeing of massive amounts of Chinese labour, through the import and export link, for 
example (Chan, 2010). In other cases, crises spread through the business cycle where Chinese 
foreign direct investments and financial products can also lose great profits (Fidrmuc and 
Korhonen, 2010).  
 
Therefore, according to the more general picture, regarding the role of global financial 
institutions that take care of global financial stability and monetary issues, there is no conflict 
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or power wrestling between China and the West. Becoming a major IMF lender means that 
China has much more responsibility around global stability when compared to previously when 
it was a sole borrower, and it would be more likely to make a cautious decision if the risks were 
assessed as too big. While embracing the Western-oriented global insitutions to cope with 
financial vulnerability, China intends to reform the IMF in the long term – a clear change in its 
compared to its initial attitude of mimicking the Western system (Ferdinand and Wang, 2013). 
It will begin to demand a bigger share of the decision-making power and a relatively more 
equal position alongside the developed countries in the governing body.  
 
In the IMF, a member’s status and voting power are determined by the quota or capital stocks 
to which it subscribes. Since quotas are calculated based on economic performance, including 
GDP, openness, variability, and reserves, they are regularly reviewed and adjusted. Moreover, 
the Executive Board of IMF had been under criticism for a long time for its lack of 
representativeness and calls for quota reform have been made by both academics and 
politicians (Stiglitz, 2003; Woods, 2000). Especially since quota reform in 2010, China’s actual 
quota and quota shares have both seen a significant increase, whereas the other five major 
members have all received decreased quota shares (see Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 IMF Historic Quotas and Quota shares of Major Member States 
 2006-2008  2012  2017  
 Quota Share (%) Quota Share (%) Quota Share (%) 
China 8,090 3.994 30,483 6.390 30,482.9 6.41 
US 37,149 17.660 82,994 17.398 82,994.2 17.398 
Japan 13,313 6.552 30,821 6.461 30,820.5 6.461 
Germany 13,008 6.107 26,634 5.583 26,634.4 5.583 
France 10,739 4.502 20,155 4.225 20,155.1 4.225 
UK 10,739 4.502 20,155 4.225 20,155.1 4.225 
Source: IMF, see http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/quotas/pubs/index.htm  [Accessed 10 
May 2018] 
 
Currently, in the structure of IMF, the quota for China is 30.4829 billion SDRs, the equivalent 
of $43.014 billion, 6.41% of the total. This quota entitles China to a 6.09% voting power among 
all members, making it the third most powerful state within the IMF’s formal governing 
structure. It is also slowing closing the gap between China and the top two, the US and Japan. 
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However, the 2010 quota reform was not as deep-rooted as many have suggested. The BRIC 
countries together received an increase of 3.46% voting shares with China being the winner; 
however, the OECD bloc saw a very slight decrease, with the rest of the world, mainly small 
states with poor economic performance, dropping by about 3% in voting power. As no change 
occurred to US voting power, it remains the most powerful governor of the IMF and can 
potentially veto the IMF’s major decisions which require a majority of 85%. In comparison, 
together, the BRIC countries currently possess 13.71% voting power. As such, the extend of 
China’s formal power within the IMF should not be over-stated.  
 
Indeed, it has been suggested that the gains in formal power made by China run far below the 
level warranted by the country’s economic growth and increased importance to the global 
economy over recent decades. Among the other BRIC and developing countries, China is 
considered the most underrepresented member of the IMF – although having 18.59% of the 
world’s economy in terms of PPP, voting power of 6.16% ought to bring about continuous 
adjustments in the foreseeable future (Weisbrot and Johnston, 2016). The voting power of 
BRIC countries, even after reforms have taken place, still does not match their share of world 
GDPs (Nelson and Weiss, 2015). With China’s GDP growing at a much faster pace and the 
country becoming more active internationally due to marketization reform and opening-up, it 
is very likely that China’s quota share among top IMF members will continue to increase; 
correspondingly, its voting power will gradually grow as well. 
 
Beyond this measure of formal influence, a series of dynamics surrounding informal influence 
can be explored to shed further light on the relationship between China and this important 
existing foundation of global financial governance. Meanwhile, Chinese representatives of the 
IMF are also endeavouring to promote its status. In terms of the geographic location of the IMF 
headquarters, networking, easy access to informational resources, and hence the activities and 
activeness of staff, the US has the unparalleled advantage. It is key for many scholars like Stone 
to illustrate US power using the informal structure of international organisations. Because the 
US enjoys this deeply rooted institutional advantage, China, here referring to Chinese staff and 
management within institutions, have few options for acquiring further power. In principle, 
these options come down to getting their voices heard more frequently and more clearly.  
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On the management level, the Chinese ED and governor have been challenging the formal 
power of the previous leading states through the informal channel by advocating reforms and 
making alliances with other EMDs. In 2007, during the 15th IMFC meeting, the Chinese deputy 
governor made a statement suggesting quota and voice reform as a mid-term strategy for the 
IMF, specifically stressing the role of EMDs (IMF, 2007); shortly afterwards, at the IMF and 
World Bank 2010 annual meeting of governors, the Chinese IMF governor also made a 
statement reemphasising and calling for quota reform (IMF, 2010). At the 28th IMFC meeting, 
the Chinese deputy governor affirmed the result of reform and pointed out that EMDs could 
potentially challenge the legitimacy of the IMF if the institution did not adapt to the current 
global structure (IMF, 2013).  
 
Instead of making direct proposals and calling for the vote, the strategy of ‘raising others’ 
awareness’ through speeches and statements appears to be working for China in the long-term. 
The effort made by Chinese governors to push forward formal reform turned the disadvantage 
of China’s lack of informal power into an advantage with its increasing formal power. 
 
Some existing literature defines one form of power as a country going for an alternative 
arrangement and bypassing institutions’ formal rules, such as the US negotiating within the G7, 
which was powerful enough to force a decision (Stone, 2013). The G20 has now replaced G7 
as a mechanism for club-based control over the IMF, and emerging economies, the ‘neo-
developmental states’, are finally getting their voices heard more frequently (Stone, 2011; 
Gallagher, 2015). The legitimacy and stewardship of international institutions would be 
insufficient if China was not included in the major leader camp, this is simply because the 
increasing interdependency of the global economy and China’s growing strength enable China 
to, ‘through monetary policy, trade’, while, ‘… to a growing extent, its foreign and security 
policy wreck the international system’ (Penttilä, 2009:4).  
 
China as a member of the new leadership group offers an effective counterbalance to US 
dominance. The expansion of leadership from G7 to G20 makes it harder for the US to 
negotiate, especially when the latter intend to exercise informal power by making arrangements 
and bypassing the formal voting system. China’s opinion should be taken into serious 
consideration, even if the US wishes to reach an agreement through negotiation with other 
leading states. In other words, China is gaining relatively more power within the IMF 
governing due to its economic performance, especially following the 2008 crisis.  
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Furthermore, while joining the elite camp, China still poses itself as being strongly allied with 
other under-developed countries and EMDs. Nowadays. China’s informal power can 
materialise through bilateral arrangements, often with developing countries, that bypass 
institutional rules or decisions – in other words, that invalidate the role of the IMF. For instance, 
many African countries are willing to provide access to resources in exchange for loans and 
investment from China. The most significant case of this kind in practice is China’s $2 billion 
loan to Angola via channels outside the IMF (Alden, 2005). This is because, on the one hand, 
IMF loans often come with conditions, sometimes rather harsh ones (Goldstein et al., 2003), 
while, on the other, China has the resources and ability to provide funding to counterbalance 
Western dominance (Humphrey and Messner, 2006). 
 
More of this kind of examples can be found in China’s engagement with developing countries 
outside the IMF and other US-led institutions. Bilaterally, China invests actively in Africa and 
South America for infrastructural development projects provide much more options than 
conventional institutions do (Zweig and Bi, 2005; Ray and Gallagher, 2015). Furthermore, 
China-led institutions – the AIIB and the NDB – are also taking up an increasing portion of 
funds and loans provided to developing countries (Sekine, 2015; NDB, 2016). These two 
strands of engagements are further explored in the later section of this chapter (Section 5.5 for 
China-led institutions) and Chapter 7 (for bilateral cooperations).  Despite China’s incremental 
power within the IMF, its power via new institutions and bilateral cooperations demonstrates 
its rising influence in the global financial regime and continues to marginalise conventional 
Western institutions. 
 
To sum up, there is clear evidence that China has been actively engaged with the IMF. China’s 
quota contribution and voting power have significantly increased to 6.41%, almost double that 
of previous decades, while Chinese staff have been calling for fairer decision-making 
mechanisms. It can be interpreted that as its economic strength increases, China has shown a 
greater interest in improving its position within the IMF’s governance body. In some individual 
cases of giving out funds and loans, it was able to counterbalance the IMF due to its own 
financial resources. However, there is no suggestion that China would proactively seek to 
overtake the IMF regime as it is a beneficiary of the existing structure, including financially; 
also, it is not capable of doing so as the US retains the power of veto over any significant 
structural change.  
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In short, China’s power within the IMF is growing incrementally but remains relatively 
marginal. While significant improvements have been achieved when compared to China’s 
position in previous decades, overall, China’s power to influence the IMF is still relatively low 
compared to the power of the US.  
 
5.3. China and the Existing Order: World Bank 
 
In the other leading global financial institution, the World Bank, China has also gained 
significant power growth in several aspects. This section proceeds by exploring China’s formal 
voting power within the Bank, the implications of its coexisting status as major borrower and 
lender status, and its cooperative support for particular projects within the World Bank. Overall, 
the suggestion is that although having achieved incremental power gain within the organisation, 
China’s power and influence over the World Bank remains limited due to its domestic poverty 
issues, including regional imbalance and overpopulation. China’s economic power in relation 
to its engagement with the World Bank is limited and insufficient to become hegemonic ready.  
 
Following the ‘Voice Reforms’ of the World Bank, referring to the IBRD and IFC, that took 
place in 2010 (Vasta, 2010), China joined the ranks of the largest shareholders, with the IBRD 
and IFC opting for an increase in capital shares. Subsequently, China’s voting power within 
the IBRD climbed from 2.77% to today’s 4.53%, making it the third-largest decision-maker, 
ahead of Germany, France, and the UK (Wroughton, 2010). China is also among the top 
countries with both their own executive director and exclusive constituencies. The detailed 
share subscription and voting power of China within each of the organisations under the World 
Bank Group can be identified in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2 China’s subscription and voting power in World Bank institutions and ADB, 2017  
 IBRD IFC IDA MIGA ADB 
Subscription 4.77 2.41 n/a 3.12 6.444 
Voting power 4.53 2.30 2.19 2.64 5.454 
Source: World Bank, see http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/votingpowers 
[Accessed 14 May 2018]; Asian Development Bank, see 
https://data.adb.org/sites/default/files/ar2017-oi-appendix1.pdf [Accessed 13 June 2018] 
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According to the Article of Agreement, in most cases, voting within the World Bank requires 
a simple majority and sometimes a special majority of two-thirds, three-quarters or other. The 
extreme case of voting in both the IBRD and IFC, for example, amending an article of 
agreement, is when a super majority 85% vote is required. Based on the current voting power 
distribution within the IBRD and IFC, only the US, the largest shareholder possessing 16.28% 
and 20.99% voting shares in each organisation respectively, has the power of veto to block a 
major decision alone. Therefore, in the current structure of the World Bank, the US still retains 
the most power, whereas China’s formal power has increased but remains insufficient. Due to 
possessing the power of veto over the World Bank, the US can overturn decisions regarding 
significant organisational changes that would potentially shake its dominance, for example, a 
significant increase in China’s stock subscription and voting shares.  
 
On the other hand, similar to the reaction to IMF quota reform, scholars have also commented 
intensively on the World Bank’s voice reforms. The focus of these debates is undoubtedly the 
sufficient representation of developing and transition countries (Clark, 2017; Strand and Retzl, 
2016). In order to maintain the World Bank’s legitimacy, it would be necessary to consider the 
changing global order, the increasing weight of EMDs (Wade, 2011), and calls for further 
reform from within the institution (Lu, 2009); also, to reallocate members’ voting powers, 
allowing substantially more voices from the relatively lower tiers.  
 
Surely the road to extensive voice reforms would lead to obstacles, such as from the US and 
those with vested interests; nonetheless, as many middle-income developing countries are 
emerging at a much faster pace than the advanced world, the general trend is heading towards 
a fairer ground for all. China, as the leading emerging economy with the biggest share of wealth 
and the largest population, is likely able to see an increasing voting power within the existing 
global financial institutions in the foreseeable future. 
 
Moreover, it is also worth mentioning that since launching a series of organisational reforms 
and increasing contributions, China has its own executive director’s office to solely represent 
the country among a total of 24 EDs on the IMF Executive Board. This is the same as its 
position among the 25 EDs within the World Bank – making a significant improvement for 
China. In this case, having an individual EDs office can strengthen a country’s representation 
because the director is able to focus on the sole interest of the represented country. Especially 
when voting on decisions, the ED representing one country is less concerned and does not need 
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to divide votes into different proportions for the interest of different stakeholders (Momani, 
2013).  
 
Despite its promoted voting power, China’s demonstrated capacity to exert influence within 
the World Bank organisations remains modest. It is widely acknowledged that control over the 
World Bank’s budget represents an important source of state power over the World Bank 
(Clegg, 2010; Clegg, 2014; Simmons and Martin, 2002). It is through this mechanism that 
member states are able to support either broad-based reform to operational practice in the Bank, 
or to support the emergence of more specific new types of project and priority. China’s capacity 
to exercise such control can be seen to be relatively limited, given the constrained volume of 
finance supplied by China to the World Bank. 
 
Based on data recorded by the World Bank, China’s position is both a borrower of the IBRD 
and a ‘lender’ in terms of capital subscription and contributions to IDA replenishment. China 
graduated from the IDA in the Fiscal Year 1999. As a lender, it makes regular contributions, 
for example, 427.94 million SDR for the most recent 18th IDA replenishment, as well as 199.05 
and 107.02 million SDR for the previous two; but the number of its contributions are far behind 
many Western contributors, such as the US and the UK, who manage to contribute just shy of 
3 billion SDR for each replenishment (World Bank, 2017). 
 
As a borrower and classified as an upper-middle-income country, China remains as a major 
borrower of the World Bank, with cumulative borrowing of $50.5 billion for 343 projects from 
the IBRD at the end of November 2017. Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show that China has been receiving 
loans for multiple projects from the IBRD each year, and the amounts of each project vary 
between $100-400 million in recent years. There has been no significant decrease in the number 
of projects approved each year, meaning that China maintains an active borrower of the World 
Bank. By the end of 2017, China still has 98 on-going IBRD projects worth $10.07 billion and 
111 on-going IFC projects (Global Reach, 2017). In comparison, according to World Bank 
records, other lending members, the US, Japan, France, Germany, and the UK, have been sole 
lenders since the 90s, following Japan’s full repayment of its IBRD loan in July 1990. 
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Figure 5.1 IBRD Loans to China Timeline by Projects in USD, 2000-2008 
 
Source: World Bank, see https://finances.worldbank.org/Loans-and-Credits/WB-loans-to-
China/qdi9-2qhv/data [Accessed 14 May 2018] 
 
Figure 5.2 Number of Chinese Projects Approved by IBRD Board 
 
Source: World Bank, see https://finances.worldbank.org/Loans-and-Credits/WB-loans-to-
China/qdi9-2qhv/data [Accessed 14 May 2018] 
 
Although China has been dramatically promoting its comprehensive economic and political 
strength, a complex set of factors, such as population, regional imbalance, and productivity, is 
holding back its per capital income level; thus, ranking it as an upper-middle income country. 
China’s chief tasks and interests are different from those of the other leading states, regarding 
the World Bank’s purpose of tackling poverty. Due to its current status as a borrower, China 
may face the situation whereby lenders hold their human rights or other political issues hostage 
– for example, in 2000, when a project in Qinghai province was cancelled because of concerns 
over Tibet (Wade, 2009). In order to receive investment, China must meet the requirements 
attached to the World Bank loans for borrowers without having much say in determining those 
conditions, this is in addition to circumstances where other leading states are able to easily out-
vote China (Woods, 2000). In this case, China has rather limited control over World Bank 
decisions even though it has become the one of the top six members with an exclusive ED 
office. 
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Nonetheless, China does indirectly influence the World Bank through its foreign direct 
investment. Chinese banks were found to have provided loans of ‘at least $110 billion to 
developing countries between mid-2008 and mid-2010’ and the World Bank plans to intensify 
its cooperation with Chinese banks by venturing joint projects (Bretton Woods Project, 2011). 
With emerging multilaterial development banks springing up over the world, the World Bank’s 
lending dropped sharply (Wang, 2017). Some even argue that large sum of capitals from China 
and China-led instituions have rendered the World Bank irrelevant (Clemens and Kremer, 
2016). Although sometimes labelling itself as a developing country, China is asserting itself as 
the ‘wave of the future’ and representative of the emerging markets, asking for a fairer playing 
ground within the World Bank (Wade, 2011). 
 
Previous studies also found that with China’s assistance, borrowing countries or investment 
recipients also face fewer conditions when acquiring World Bank funding. It is believed that 
‘they receive 15% fewer conditions for every percentage-point increase in Chinese aid’ – with 
investment and funding from China to developing countries able to reduce the size and 
conditionality of a World Bank loan (Hernandez, 2017:544). This finding demonstrates that 
China has the ability to dilute or even ‘replace’ the World Bank’s operational reach. 
 
In short, China’s power within the World Bank is also growing incrementally but remains 
relatively marginal. Although compared to China’s role in the World Bank decades ago it has 
been a great achievement, China’s power to influence the World Bank is low because of the 
unsolved poverty. China’s borrower position diminishes its state power and influence within 
the World Bank. Overall, China’s economic power through engagement with the World Bank 
is limited that cannot form global hegemonic influence.  
 
5.4. China and the Emerging Order: CRA and CMIM 
 
The previous sections suggested, broadly in line with expectations from the existing literature, 
that China’s influence on the World Bank and IMF remains limited. Below, attention is turned 
toward new institutions created by China that parallel the functions of the IMF. After 
introducing the CRA and CMIM, this section reviews China’s voting power and major 
activities within these aforementioned institutions, followed by a comparison with the IMF. 
Overall, the suggestion is that as the leading figure in the CRA and CMIM, China demonstrates 
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great capacity and willingness to become a regional leader. However, it is important to note 
that these new institutions are important complements to the existing Bretton Woods 
institutions, not replacements. 
 
As a major rising power, it is possible that China may wish to circumvent its status as a 
subordinate member of existing institutions and regimes by seeking out alternative 
arrangements and arenas that allow for enhanced capacity to promote its interests. The Chiang 
Mai Initiative represents one potential manifestation of this dynamic. 
 
For the purpose of maintaining financial stability, especially since the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, a regional reserve scheme has been carried out among Southeast Asian countries, 
including China, Japan, and South Korea, namely the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). Initially 
built as a regional currency swapping mechanism, it later upgraded into the Chiang Mai 
Initiatives Multilateral (CMIM) in 2010 and was institutionalised by setting up reserve pools 
as well as implementing operational rules.  
 
The CMIM’s function body includes a Resolution Facility and a Prevention Facility in addition 
to its governance body, which is, as indicated, responsible for supervision and resolution. In 
recent years, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), as an independent 
international organisation, was also established to provide policy guidance and supervision for 
the CMIM. The CMIM peacetime checklist and operational guideline have run tests ‘under 
various scenarios since 2013’ (CMIM, 2016a), preparing to respond actively and effectively to 
potential major financial crises.  
 
The reserve pool of the CMIM currently totals $240 billion, approximately 1/3 of IMF quotas, 
amongst which the ‘plus 3’ countries (China, Japan, South Korea) contribute 80% of the total 
reserve. More specifically, China (including Hong Kong) and Japan, are the leading 
contributors, each taking up 32% of the total reserve contribution. The voting power of the 
members is determined by their financial contribution plus a basic vote. As a result, while 
others possessing a much less significant number of votes, China and Japan, each holds 28.41% 
of the total voting power, making them the most decisive figures within the organisation 
(CMIM, 2016b). However, due to the special autonomy given to the monetary authority of 
Hong Kong, the voting power of Mainland China is in fact 25.43% which may be a potential 
obstacle for China in acquiring further influence. Yet, this is a very minor setback, as most 
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significant decisions require 2/3 majority – meaning that not a single country has the power of 
veto, a great distinction when compared to the IMF. 
 
In general, it can be concluded that the ‘plus 3’ countries obtain most power from the CMIM, 
with China and Japan obtaining most power among the ‘plus 3’ group. For example, the 
governance body includes two co-chairs to coordinate any activities triggered by swap requests, 
and these co-chairs consist of one of the 10 ASEAN countries and one from the ‘plus 3’.  
 
Besides voting power and control over the chair, China’s influence over the CMIM contains 
many informal aspects. There are arguments that the CMI was initially dominated by Japan, 
with China advocating for the formalisation of rules and the transformation of CMIM. From 
that perspective, the CMIM is mainly the fruit of China’s endeavours. Scholars have also 
concluded that the power source of China comes from its regional trade volume, the amount of 
its foreign reserve having surpassed Japan since 2006, as well as the tremendous amount of US 
debt it holds (Tso and Yeh, 2013). Since Beijing has been totally ready to spend its large reserve 
on foreign diplomacy, regional cooperation with neighbouring countries, as in the CMIM, is a 
good place to start (Jiang, 2010; Kuik, 2005).  
 
The CMIM, then, represents a quantitatively significant new addition to the regional monetary 
regime in East Asia, and a structure in which China enjoys considerable mechanisms of 
influence. However, it is important to note that the CMIM maintains significant operational 
links with the IMF. As such, the CMIM is fundamentally supportive of the IMF, albeit in a 
manner that may introduce a degree of inter-institutional competition. The IMF alone is 
increasingly unable to provide sufficient stabilising finance to countries in need, as shown in 
examples of Asian Financial Crisis, Greece, and Egypt, whereas joint funding is now the 
common practice (Boughton, 2004; Lütz and Kranke, 2014). CMIM represents a mechanism 
for potential concerted lending with the IMF across ASEAN countries (Khor, 2017). 
 
There is a general trend whereby the CMIM is growing in strength and importance as it enlarges 
its reserve pool and increases ‘the drawable proportion out of the IMF approval to 30%’ (Tso 
and Yeh, 2013:114). In practice, this means that borrowers can draw up to 30 per cent of their 
swaps prior to agreeing to an IMF rescue programme, meaning that the 30% drawable fund is 
the de-link portion. 
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Scholars believe the establishment of the CMIM represents a step towards the 
institutionalisation of an Asian Monetary Fund that will provide the region with independence 
from the IMF. It is suggested that China’s participation in this arrangement is aligned with its 
interest of RMB internationalisation and a move away from US dollar dependency to RMB 
reliance (Grimes, 2011; Tso and Yeh 2013). 
 
Overall, as to the future of the CMIM and China’s role, it is suggested that the stable economic 
growth of China and Japan are key foundations to Asian financial stability; however, the 
increasing financial and political instability in Europe, as well as America’s changing attitude 
towards globalisation under President Trump, are potential risks. No significant crisis has 
occurred under the CMIM framework. The CMIM has not yet been drawn upon since its 
founding. Therefore, the CMIM resolution mechanism and its reliability are yet to be tested in 
real practical situations; nevertheless, the experience of incidents happening worldwide have 
equipped the CMIM with valuable lessons for its daily operation and crisis prevention (AMRO, 
2017). 
 
Another strand of China’s external engagement with new structures of international monetary 
governance lies with the BRICS Contingent Reserve Account. Financial cooperation among 
the BRICS countries saw the establishment of the CRA, which fulfils a similar purpose to the 
IMF. It was designed to ease the short-term balance of payment pressure for BRICS members 
and maintain financial stability by providing emergence loans with members’ committed 
reserves.  
 
The CRA is based on commitment rather than subscriptions of stocks, meaning that other 
member states are required to provide only when a fund is requested by a member in need. 
China has committed $41 billion according to Article 2 of CRA treaty, which is 41% of the 
initial total $100 billion committed resources, and just 1.3% of China’s total holdings of the 
foreign reserve (Brazil. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).14 Article 3e also indicates that the 
voting power of each member is calculated based on the proportion of their contribution plus 
 
14 Till April 2018, China’s foreign reserve totals $3.1 trillion. See China State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange website. See http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/sy/tjsj [Accessed 25 
May 2018] 
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5% shared equally among all members. Under this formula, China’s voting power within the 
CRA is 39.95%15.  
 
The CRA, as a relatively smaller and more flexible mechanism with just a handful of members, 
has a governance organisation consisting of one governing council and a standing committee. 
Both these governing bodies are expected to make decisions by consensus; except when the 
standing committee is dealing with a ‘request’ or with ‘renewal or request of support through 
the liquidity or precautionary instruments’ where a weighted vote by the providing members 
is required (Brazil. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014: Art. 3cii & 3ciii).  
 
As a very recent development, the CRA can provide limited information on its operation. There 
is no dedicated research institution linked to supervise it, neither can abundant academic 
research be found relating to this arrangement. It is not fully materialised as no reserve pool 
has formed like for the CMIM, instead, there has merely been a commitment. Because it is 
relatively small, flexible and informal, there is still huge uncertainty regarding the nature and 
the future of the CRA. Nevertheless, it can be inferred that the CRA can potentially become an 
organic component of the global financial system just as the CMIM, especially against the 
backdrop of the IMF’s insufficient functionality. Also, China’s significance and influence are 
substantial due to its economic size and reserve size in comparison to the other four members. 
 
To sum up, as outlined Strange, one of the core characteristics of a financial power relates to 
the ability to manage monetary stability. In addition, Kindleberger has also emphasised 
hegemony to be the willingness and to provide stabilising finance during a time of crisis. While 
both the CMIM and BRIC Contingent Reserve Account remain untested during times of crisis, 
through their creation we see that China is willing and able to take the lead in institutionalising 
international financial stabilisation mechanisms. In both cases, China has played a prominent 
role in creating structures, is the largest supplier of capital, and wields preponderant control. 
As such, while their durability and effectiveness are yet to be proven, the CMIM and CRA can 
be seen to represent significant movements in the shift towards hegemonic status on the part 
of China. However, it will take a certain amount of time before China moves forward to global 
leadership from the role of a regional hegemon. 
 
 
15 5%/5+41%*(100-5) = 39.95% 
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5.5. China and the Emerging Order: the NDB and the AIIB 
 
In recent years, as regional equivalents of the World Bank, the emergence of the NDB and 
AIIB has caught the attention of both politicians and academics. This section will examine 
China’s engagement with these newly established infrastructural investment banks from the 
aspects of their organisational structures and operational activities. The analysis will focus on 
the NDB and then the AIIB. The overall insight is that China has proactively supported the 
establishment of these infrastructure investment institutions, with its substantial material 
resources playing an important role in furnishing the organisations. However, the NDB and 
AIIB do not cover some of the World Bank’s core function of tackling poverty, and therefore 
are unlikely to overtake the latter. 
 
In the face of a double-standard and sometimes ineffective Bretton Woods institutions, the 
BRICS countries have been discussing launching ‘a $100 billion Contingent Reserve Pool or 
arrangements for strengthening global financial safety’ (Singh, 2013:394). The result of such 
discussion was the NDB, officially founded in 2015 by the five BRICS, a year after the 
Agreement on the New Development Bank was signed in July 2014 (NDB, 2014). According 
to the Agreement, the general agenda of the NDB is to provide capital to its member states for 
sustainable developmental projects, such as fundamental infrastructure and clean energy 
supply.  
 
The establishment of the NDB included a total of US$100 billion authorised capital, of which 
US$50 billion accounted for subscribed capital, equally distributed among the founding 
members. The voting power of each NDB member is calculated based on the shares held by 
the member, with one share worth US$100,000 at par. At the moment, membership of the NDB 
remains limited to the five founding members. As one of these, China subscribed capital of 
US$10 billion, holding 100,000 shares as 20% of the total voting power, the same as the other 
BRICS members. Meanwhile, the NDB has another US$50 billion in unsubscribed capital. 
This means that potentially, if any eligible state is willing to join the organisation or if any 
existing member extends its subscription, it will lead to changes in the distribution of voting 
power within the limits of the institution’s regulations.  
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Although NDB membership is open to any country recognised by the UN and no specific 
amount of capital stock subscription is presented, the Agreement has laid down certain 
conditions for when a subscription becomes invalid – if 1) founding members hold less than 
55% of voting shares; 2) non-borrowing members hold more than 20%; and 3) a non-founding 
member holds more than 7% (NDB, 2014: Art. 8c).  
 
Therefore, over the time, as new members join the NDB, China along with other BRICS 
founding members would possess a minimum of 11% of the total voting power each and still 
maintain their leading position; or as an opposite extreme scenario, China could possess 56% 
of the total voting shares if it subscribed to all the unallocated capital stock, although this is 
unlikely. Under any circumstance, China can certainly maintain a dominant position in the 
NDB, either alone or together with its BRICS allies, as the controlling bloc of the bank; 
currently, as a founding member, it enjoys a 20% share of the voting power, which is equal to 
the other four members. 
 
The organisation of the NDB includes the Board of Governors, the Board of Directors, and 
Management. Besides the Board of Governor possessing the ultimate powers in decision 
making, according to the Articles of Agreement, the Board of Directors is in charge of most of 
the decision-making. Directors solely consist of personnel from the founding member countries, 
as each of the five BRICS countries appoints one director and one alternate, except otherwise 
elected by the Board of Governors, in terms of additional directors. Judging from the current 
arrangement of the NDB, with founding members each subscribing to an absolute equal share 
of capital, and based on the Bank’s rotation approach to arranging other management staff, it 
can be assumed that each director is currently entitled to an equal share of 1/5 in a voting 
circumstance.  
 
Furthermore, the management consists of a president and four vice-presidents who are 
responsible for managing the daily functioning and operation of the NDB. They should come 
from the five founding members on a rotation basis and are appointed by the Board of 
Governors to certain task areas. Currently, the Chinese representative, Xian Zhu, has the role 
of vice president and COO of the NDB, while vice presents from other member states hold the 
roles of CRO, CAO, and CFO. The roles of the presidency are also on rotation as stated in the 
NDB agreement in order to show absolute equality and mutual respect. 
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Among the BRICS countries, China has the biggest economy in terms of size, especially since 
the 2010s, when China’s GDP exceeded that of the other four countries put together. This was 
partially due to its domestic financial reformation as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Resource and capital are allocated more freely and accordingly to the market demand, and the 
introduction of various kinds of financial assets has diversified China’s financial market. This 
may lead to further capacity and ability for China’s financial structure and consequently 
enhance its external influence, especially among its BRICS cohort.  
 
The NDB has been officially operating for more than a year. The 2016 annual report presents 
the current organisation and personnel, current achievement, and major decisions made by the 
NDB. In this report, the frequency of words is shown as follows: 
 
Table 5.3 Word frequency of the NDB 2016 annual report 
Word times word times 
China 46 Russia(n) 19 
Chinese 7 Africa(n) 9 
India(n) 29 Brazil(ian) 7 
RMB 13   
 Source: (NDB, 2016) 
 
Words directly addressing China appear the most, much more so than for other member states. 
China’s involvement, as presented in the annual report, includes perspective of geographic 
location (in terms of headquarter), involvement of relevant persons, borrowing and lending 
activities, and projects. For example, the NDB bond was issued only to China’s inter-bank 
market and two out of the five approved projects are in China. China’s credit rating agents 
participating in the NDB operation is also included in the report, which leads to a much more 
frequent appearance of China. It can be assumed from these numbers that China’s engagement 
with the NDB is much more intensive than for other members.  
 
Furthermore, while the Chinese currency is specially mentioned in the report, the remaining 
currencies were not as privileged. The report states key parameters for loans, specifying a few 
types of loans provided. Among the six different loan types, there is one called ‘Sovereign 
Project Loan in RMB’ whilst all the others are in USD. Correspondingly, by the end of 2016, 
the NDB had received $2.2 billion of paid-in capital and approved 7 projects worthy of $1.561 
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billion; among the 7 approved projects, two of the loans were made to China in its local 
currency, the RMB (NDB, 2016). 
 
In short, this is the first case where an international institution, has used something besides the 
US dollar as a major operational currency.  Moreover, this is an exceptional case that only 
applied to NDB loans to China, as no exception in terms of loan currency has been made to 
other BRICS members.  
 
Further to these lending activities, the NDB has also been borrowing from China’s commercial 
banks on top of the capital stocks collected from member states. The first NDB green bond was 
issued in China’s onshore market denomination of RMB as part of its financing instrument and 
was considered very ‘successful’ according to the recent NDB five-year strategy (NDB, 
2017:7). The green bond had a size of 3 billion Yuan, the equivalent of $449 million. Two 
Chinese credit rating agencies were also granted the chance to assess the NDB and both gave 
an AAA rating to the institution upon issuance of this first green bond. This can be interpreted 
as a sustainable infrastructural project in China allowing for the acquisition of funding in local 
currency through the NDB with a sovereign guarantee, while the funds eventually coming from 
a Chinese commercial bank.  
 
The use of local currency and the process where funds go through different hands greatly 
reduce various aspects of risk, for example, exchange rate and timeframe. Although there are 
press releases on plans to issue similar bonds in other member states, none have yet 
materialised (Galbraith and Holmes, 2017). The NDB currently still operates mainly based on 
the US dollar, aside from the RMB business.  
 
In short, current numbers indicate that a large proportion of NDB activities and operations take 
place in China, based on Chinese resources and communication channels. Because China has 
the capacity, resources and information, it shows a much more intense sort of engagement with 
the NDB than the rest of its BRICS cohort. 
 
In comparison, some arguments on the US control of institutions suggest that its effective 
control is due to the great number of members, insufficient representation of small states, and 
coalition among big states due to aligned interests, that the US is allowed to bypass formal 
rules (Stone, 2011). While the World Bank has 189 members, the NDB contains merely five, 
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with highly consistent mutual interests; it has also been operating for less than two years. The 
decision-making mechanism of the NDB is much more flexible compared to the World Bank, 
and each member can be sufficiently represented. 
 
The director meetings take a relatively simple form, and although a formal vote can be 
requested by directors and should be recorded, there is no record of any vote taking place in 
the minutes of the quarterly Board of Director meetings (NDB, nd). Most likely, decisions by 
the board are made through consensus.  
 
The new approach stated in the NDB strategy indicates that the NDB choose to adopt ‘a more 
streamlined project review and implementation oversight without unnecessary bureaucracy’ 
and that approval of projects is based on risk assessment (NDB, 2017:4). This means delegating 
investment decisions to the credit and investment committee, which comprises of the president 
and all vice presidents, each representing a member state while having the directors and 
governors focus on high-level policymaking. As presidency is set to be on rotation and all 
members are represented in the credit and investment committee, therefore, having one 
member trying to imperceptibly dominate or manipulate the NDB against the will of other 
members is an unlikely achievement. Nonetheless, through the aspects of market capacity, 
resources and locations, and information, it can be confirmed that China possesses a rather high 
level of informal influence on the NDB. 
 
Another China-led institution with developmental and infrastructural purpose is the AIIB, and 
here, China has drawn the attention of a wider range of participants. The AIIB is also of 
developmental purpose as it aims to invest in infrastructural projects in developing countries, 
mainly Asia. At the moment, there are 38 regional members from Asia and Oceania, and 
Eastern European, and 20 non-regional members. With new members signing up over time, the 
AIIB is constantly expanding in terms of scale and there are consequent changes to the 
composition and distribution of power.  
 
As laid out in the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement, the voting power of each member state is 
determined by a combination of basic votes which make up 12% of the total votes equally 
distributed among all members, share votes, and 600 founding member votes (AIIB, 2015: Art. 
28); the initial authorised capital stock of US$100 billion is divided into one million shares at 
a par value of 100,000 each share (AIIB, 2015: Art. 4).  
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By the end of 2017, statistics show that China’s subscription of capital is US$29,780.4 million, 
31.0215% of the total subscription; with the power of 300,518 votes, it thus accounts for 
26.6491% of the total (AIIB, 2018). Compared to late 2016, this represents about a 2% decrease 
in both China’s subscribed capital shares and voting shares (AIIB, 2016). With approximately 
US$4 billion of capital still awaiting subscription, assuming all prospective founding members 
will have ratified the AIIB Agreement and China maintains the size of its current subscription, 
then ultimately China’s voting power should be approximately 25.58%. Nonetheless, with the 
second-largest voter occupying less than 8% of voting shares individually at the moment, and 
all current members facing a decrease in voting powers when new members join, China will 
maintain its dominant position in the AIIB voting system.  
 
Furthermore, as its agreement has stated, any major decision, such as the distribution of income 
and the issuance of capital shares or new membership, should be approved with an ‘affirmative 
vote of two-thirds of the total number of Governors, representing not less than three-fourths of 
the total voting power of the members’ (AIIB, 2015: Art. 28). This means that as China 
currently holds 26.6491% of the total voting power and potentially a minimum of 25.58%, it 
has, in theory, the power of veto to disallow any major decisions from the AIIB; that said, 
China has declared that it would never use this veto power. 
 
Besides the voting system which may shape the decisions made by the Board of Governors 
who represent the supreme power within the institution, the AIIB formal governance also 
contains a Board of Directors and a presidency. Directors are elected by governors and can cast 
votes based on the voting share of the governors who elected them. The current structure of the 
Board of Directors and the approximate voting share by each director are shown in Table 5.4, 
with the Chinese director shown to possess the largest share of the voting power overall, and 
other delegates holding shares ranging from 5% to 14%. 
 
Table 5.4 ED offices and voting power (November 2017) 
Director 
No. 
Constituency Voting 
power 
Total Director Constituency Voting 
power 
Total 
1 Jordan 0.3783 5.6585 8 Denmark 0.6073 7.8273 
Oman 0.5064 Hungary 0.3058 
Qatar 0.8222 Iceland 0.2853 
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Saudi Arabia 2.5975 Norway 0.773 
UAE 1.3541 Poland 1.0303 
2 Azerbaijan 0.5017 5.3037 Sweden 0.8457 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
0.3171 Switzerland 0.9156 
Georgia 0.3185 UK 3.0643 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
0.2937 9 Iran 1.7156 9.1995 
Pakistan 1.2154 Kazakhstan 0.9365 
Turkey 2.6573 Russia 6.2499 
3 Bangladesh 0.8736 4.6025 Tajikistan 0.2975 
Malaysia 0.3694 10 Austria 0.7274 13.7892 
Maldives 0.2758 Finland 0.5531 
Nepal 0.3432 France 3.3579 
Philippines 1.1651 Germany 4.3723 
Thailand 1.5754 Italy 2.6224 
4 China 27.5186 28.433 Lux 0.333 
HK 0.9144 Malta 0.2816 
5 Israel 0.9554 5.4226 Netherlands 1.2128 
Korea 3.6901 Portugal 0.3287 
Mongolia 0.3068 11 India 7.9254 7.9254 
Uzbekistan 0.4703 12 Cambodia 0.3262 5.0055 
6 Egypt 0.8644 1.1206 Indonesia 3.3443 
Ethiopia 0.2562 Lao 0.3085 
7 Australia 3.6467 5.7122 Myanmar 0.5112 
New Zealand 0.6915 Sri Lanka 0.5153 
Singapore 0.4979 
    
Vietnam 0.8761 
    
Source: (AIIB, 2017) 
 
The structure of the AIIB is apparently similar to the World Bank except on a smaller scale. 
There is, however, a fundamental organisational difference between the two. As presented 
previously in section 3, among the six biggest shareholders of the World Bank, five are 
advanced countries that have not requested any investment for decades. Some scholars have 
argued that the weakened accountability of the World Bank and IMF is exactly due to such 
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organisations, where the rich and powerful determine the future of the weak and poor (Foot, 
MacFarlane, and Mastanduno, 2003; Stone, 2004).  
 
Within the structure of the AIIB, non-borrowing members occupy less than a quarter of the 
total share. China is the biggest investor and, at the same time, also a borrowing country. This 
is the opposite of a picture of the World Bank. In other words, for developing countries, the 
nature of the AIIB is more one of self-help than an institution under hegemonic control; 
whereas, for non-borrowing members, the major attraction is the huge market of Asian 
developing countries in need of infrastructural development and pragmatic profit-making 
opportunities (Chen and Dai, 2015; Sekine, 2015). 
 
Nonetheless, even though China has promised not to use its veto power or to manipulate the 
institution in any form (He, 2016), with such a short operating history it is impossible to 
arbitrate in what future direction the AIIB is headed. For this particular aspect, it is fair to argue 
that in comparison to the World Bank, the AIIB’s leader is much more benevolent; however, a 
more convincing conclusion will require close observation over time. 
 
Some have speculated that the AIIB poses a great threat to the US-led World Bank as many 
European countries have willingly participated in this China-led institution (e.g. Heilmann et 
al., 2014; Wihtol, 2015; Chung et al., 2016). Despite some overlapping responsibilities and 
functions, there are some fundamental distinctions in the nature of both the AIIB and the World 
Bank. 
 
Regarding the organisation of both institutions, the AIIB has clearly not set up a department 
for research and technical support, while, a large part of the work done by the World Bank 
includes providing technical suggestions and conditions to the fund receivers. The AIIB 
focuses heavily on investment risk and return rather than the ethical issue of tackling poverty 
in the long term.  
 
It can also be confirmed that the World Bank is cooperating with the AIIB because so many 
joint investments are carried out. Among 24 approved AIIB projects, those displayed in Table 
5.5. are co-financed with the World Bank. Many other AIIB projects are co-financed with the 
Asian Development Bank and other regional institutions. Indeed, it is rare for large AIIB 
projects to be financed solely by this entity. 
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Table 5.5 List of AIIB-WB joint projects (November 2017) 
Project AIIB 
($ million) 
WB 
($ million) 
Philippines: Metro Manila Flood Management Project 207 207 
Egypt Round II Solar PV Feed-in Tariffs Program Amount unspecified 
Tajikistan: Nurek Hydropower Rehabilitation Project 60 225.7 
India: Andhra Pradesh 24x7 – Power for All 160 240 
Indonesia: Dam Operational Improvement and Safety Project 125 125 
Indonesia: Regional Infrastructure Development Fund Project 100 103 
Azerbaijan: Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project  600 800 
Pakistan: Tarbela 5 Hydropower Extension Project 300 390 
Indonesia: National Slum Upgrading Project 216.5 216.5 
Source: (AIIB, nd) 
 
The financing details of the joint projects above also show that in many of these projects, the 
AIIB is playing a supporting role instead of taking the lead. If we compare the financial position 
of the two, the World Bank is more resourceful due to its larger membership and high level of 
participation from highly advanced countries like the US and Japan. Currently, the 
establishment of the AIIB shows little threat to the World Bank regarding its purpose, financial 
strength, and sphere of influence. 
 
To sum up, within the structure of the AIIB and the NDB, China is the leading state holding 
the biggest number of stocks and voting powers. With China proactively taking the lead to 
establish these institutions, it presents an adequate amount of economic strength and a 
willingness to play the role of a regional hegemon, according to Kindleberger’s justification of 
hegemony. China’s non-coercive approach in organising and managing these institutions 
generates mutual benefits and attraction, drawing subordinate countries along and 
demonstrating hegemonic power under the liberal rationale. On the other hand, these newly 
established institutions do not pose a significant challenge to the existing order. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the new institutions are merely regional, only partially overlap with the 
World Bank’s function, and have a smaller fund size than the World Bank – the two see more 
cooperation than competition.  
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5.6. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter examines the pattern of China’s participation in international financial institutions, 
in terms of the external aspect of China’s financial structure, to understand to what extent China 
has demonstrated economic power within the international financial systems.  
 
The existing literature has extensively discussed the relation between hegemonic power and 
international institutions. By illustrating this with the case of US hegemony, Kindleberger 
(2013) and Keohane (2005) both demonstrate the importance of institution to hegemons. While 
the establishment of an institution signifies hegemonic power, institutions are also an 
instrument for maintaining and stabilising an existing hegemonic regime, even in the context 
of hegemonic decline. Recent empirical studies show the formal and informal channels by 
which hegemonic power can exert power within institutions, arguing that the US remains the 
dominant power behind the apparent hegemonic decline (Stone, 2011). It is agreed that 
institutions heavily reflect the interests of the leading state.  
 
Meanwhile, emerging economies, as their powers grow, often seek a new equilibrium or 
alternative if they are no longer satisfied with their share of power and interest. Therefore, this 
chapter aims to explore through two case strands – one, China’s pursuit of power in existing 
US-led institutions, and, two, China’s effort to participate in major US-excluded institutions. 
 
In recent years, China has been more actively engaging with long-standing Bretton Woods 
institutions, namely the IMF and the World Bank, and seeking more of a voice and insitituional 
reform so that these institutions can better meet China’s pragmatic interest (Ferdinand and 
Wang, 2013). Both these institutions have gone through a series of reforms to adjust members’ 
financial contribution and voting power distribution, with China being granted a much bigger 
proportion of quotas and voting shares.  
 
However, China has remained a relatively passive member of the IMF; while the country has 
a clear interest in the maintenance of global and regional financial and economic stability, there 
is little evidence of attempts to use its influence to pursue specific goals through the institution. 
In relation to the World Bank, China has in recent years gained voting power and increased its 
contributions to the Bank’s budget. However, again, the overall characterisation is of a rising 
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power accommodating to an existing institutional structure. Overall, China’s influence has 
stayed relatively insignificant in comparison to the US’s existing dominance in these 
institutions.  
 
The CMIM and AIIB both represent institutional structures in whose development and 
evolution China has played a central role. These developments suggest that China is moving 
towards taking up a hegemonic role, by virtue of its willingness and ability to contribute to 
making an injection of finance into the international economy, both for development and 
stabilisation-related purposes. However, given the established links between the CMIM and 
the IMF and the AIIB and the World Bank, it seems like this rising role is taking place in a 
relationship that is accommodative of existing structures. Therefore, in structures both existing 
and new, the rise of China appears to be taking place in alignment with, rather than in tension 
against, the existing global order. 
 
Overall, while internal development of financial system fundamentally promoted China’s 
economic power, China’s engagement with international financial institutions demonstrates the 
external implication of this rising power. With the enhanced economic power, China is able to 
become a much more active player in the existing Bretton Woods institutions and a dominant 
role in newly founded regional institutions. Meanwhile, because of the incremental change of 
China’s influence and participation in existing institutions, China’s financial power remains 
limited within a global scope. 
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6. Internal Development of the Production: Market Reform 
and Sectoral Development 
 
Along with its financial reformation, China has seen a qualitative leap in production since the 
late 1980s. As touched upon in Chapter 4, the enhanced freedom of capital and organisation of 
banking and investment provided foundations for these transformations. Through this chapter, 
attention is turned to the sources of strength and weakness relating to industrial structure reform, 
productivity, and increased reliance on external inputs and external markets to assess the extent 
to which these transformations constitute a source of economic power.  
 
This chapter first provides an analytical framework for studying the issue of production in 
relation to hegemonic rise. Drawing on existing studies, this chapter defines the concept of 
production and outline major indicators for evaluating the strength of a country’s production 
structure. By looking through existing literature and empirical case studies on previous 
hegemonic powers, three aspects can be pinpointed as the focus of this chapter. These, namely, 
are production volume, productivity, and external dependence. Following this framework, the 
rest of the chapter proceeds to an analysis of each of these three aspects. 
 
Overall, the suggestion is that although China is experiencing unprecedented economic growth 
in relation to its production volume, its production structure continues to be weakened by low 
productivity and heavy external reliance. This indicates that China’s rise toward hegemonic 
status suffers from significant constraint in relation to the production structure of economic 
power. 
 
6.1. Operationalising the Study of the Production Pillar: Internal 
Development 
 
When proposing the theory of structural power, Strange defines a production structure as ‘the 
sum of all the arrangements determining what is produced, by whom and for whom, by what 
method and on what terms’ (Strange, 2015b:70). In other shorter terms, production is about 
generating wealth and adding value. From an intuitive perspective of Strange’s production 
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structure, a fine production structure performance usually indicates a good level of overall 
strength.  
 
Strange’s definition, however, remains very broad. The question of what the direct indicators 
of productive power actually are in relation to a hegemonic transition remains ambiguous. 
Before carrying out an analysis on China’s production structure, it is therefore vital to identify 
what indicators and factors should be assessed in order to evaluate the extent of hegemonic 
transition. Existing literature have attributed China’s production boom to factors such as the 
opening-up of the market, SOE reform, and the emergence of private and township collective 
businesses. However, unfortunately, potential indicators for measuring the strength of the 
production structure remain under-specified. By reviewing the existing literature, this section 
identifies three elements to indicate production structure – production volume, productivity, 
and external dependence. The paragraphs below outline the sources from which these focuses 
of analysis have been drawn.  
 
Existing literature on empirical hegemony study has indicated that production volume is the 
major consideration when evaluating a country’s production structure. An interesting historical 
case to illustrate the significance of production volume involves the comparison between China 
and most Western countries. The different production structures of the East and the West, as 
reflected in industrial relations, social and economic dimensions, business activities, and so on, 
have consequently led to a distinction of economic and political power between those countries 
since the 16th century (Strange, 2015b).  
 
Previous hegemony studies note that taking Britain as an example, between 1651 and 1815, 
Britain triumphed in ten major wars against the Netherlands and France, eventually dominating 
Europe and other parts of the world. One of the reasons for Britain becoming a hegemon was 
that by the end of the 18th century, Britain had already occupied a significant share of the 
world’s manufactured output and was exceptionally well endowed in agricultural term 
(O’Brien and Pigman, 1992). Later, Asia’s pursuit of capitalism and a market economy, as well 
as US hegemony can also be identified as vivid illustrations of the positive correlation between 
production structure and power. 
 
When analysing what was termed ‘the myth’ of US hegemonic decline, Strange chooses the 
method of examining ‘the proportion of total world production of goods and services produced: 
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a) in the United States, and b) by enterprises ultimately headquartered in the United States and 
responsible to the government in Washington’ (Strange, 1987:566-567). By breaking down the 
statistics, Strange notes that the changes in market share of different US sectors, including the 
manufacture of both basic and high-tech products, the services sector, oil business, and so on, 
indicate that the US production structure is still dominant.  
 
The reasons behind this growth in productive capacity were, for Strange, the large mass internal 
market of the US, laws and policies encouraging exploitation of the market and control over 
foreign subsidiaries. By emphasising the importance of the production structure to analysing 
power, Strange also points out that an increasing number of firms, including small to medium-
sized companies, no matter if private or publicly-owned, are participating in the global market. 
Particularly regarding this context of internationalisation, a country’s production structure can 
be affected by transnational corporations (TNC). This includes figures reporting on TNC’s 
contribution to domestic wealth generation and the evaluation of how effective a state’s policy-
making is in terms of regulating TNC (Strange, 2015b).  
 
To sum up, in order to assess hegemonic power from the perspective of production volume, it 
is to consider the volume of output and market share, among all countries in the world, from a 
quantitative standpoint. Therefore, the first section will explore the reform of China’s 
production structure and the consequent production volumes of each sector, including the total 
amount of production and its relative share around the world. This section focuses on the 
growth of China throughout time as well as looking at the comparison and gaps between China 
and the US. 
 
Besides production volume, an additional indicator that is turned to in existing literature relates 
to productivity. While there are significant challenges in precisely measuring productivity, 
broadly this refers to how efficiently factor inputs are translated into outputs. After all, along 
with the discovery of new lands and the forming of modern international society, countries 
come in all sizes with distinct levels of population and development. Merely judging a country 
by its total volume of goods and services being produced would be an incomplete measure of 
power. Therefore, the second factor inferred through reading existing literature is productivity.  
 
Most of the existing literature briefly touches on the relationship between productivity and 
hegemony. Implicitly, productivity is lodged as an important explanatory factor in hegemonic 
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transition. Analysis comparing the British and US hegemonies hints a forthcoming transition 
as Lake (2002) found that by the end of the 19th century, the United States had reached a 
relatively higher level of labour productivity than Britain, as well as expressing some other 
production indicators. This higher level of productivity was, therefore, paving the way for the 
later transition of the US, when it overtook Britain to become the world hegemon.  
 
Similarly, Maier, by studying the policy and political agenda of the US, notes that 
straightforward and clear stress on economic productivity in the US has actually existed across 
time, and up to the modern-day.  For the US, ‘productivity’ was raised to the level of ‘principle 
of political settlement in its own right’ (Maier, 1977:609). In this way, the US was able to 
resolve its previous economic issues and reorganise its economic power. It could later produce 
hegemony as well as maintain it. This principle was considered so successful that the US also 
extended it to its subordinates following WWII, especially those devastated by war. 
 
Building upon Maier’s work, Rupert further explains the phenomenon of US hegemony and 
‘the politics of productivity’ by engaging IPE theories, particularly critical theory. Making 
productivity a political principle, in fact, reflects the ideology of liberal capitalism which is the 
foundation of US hegemony. By building a historic bloc of capitalism, in other words, 
neoliberal hegemony, the US was ‘simultaneously creating the social infrastructure of mass 
production and consumption’ as high productivity allowed it to ‘sustain the profitability of 
mass-production industry, and maintain social stability’ (Rupert, 1990:437-438).  
 
Some other literature has also confirmed this opinion and stated that, in its infancy, US 
hegemony was grounded in productivity so that it could consequently acquire economic 
strength and later provide a large amount of dollar output for the eventual hegemonic transition 
(Cox, 1992; Cafruny and Ryner, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, the method of using productivity to evaluate the changing dynamic of power can 
be found in previous studies as well. In a paper examining the relative decline of US hegemony, 
Corden makes an analysis based on US labour productivity and productivity growth, alongside 
with other indicators such as gross domestic products (GDP) and dollar value. As GDP and 
labour productivity of the US continued to grow, its rate of productivity growth began to slow 
down, although it had stayed positive since 1973 – this corresponds to the hegemonic decline 
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in question and coincides with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s 
(Corden, 1990). 
 
Contrary to production volume, productivity moves focus away from the total amount of goods 
but looks at more detailed factors instead. It is connected to variables such as demographic 
features, energy consumption, and technological advancement.  
 
For instance, population growth has been adding pressure to states’ production structure and 
the latter may come up with different solutions to stimulate output. Productivity is reflected in 
the types of production system, such as a feudal or capitalist system, and industrial structure, 
which is the composition of different economic sectors (Strange, 2015b). Another study on the 
rise of British Empire agrees that a shift from the Middle Ages feudal system to a pre-modern 
style of production was foundational for British hegemony, as resources were allocated and 
exploited differently (O’Brien, 2006). Admittedly, this is a very general rationale from the 
perspective of ideology and institutional structure.  
 
For another example, productivity can be influenced by scientific and technological 
development. A straightforward example is the Industrial Revolution which took place during 
the second half of the 18th century and the early 19th century. The massive improvement in 
production methods and means, due to technological advancements, greatly boosted 
production volume and labour productivity, consequently resulting in the Pax Britannica (Lake, 
2002; Glynn and Booth, 1996; Wrigley, 1988). Many economists generally believe that 
technological innovation has had an effect on economic growth and productivity gains 
(Kraemer and Dedrick, 1999).16  
 
More recent studies on the ‘Productivity Paradox’ also note that technological innovation may 
negatively impact productivity as it could bring about the inability of technocratic instruments, 
a lack of regulation, and other instances of social regression. Some have argued, that ‘this has 
resulted in the undermining of one of the main conceptual fortresses constructed by the think 
tanks of neoliberal globalization, leading to a questioning of U.S. hegemony’ (Sunshine and 
Breña, 2007:44). Regardless of whether a negative or positive correlation has been found, there 
 
16 Also see VanGelderen (1913), Schumpeter (1939), Abramovitz (1956), Kendrick (1956) 
and Solow (1957), Arthur (1994), and Romer (1990), as all cited in (Kraemer and Dedrick, 
1999). 
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is little dispute over the idea that productivity, affected by science and technology, can be a 
factor determining hegemonic power. 
 
Despite the complexity of productivity, this indicator can be analysed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. This chapter aims to examine the productivity of China and the US, focusing on 
the following aspects in order to evaluate the possibility of hegemonic transition. First, the 
composition of different sectors in the production structure will be explored, which is 
responding to Strange’s justification of productivity. Second, a quantitative analysis of labour 
productivity will be presented. According to OECD, among all kinds of productivity, labour 
productivity is ‘particularly important in the economic and statistical analysis of a country’ 
(Freeman, 2008:5). Several of the IPE literature noted above also privilege labour productivity 
as a measure of economic power. Third, an examination is presented on the relation between 
technology and its effect on China’s productivity in a qualitative manner. Through these three 
aspects, a comprehensive evaluation of hegemonic transition from the perspective of China’s 
productivity condition will be constructed. 
 
Beyond the volume of production and productivity, external dependence features as the third 
factor of relevance to hegemonic rise and fall. External dependence here refers to reliance on 
foreign capital and foreign market – one’s position in the global supply chain. According to 
David Lake, during the 16th to 18th centuries, the international economy was ‘dominated by 
mercantilism’ (Lake, 2002:128). As previously introduced, with great technological 
advancements and the Industrial Revolution, Britain had become the model of modern 
countries when it reached its hegemonic peak around 1870. The significant improvement in 
production boosted the growth of national wealth and was soon urging its overseas expansion.  
Many previous British colonies, as well as other countries in the far East, had been playing a 
role in Britain’s overseas market as well as being Britain’s raw material supplier.  
 
At some point, this involved forcing foreign markets to open up in order to sustain British 
manufacturing and merchandising. Meanwhile, in Europe, Britain was promoting its Corn Law, 
inducing neighbouring countries to participate in its free trade regime; indeed, regardless of the 
actual functionality of the regime, it would ideally enhance exportation and value-added to 
Britain’s production structure.  
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The hegemonic ascendancies involved opening up the international economy in both British 
and American cases. However, as compared to US hegemony, British hegemony was built 
upon its trade regime and exportation, as well as its domestic economic strength. In other words, 
Britain’s production structure needed greater external reliance to maintain its hegemony, which 
also means that British hegemony had a higher risk of being affected by other players in the 
international arena (Lake, 2002). In fact, as soon as wars broke out and the international 
economy generally collapsed, British hegemony also declined dramatically.  
 
Similarly, Gamble also comments on British hegemony by comparing the two historical 
hegemonies, stating that an obvious distinction between Britain and the US is that the former 
relies much more heavily on trade than does the latter. For example, Britain ‘needed a visible 
trade deficit rather than a visible trade surplus in order to stimulate economic development in 
other parts of the world economy which boosted demand for British banking, shipping, and 
insurance service’ (Gamble, 2002:130). British hegemony was often considered benevolent in 
comparison to the US, due to the way it stimulated development elsewhere. However, this also 
means that the British economy was under greater risk of being surpassed by those economies 
it stimulated. It would not be an absolute decline in that case, but relative – which is sufficient 
enough to trigger a hegemonic transition.  
 
Correspondingly, Mommsen (2002) notes that by the end of the era of British hegemony, 
Britain was at the brink of being surpassed by the US and Germany, not only in traditional coal 
and steel manufacturing, but also in some newly emerging industries, such as chemical and 
electrical industries. This can be proven from another viewpoint, that is, when mismanaged, 
excessive external dependence can lead to a relative decline in production and, hence, 
hegemonic power. 
 
In other literature focusing on different periods of hegemony, Flynn considers that Spanish 
hegemony was largely built upon ‘extracting much of the excess mining profit’ (Flynn, 
1982:140). Hamilton argues that this form of external engagement proved to be unsustainable, 
noting that ‘the most famous external cause of decline […] is that Spanish society had become 
addicted to the influx of American treasure; the peninsula could not survive the withdrawal 
associated with drastically reduced imports of precious metals in the 1620s and 1630s’ 
(Hamilton, 1937, as cited in Flynn, 1982:139). 
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Though Flynn’s article focuses on the fiscal aspect of Spanish hegemonic decline because 
silver was a currency at that time as well as a commodity, it is, nevertheless, the heavy reliance 
on external actors - in terms of importing materials - that made the empire vulnerable in the 
face of radical changes to the international situation. An excessive level of reliance on colonies 
and external players gave the Spanish Empire less say in controlling its own production 
structure.  
 
However, it is not to say that external reliance has an absolutely negative impact on hegemonic 
power. In fact, by comparing Spanish and British hegemony as well as other European 
countries during the early stages of capitalism, many historians conclude that flourishing 
economic performance started alongside warfare in a particular period, with mercantilist 
economy and war mutually benefitting each other (Jurado-Sánchez and Jerez-Méndez, 2012). 
Similarly, for US hegemony, although war was no longer a means of recruiting subordinates, 
being the leading figure in exportation due to mass production equipped the US with 
hegemonic advantages (Norrlof, 2010). 
 
The relationship between hegemonic rise and external dependence is explored in the case of 
the US by Krasner in his early work. For example, Krasner foregrounds the importance of 
gaining access to stable supplies of raw materials as a matter of US foreign policy in the post-
1945 period. Indeed, such economic interest in countries within its near neighbourhood and 
beyond was identified as an important driver of foreign intervention (Krasner, 1978). More 
recently, literature has highlighted the manner in which US oil dependence through recent 
decades served as a source of structural vulnerability (e.g. Greene, Jones, and Leiby, 1998; 
Gnansounou; 2008; Greene, 2005).  
 
Therefore, how external dependence affects a hegemonic or rising power is dependent on the 
contextual specificities of the individual case. External dependence, as presented above, 
includes dependence on overseas resources and overseas market. This chapter focuses on the 
overseas market and capital resources, and raw material resource will be analysed separately 
in the next section. 
 
To sum up, this section seeks to qualitatively assess the benefits and vulnerability that China’s 
production structure is facing, and to identify what factors could possibly undermine or hinder 
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the continuing development of China’s production, thus resulting in an inability to push 
forward the potential hegemonic transition in question.  
 
Overall, these three aspects, production volume, productive, and external dependence can be 
identified as the key indicators of China’s production structure when evaluating the possibility 
of hegemonic transition. Production volume is about assessing a country’s actual amount of 
output and its share in the world market, which is largely influenced by the country’s 
production-related policies. Productivity takes into consideration the sectoral structure, labour 
productivity statistics, and the use of technology in production methods. External dependence 
looks into whether China’s production structure submits to an excessive export-oriented style 
and assesses the vulnerability of its production due to external factors. By combining the 
analysis of these three aspects, this chapter aims to provide a thorough and comprehensive 
evaluation of the US-China hegemonic transition from the perspective of production structure 
as the second pillar of this study. 
 
6.2. Post-1978 Economic Liberalisation and Production Volume 
 
This section provides an overview and evaluation of China’s production volume. It consists of 
three major parts, analysing each of the three production sectors of China: agriculture, industry, 
and service.17 The analyses contain a historical overview of the development and reformation 
of China’s production structure and a statistical description of each sector. This section 
introduces the institutional foundation of China’s production pillar. 
 
Overall, the suggestion is that since economic reform, the production volume of all three 
sectors have seen tremendous development, but at different speeds. The soaring amount of 
GDP and rapid GDP growth are based on an overemphasised industry sector. While taking 
second place as the country with the highest production volume, China’s production structure 
can be optimised and made more competitive by gradually shifting its focus to the tertiary 
sector. At the moment, it is the country with the second-largest GDP, which is the main reason 
for considering China a rising hegemonic power.  
 
17 According to the Fisher-Clark tripartite classification of sectors, the three production 
sectors are about agriculture (primary), industry (secondary), and services (tertiary) 
respectively (Fisher, 1939). 
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The story of China’s prosperity can be divided into a few phases with historical demarcation 
points of 1978 and 1992, as major events occurred during those times. Statistics on China’s 
GDP growth rate provided by the World Bank echo this story of development. The political 
turmoil due to the Great Leap Forward between 1958-1960 and the Cultural Revolution of 
1966-1976 greatly impacted productivity, and the reliability of data from this period could be 
questionable. Nonetheless, what is certain is that the 3rd Plenum occurred by the end of 1978 
and a series of further reformations, particularly the one in 1992, have led the new people’s 
republic into stable, positive and fast-paced economic growth (Figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1 Annual GDP Growth Rate, China 1961-2015 
 
Source: (World Bank, nd) 
 
The late 1970s is set as the starting point for this study, because it was the time when sectoral 
composition, industrial relations, and production methods were reformed after the 3rd Plenary 
Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (the 3rd Plenum) 
(Tisdell, 2009).  
 
 
 151 
6.2.1. Agricultural and Household Responsibility System 
 
Before 1987, all the land was owned by the People 's Commune, production tools were 
distributed equally between farmers by the Commune, and no reward or punishment was given 
based on one’s contribution. Hence, people were likely to do the minimum and, in local terms, 
‘eat from the same big pot’. This collective land ownership and agricultural system under the 
rigid Maoist system greatly undermined farmers’ enthusiasm and productivity. 
 
Secretly carried out by 18 families from Xiaogang Village in the beginning, the Household 
Responsibility System was eventually acknowledged and encouraged by the central 
government, then extensively promoted nationwide. In the Minutes of the National Rural Work 
Conference published on 1st January 1982, a few points were made to acknowledge these 
changes to the essentials of China’s agricultural production: 
 
‘… more than 90% of the rural areas have established a responsibility system 
for agricultural production … The current responsibility system, including 
[different types of] contracting to individuals, households, or groups,18 are all 
legitimate method for production responsibility allocation of China’s socialist 
collective economy.’ (CPC, 1982) 
 
Through this document, the CPC recognised that the time of class struggle and ideological 
conflict should be put to an end, and instead to conclude, perfect, and stabilise. The frequently 
appearing word ‘contracting’ recognised that this HRS could be considered a kind of 
insourcing contract between state and farmer, giving greater autonomy to farmers in terms of 
the whole process of production. More importantly, the second section of the Minutes provided 
guidance on the trading of agricultural and side-line products:  
 
 
18 In the original text, three words – ‘包工’, ‘包产’, and ‘包干’ – could all be translated into 
‘contracting’. The difference is in the detailed methods of distributing responsibilities and 
ownerships of the products. 
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‘Increasing farmers' income not only relies on raising purchasing prices or 
reducing the basic purchasing amount,19 but also the development of commodity 
production, to achieve product abundance and high profit.’ (CPC, 1982) 
 
By allowing a commodity economy for agricultural products, farmer-land and farmer-state 
relationships were modernised. Farmers were given a certain level of freedom to allocate 
resources and distribute products produced on the land that they were responsible for. This 
reform successfully gave farmers the incentive to work and promote the production volume of 
agricultural products, and this responsibility system is still in use today. 
 
Figure 6.2 Agricultural value added (current US$), China 1966-2014 
 
Source: (World Bank, nd) 
 
Further reforms were carried out after the millennium based on the existing results of the 
responsibility system reformation. From 1982, a series of ‘No.1 Documents’ 20  regarding 
agriculture were successively published. In the heart of these documents were three issues: 
farmers, rural areas, and the agricultural sector. More specifically, a series of policies were 
conveyed, including those to ‘modernise China’s agricultural sector by adjusting its structure’, 
 
19 ‘Basic purchasing amount’ means price fixed by the government for a ‘basic amount’ of 
products purchased from farmers and a flexible price for products beyond that amount. 
20 ‘No.1 Documents’ is the nickname given to an annual announcement on agricultural policy 
by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council. These documents reflect the CPC’s 
main line of action on agricultural reform. 
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to ‘construct the rural areas by improving infrastructure’, and to ‘increase social welfare and 
state subsidies to farmers via macro control’.21 Overall, the effect of these policies can be seen 
reflected in the agricultural value-added (Figure 6.2).  
 
The agricultural value-added in China has shown rapid growth since the initial reformation, 
which could be considered as one of the most important achievements of the production 
structure. China’s production volume of several major agricultural goods has since caught up 
with the US (USDA, 2018). In particular, China has faster production growth in livestock, 
crops, and, specifically, food production, than the US. According to the World Bank’s 
production index, while the US has occasionally experienced negative growth in crop and 
livestock production, China has kept steady growth at all times.  
 
Up until 2013, China had a 33% increase in crop production compared to 2004-2006 and a 26% 
increase in livestock production. The equivalent data for its counterparts in the US were merely 
8% and 7% (World Bank, nd). By 2015, China’s total grain production had taken up 20.68% 
of the world’s total whereas the US-occupied approximately 17.48%. Despite the US having a 
slight advantage in oilseed production, China is seeing steady growth and increasing its 
advantage over the US in overall agricultural production.  
 
6.2.2. Industry and Market Economy 
 
The secondary sector, namely industry, was a focus for the early stages of economic 
reformation, particularly in terms of manufacturing. Growth was significant, as were the 
changes made regarding the structure and its relevant policies. In an overview, the most 
significant push to the industry and manufacturing sector occurred around the mid-1980s, when 
the market economy was formally introduced to China’s industrial realm (Jefferson and Singh, 
1999). Information containing ideological guidance was published by the central government 
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping during the period when economic development replaced 
the class struggle as the focus of Chinese society. 
 
Major changes started to take place during the mid-90s, starting with de-centralising and 
privatising state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In 1996, China’s central government initiated the 
 
21 The selected phrases are taken from No.1 Documents of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
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plan of selling more than 300,000 SOEs. Before this plan was launched, these companies were 
described follows 
 
‘[they] employ 100 million workers, receive 90% of bank loans, and account for 
40% of industrial output. Many are plagued by over-capacity, running at an 
estimated average 60% utilization, with perhaps 1/3 too many workers. Half of 
them lost money in 1996’ (The Economist, 1997, as cited in Pyke, Robb, and 
Farley, 2000:579). 
 
The plan of privatising SOEs, however, was not thorough. Only 10-15% of the previously state-
owned companies reformed completely into private firms, with many more partially 
transformed and staying in the safe ‘grey zone’ where they were collectively owned or of mixed 
ownership. China’s economy still relies heavily on state spending, with lifeline industries, such 
as steel manufacturing, oil refining, and electricity generation, all part of a state monopoly 
(Yueh, 2007; Pyke, Robb, and Farley, 2000).  
 
Nonetheless, the formation of China’s industry sector does not need to be totally negated. On 
the one hand, with a small number of firms privatised or owned collectively by township, light 
industries, such as the manufacture of daily necessities, were revitalised (Jefferson and Rawski, 
1994; Murakami, Liu, and Otsuka, 1996). According to China’s Bureau of Statistics, the 
number of private firms has seen exponential growth in recent decades (PRC. National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2018; Lu, 2018).  
 
On the other hand, ideological changes and transformations also took place within a large 
number of remaining SOEs. The 3rd Plenary Session 1993 adopted the Decisions on Issues of 
Constructing Socialist Market Economy System. Similar to the reformed agricultural sector, 
great autonomy was given to companies in terms of management, despite a lingering emphasis 
on state ownership. The second section of the Decision particularly pointed out the importance 
of establishing a ‘modern enterprise system’, one targeting a vast majority of SOEs, especially 
in the heavy industries.  
 
The highly generalised conclusion of the Decision was that SOEs should ‘define ownership, 
clarify rights and responsivity, separate government and enterprise, and adopt scientific 
management’, among which the key was a separation between government and firms. Since 
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the state had withdrawn most of its support to, SOEs financially and strategically, the latter had 
to introduce new methods and strategies of production and management in order to promote its 
competitiveness and ability to survive.  
 
The core message of the Decision continues to affect China’s strategy of production even today. 
Refining a socialist market economy became one must-have discussion during each meeting 
of the CPC. For example, in 2003, at the 16th meeting of the CPC Central Committee, mainline 
of actions, such as ‘consolidating public ownership’ and ‘guiding private business’, were 
advocated to ‘perfect the socialist market economy’ (CPC, 2003). 
 
This transformation of manufacturing companies has led to quite a number of redundancies 
and bankruptcies. Nevertheless, by liberalising the industry sector, with human and capital 
resources better allocated, China’s industry sector has seen massive growth. To date, China has 
reached the top position in terms of industrial production and become the largest manufacturer 
among all countries in the world. China’s total value added for the industry sector surpassed 
the US in 2011 and the EU as a whole in 2012 when it became the world’s top manufacturer 
(see Figure 6.3). This has also become the major reason for China’s economic rise with a great 
contribution to the country’s GDP every year. 
 
Figure 6.3 Industry, value added (current US$) by countries, 1966-2014 
 
Source: (World Bank, nd) 
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Furthermore, the expanding domestic industry sector also reached beyond the border to futher 
boost the national production. Since the 1980s, China has been trying to transform state-owned 
gaints into globally competitive multinational enterprises; to date, however, some scholar 
believe the level of Chinese ownership integrating into the global supply chain is still rather 
low (Nolan, 2012). The challenge for Chinese business acquiring Western companies is also 
rather big due to factors such as local protectionism, political sensitivity, ownership structure 
of the target company, experience of overseas acquisition, and nearly half of the attempts have 
ended up in vain (Zhang and Ebbers, 2010; Zhang and Zhou, 2010). Therefore, progress of 
China’s production growth from this source is rather insignificant, more of an inspiration than 
adding to China’s national production growth. 
 
6.2.3. Services and Further Development 
 
On 16th June 1992, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council made the Decision on 
Accelerating the Development of the Tertiary Sector, marking the deepening of China’s 
production structure reformation. The target was to ‘spend ten years or more, gradually 
establish a services market system, a comprehensive rural-urban social service system, and a 
social welfare system that are suitable for China’s unique national conditions’ (CPC, 1992). 
This decision also pointed out that the growth rate of the tertiary sector should be higher than 
for agriculture and industry, while reaching the average level of developing countries in terms 
of the tertiary industry’s proportion of added value and employed labour force.  
 
A speech by President Jiang Zeming on the 14th CPC Central Committee, four months after 
the previous decision, stated that 
 
‘The expansion of the tertiary sector can not only stimulate market development, 
but also stimulate the market. It can […] enhance economic efficiency and 
productivity […] while providing more employment, which is beneficial to the 
transformation of economic structure, business management mechanisms, and 
governmental institutions.’ (Jiang, 1992)  
 
The speech repeatedly stressed the target of accelerating the development of service industries 
and increasing their proportion within the national economy. By comparing China’s sectoral 
composition with what are considered major developed countries and regions, particularly in 
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the comparison between China and the US, it is clear that China’s primary and secondary 
sectors are still taking up more than half of the country’s overall value-added, whereas, for the 
US, the tertiary sector occupies more than three-quarters of its total value added (Figure 6.4). 
What this indicates is that the sectoral composition shift within China’s production structure is 
far from enough, despite China’s tertiary sector expanding dramatically based on the numbers.  
 
Historically, China’s service sector was immature and often significantly underestimated due 
to historical reason and some special characteristics of the sector, as it was purposely 
suppressed during the Mao Era (Yue and Zhang, 2002; Tsui, 1996). It means that this sector 
necessitates further development with uncertainty lying ahead. Reform of the service sector 
comes naturally with difficulty because of China’s unique political form. Although small 
service businesses sprung up, large-scale service sector reform is hard to operationalise under 
state monopoly over certain segments, the so-called lifeline industries (Perkins, 1994; Pearson, 
2007).  
 
Figure 6.4 Comparison between China and the US on the composition of GDP by sectors 
 
Source: (World Bank, nd) 
 
 
Nonetheless, according to the most recent statistics, value added by the services sector is taking 
54.1% of China’s GDP, as result started to materialise since the government’s initiative to 
promote the share of services in the economy during the 12th Five-Year Plan (PRC. National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Further to that, director of the Services Statistics Division of 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics, Xu Jianyi, gave two factors supporting the argument that 
services are leading China’s economic growth: 1) investment into the services sector has grown 
rapidly with an increase of 11.7%, 7.3% more than that into the industry sector; and 2) power 
consumption by the service sector is growing rapidly as well, taking 13.4% of the total 
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electricity consumption, with a growth of 9.2% (Xu, 2016). With the experience of 
liberalisation in the previous two sectors, while this reformation of China’s service sector may 
be experimental, it is still looking optimistic. 
 
6.2.4 Summary 
 
This section aims to provide a consistent description of China’s production volume. It also 
explores the institutional change of China’s production structure in order to identify the 
momentum for China entering a high-speed growth era – asking what has changed regarding 
ownership, responsibility, production method, and so on. By shedding light on this historical 
development, it is possible to explain China’s miraculous recovery from world wars and 
internal ideological struggles, especially post-Cultural Revolution, when all that had been left 
undone was to be re-done.  
 
The trajectory of China’s production sector is a peculiar one. The transformation from a 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy has enabled China’s gross domestic 
production (GDP) to maintain a high growth rate at an average of 9.7% with 14% as a peak 
reported by the World Bank. Additionally, one major principle promoted during China’s 3rd 
Plenum was the market economy. In the heart of the reformed economy was a series of changes 
on sectoral composition, industrial relationships, and market-openness policies, which 
consequently led to a boost in production. Further to that, the introduction of the household 
responsibility system (HRS) in rural areas and the decentralisation of state-owned enterprises 
in urban areas were also focuses of this late 1970s/early 1980s reform. As a result, the industrial 
structures of many industries experienced a huge transformation, with domestic production and 
social wealth quickly multiplying (Figure 6.5, Table 6.1, Table 6.2).  
 
Table 6.1 Growth of GDP, by Sector, at Constant Prices, China 1890–2003 
 
Source: (Maddison, 2007:60) 
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Table 6.2 Structure of Chinese GDP, 1890–2003 
 
Source: (Maddison, 2007:60) 
 
Figure 6.5 Value added (% of GDP) by sectors,22 China, 1965-2015 
 
Source: (World Bank, nd) 
 
At the beginning of the 90s, China had already surpassed the USSR and Japan in GDP 
(Maddison, 2007: 60-62). According to the World Bank, China’s GDP took up approximately 
14.8% of the world’s total in 2015, placing the country second in the world rankings, following 
the US (24.4%), and it continues to grow at a faster pace each year. From this perspective, 
undoubtedly, that China has reached a high capacity of production volume. It is now able to 
level, even surpass, the US regarding the production of several commodities, especially in 
agricultural and traditional industries. Although its tertiary sector is still lagging behind many 
Western countries at the moment, China’s production structure is becoming increasingly 
competitive and capable judging by current trends. 
 
 
22 Industry includes manufacturing. 
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In short, production reform, especially the emergence of small to medium business and the 
manufacturing boom, greatly promoted China’s economic power from the perspective of 
production volume. However, this rising economic power does not indicate a move toward 
hegemonic status because China’s sectoral composition is rather underdeveloped in 
comparison to other advanced economies.  
 
6.3. Productivity and Labour 
 
This section examines China’s production power via labour productivity. A strand of the 
existing literature has been studying the improvement of China’s productivity in relation to 
overall economic development. Historically, productivity has been used as an indicator of 
China’s economic development in a number of studies (e.g. Kuan et al., 1988). While Solow 
(1956) has theoretically explained the effect of productivity on economic growth from the 
economics perspective, Chinese scholars have also argued that China’s economic growth not 
only relies on factors of input, but also factors of efficiency (Yi, Fan, and Li, 2003). McMillan, 
Whalley, and Zhu (1989) found that institutional changes in China, such as the post-1978 HSR, 
have led to significant productivity growth and, hence, overall improvement in production. Cai, 
Wang, and Du (2002) argue that regional disparity in China is caused by labour market disorder, 
illustrating the linking between economic development and labour productivity. Others have 
found that in order to achieve sustainable social and economic development, China is urged to 
improve resource productivity (Yuan, Bi, and Moriguichi, 2006). 
 
Although China has been quickly catching up with the West, especially the US, in terms of 
production volume, the GDP growth of China has been slowing down, returning and stabilising 
at the point of 7% annual growth in recent years. The reason for this is complex. From the 
perspective of domestic production, it could be explained by further analysis of factors mainly 
involving efficiency and productivity. 
 
There are many indicators and methods of studying productivity. This research chooses to 
explore the aspect of labour productivity to draw a simple and clear picture and compare each 
of the three sectors in terms of China and the US. Specifically, Wu (2001), by comparing the 
labour productivity of China and the US, has found an increase in China’s labour productivity, 
from 3.0 to 7.6 (US=100), between 1952 and 1997. It is also found that due to the market-
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oriented economic reform, China shows evidence of catching up with the US in labour 
productivity since the 1990s after a long period of stagnation at 4.5. More recently, US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics specifically points out that the number of employees in China’s 
manufacturing sector is about 4 times more than that of the US during the 2000s; meanwhile, 
the average wage of these Chinese manufacturing employees is approximately 1/10 of its US 
counterpart (US. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Besides the worrying concern of workers 
treatment in China, these numbers also hint relatively much lower productivity of China’s 
manufacturing sector. 
 
This section will extend existing knowledge of China’s labour productivity by presenting the 
most up-to-date productivity data for the three sectors, service, industry, and agriculture, 
respectively. Pragmatically and contrary to the complexity of assessing multi-factor 
productivity, which involves collating wide-ranging sources of or the difficulty of acquiring 
accurate data on energy consumption, statistics on a labour force and value-added can be easily 
retrieved from annual household surveys.  
 
Overall, the finding is that, for all the sectors examined in this part of the thesis, China’s labour 
productivity is lagging significantly behind its American counterpart and growing at a slower 
rate than that of the US. This has thus become a major obstacle standing between China and 
comprehensive hegemonic power.  
 
The OECD Statistics Directorate has provided guidance on calculating labour productivity. 
The formula is  
Labour productivity = volume measure of output / measure of input use 
 
The volume measure of output is measured either by gross domestic product (GDP) or gross 
value added (GVA), while labour input is measured either by the total number of hours worked 
of all persons employed or total employment (headcount); (Freeman, 2008:5). Because this 
section will explore labour productivity in each sector, the calculation is  
Sectoral labour productivity = sectoral value-added / sectoral employment 
 
The data of sectoral value-added for both countries is taken from the World Bank database, 
and the information for sectoral employment (number of employed people in a sector) is found 
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on both countries’ bureaus of statistics, which can be considered valid and liable. The time 
coverage of the selected data runs from 2002 to 2014. 
 
6.3.1. The Significance of the Services Sector 
 
As mentioned above, a great institutional transformation has occurred regarding China’s 
sectoral composition. More precisely, based on World Bank data, this transformation can be 
identified as mainly a shift of focus from agriculture to the other two sectors. In addition to this, 
and for a very long time, value-added by industry had been taking the largest share of total 
GDP, until 2012 when it was surpassed by services. Though the services sector takes up more 
than half of the total GDP of China and is keeping a rapid development momentum, the current 
composition of sectors in relation to China’s production structure is insufficient to maintain 
this short-lived high growth rate.  
 
As empirical wisdom has already proven, the degree of development for a country’s tertiary 
sector, namely its services sector, is, according to the Fisher-Clark classification of sectors 
(Wolfe, 1955), the clearest indicator for measuring that country's economic development and 
production level, as well as the level of modernization (Park and Chan, 1989; Wang, 2000; 
Joshi, 2004).  
 
This is because first, only when productivity and efficiency of the first two sectors reach a 
certain level can more labour and resources be put into developing its services industry; and 
second, conversely, a more advanced service industry can promote the economic performance 
of the first two sectors, for example, providing transportation, insurance, and communication 
for the industrial revolution (Gemmell, 1982; Miles, 1993). As mentioned in the previous 
section, the importance of the tertiary sector has also been acknowledged by the Chinese 
government. 
 
With a further comparison between China and the US in value added by different sectors, 
taking 2014 as an example (Table 6.3), it can be seen that the value added by services sector 
of the US in 2014 is about 1.6 times more than that of China, whilst China’s advantage in the 
first two sectors is relatively weak. Meanwhile, China’s labour force participating in the tertiary 
sector is 2.66 times that of the US (Table 6.4).  
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Table 6.3 Value added (current Trillion US$), by sectors, by countries/regions, 2014 
 
Services Industry Agriculture 
CHN 4977.86 4423.68 949.571 
USA 13083.64 3470.60 223.86 
EUU 12262.967 4046.78 264.83 
Source: (World Bank, nd) 
 
Table 6.4 Labour force composition (millions), 2014 
 
Source: (PRC. National Bureau of Statistics, nd; US. Bureau of Labor Statistics, nd) 
 
In other words, in terms of value-added per unit of the labour force, the US efficiency of 
services value added is about 7 times its counterpart, with the absolute value of this gap being 
94911.15 current US$ per labour force unit in 2014. This means that the average US service 
worker adds $94,911 more value annually than average Chinese service worker. 
 
Some may argue that although the gap in labour productivity is big, it would take no or very 
little time before China, with its great potential and resources, could catch up with the US and 
finalise the hegemonic transition. Indeed, a transition is a dynamic process rather than a static 
point in history, and therefore, it is necessary to expand our horizon to take longer periods of 
time into account while exploring this tendency.  
 
However, existing statistics cannot sufficiently prove this opinion. This trend is nowhere to be 
seen based on a calculation. Both countries’ labour productivities are shown in Table 6.5 and 
Figure 6.6. It can be seen that besides the great difference between their productivities, both 
countries are experiencing an improvement (positive growth) in productivity. Furthermore, 
according to the linear function,23 which is based on 8-year figures, the gradient of productivity 
growth for the US (a=2704.6) is higher than that of China (a=1186.3). This means that China’s 
 
23 y = ax + b, where y refers to productivity and x refers to year 
 China US 
Primary 227.9 2.2 
Secondary 231.0 26.0 
Tertiary 313.6 118.1 
Total 772.5 146.3 
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service sector not only has much lower labour productivity but also a slower growth rate 
compared to its US counterpart. 
 
Table 6.5. Service sector labour, value-added, and productivity, China and US, 2002-2014 
 US Labour 
(million) 
US Value 
added (Current 
US$) 
US 
Productivity 
(V/L) 
China Labour 
(million) 
China Value 
added (Current 
US$) 
CN 
productivity 
(V/L) 
2002 104.812 8252007 78731.5098 209.5808 618448.713 2950.8844 
2003 107.895 8623739 79927.1421 216.04648 694401.353 3214.12945 
2004 109.229 9141251 83688.8647 227.24784 800826.406 3524.02208 
2005 111.459 9734295 87335.2085 234.39158 939249.234 4007.17993 
2006 113.409 10255997 90433.7134 241.42916 1143553.57 4736.60085 
2007 115.057 10751999 93449.3251 244.04004 1512860.99 6199.23269 
2008 115.498 10997687 95219.7181 250.87248 1955860.81 7796.235 
2009 113.163 11014404 97332.2022 258.57348 2248808.44 8696.98023 
2010 112.969 11380637 100741.239 263.3233 2669651.27 10138.3025 
2011 113.422 11729656 103416.057 272.82 3320899.17 12172.4917 
2012 115.675 12239015 105805.187 276.9 3850101.86 13904.3043 
2013 116.594 12561392 107736.179 296.36 4452807.39 15024.9946 
2014 118.1 13083640 110784.42 313.6 4977857.54 15873.2702 
Source: (PRC. National Bureau of Statistics, nd; US. Bureau of Labor Statistics, nd; World 
Bank, nd) 
 
Figure 6.6 Service sector productivity, China and US, 2002-2014 
 
 
The productivity growth gap is kept in positive figures, which means that the disparity between 
China and the US, in terms of productivity, is, in fact, getting bigger and bigger. Based on this 
data and from the perspective of productivity in the tertiary sector, there is no sign of a decline 
in US production, neither is there the potential that the US will be surpassed by China. The 
foundation of China’s hegemonic rise is lacking significant support by the tertiary sector. 
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6.3.2. Industry and Productivity 
 
Among a total of 31 industrial sectors,24 manufacturing takes up more than 30% of the total 
GDP, and, along with other sections from the industry sector, is problematic by itself, even 
facing severe challenges. The reason for this is somehow institutional and rooted in China’s 
grand strategy for production. Within a market built under ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’, there are two major types of players: large-scale enterprises which are also 
state-owned at the same time, along with relatively smaller privately owned and invested 
companies. This section below examines the productivity of China’s industry sector in 
comparison with the US. 
 
On the one hand, state-owned enterprises are often referred to as ‘zombie’, because of their 
rigid bureaucracy and low efficiency and productivity (Wildau, 2016); on the other, private 
companies are developing faster dynamics in China’s industry sector. However, they are 
vulnerable to some extent because of excessive external dependence that will be analysed in 
the later on section. As a whole, the situation of China’s industry sector is often described as a 
slow and clumsy giant with a regional, sectoral, and social imbalance (Wei, 2002; Huang and 
Wang, 2010). 
 
Using a similar approach to the calculation in the service sector, productivity levels in the 
secondary sector of both China and the US for 2002-2014 are subsequently analysed (Table 
6.6 and Figure 6.7). According to statistics from the World Bank database (World Bank, nd), 
China’s production in relation to industry (including manufacturing) has recently surpassed the 
US, turning it into the leading world figure. However, in terms of productivity in this sector, a 
similar pattern to the service sector can be found.  
 
Table 6.6 Industry sector labour, value-added, and productivity, China and US, 2002-2014 
 US Labour 
(million) 
US Value 
added (Current 
US$) 
US Productivity 
(V/L) 
China Labour 
(million) 
China Value 
added (Current 
US$) 
CN 
productivity 
(V/L) 
2002 28.332 2258241 79706.3744 156.819 647872.418 4131.33879 
2003 27.565 2380882 86373.372 159.27 750523.136 4712.26933 
2004 27.791 2570422 92491.1662 167.094 888384.4 5316.67445 
2005 28.074 2776876 98912.7306 177.66 1063267.15 5984.84267 
2006 28.813 2990419 103787.145 188.945 1293845.79 6847.73763 
 
24 Based on the ISIC Rev.3 classification, industry consists of mining, manufacturing, and 
construction. See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=2. Accessed 24 April 
2018 
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2007 28.894 3103737 107418.045 201.86 1645026.62 8149.34419 
2008 27.697 3084110 111351.771 205.534 2131303.7 10369.5919 
2009 24.611 2828294 114919.914 210.802 2310655.21 10961.2585 
2010 23.889 2958610 123848.215 218.421 2788722.8 12767.6496 
2011 24.192 3102150 128230.407 225.439 3457251.41 15335.6403 
2012 24.607 3214706 130641.931 232.41 3805274.94 16373.1119 
2013 25.205 3327741 132027.018 231.7 4144904.77 17889.1013 
2014 26.001 3470600 133479.482 230.99 4423682.33 19150.969 
Source: (PRC. National Bureau of Statistics, nd; US. Bureau of Labor Statistics, nd; World 
Bank, nd) 
 
Figure 6.7 Industry sector productivity, China and US, 2002-2014 
 
 
Despite achievements in production volume, when divided by the volume of labour force in 
the corresponding industry, a huge disparity between the two countries emerges. According to 
these figures, this disparity in productivity has maintained a level of more than 110,000 (current 
US$ per unit of labour force) in the recent 5 years. Meanwhile, the numbers for productivity 
growth show that the growth of US industry productivity is slowing down, with the growth of 
China’s industry productivity relatively stable at around 1000 (current US$ per unit of labour 
force).  
 
These statistics mean that a potential decline in the US industry sector could be happening 
shortly, but slowly, and meanwhile there is more possibility that China will catch up with the 
US, in terms of industry productivity, when compared to the result of productivity in the tertiary 
sector. Nonetheless, the current trend of China’s industry sector development shows that, for 
this possibility to become reality would take a rather long time. Combining this with the 
previous analysis on the tertiary sector, since these two sectors take up almost 90% of China’s 
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domestic production and the level of productivity for both sectors are relatively much lower 
than that of the US, it would be quite difficult to see China as a rising hegemonic power on an 
unbalanced economic foundation. 
 
Furthermore, according to the data and report published by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, between January and August 2016, industry enterprise profits reached the highest of the 
year in August, 19.5% more than for August 2015. However, this is because there were a series 
of economic traumas in 2015, including declined demand, rising cost, stock market dramas, 
and so on. In other words, the reason for month-on-month growth being seemingly so high was 
due to the economic downturn of 2015; if using 2014 as the benchmark, profit growth between 
2014-2016 was merely 4.4% (He, 2016). The report continues by stating that from the macro 
point of view, the foundation supporting fast development of the industry sector is not yet 
consolidated enough.  
 
Most importantly, traditional industries are facing the challenge of overcapacity (Lin, Cai, and 
Li, 2003; Zhang, 2014), especially in relation to the manufacturing of steel, cement, and 
photovoltaic glass, which may seriously undermine China’s production structure. Emerging 
industries, including industries relating to wind power, photovoltaic, carbon cellulose, are also 
showing signs of overcapacity materialising in the near future following a similar 
developmental approach as the traditional ones (Yin, 2018). In order to overcome the challenge 
of overcapacity, a series of actions, solutions, and suggestions will be discussed in the next 
section.  
 
6.3.3. Agriculture 
 
Labour productivity levels for the agricultural sector in both China and the US are calculated 
in the same manner as the previous two (see Table 6.7 and Figure 6.8). The result of sectoral 
productivity is rather similar to the other two as well. With about 100 times more labour 
involved in agricultural production, in 2014, China’s labour productivity in the realm of 
agriculture was about 30 times lower than that of the US.  
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Table 6.7 Agriculture sector labour, value-added, and productivity, China and US, 2002-2014 
 US Labour 
(million) 
US Value 
added (Current 
US$) 
US Productivity 
(V/L) 
China Labour 
(million) 
China Value 
added (Current 
US$) 
CN 
productivity 
(V/L) 
2002 3.34 106400 31856.2874 366.4 195585.357 533.80283 
2003 2.275 130076 57176.2637 362.044 205005.437 566.244536 
2004 2.232 153599 68816.7563 348.298 252534.796 725.053822 
2005 2.197 149270 67942.6491 334.419 266081.3 795.652461 
2006 2.206 141596 64186.7634 319.406 292384.679 915.401336 
2007 2.095 152255 72675.4177 307.31 365205.389 1188.3941 
2008 2.168 164224 75749.0775 299.233 471268.007 1574.9199 
2009 2.103 147777 70269.6148 288.905 499956.085 1730.52071 
2010 2.206 170356 77223.9347 279.305 581282.956 2081.17634 
2011 2.254 205527 91183.2298 265.942 714281.514 2685.85449 
2012 2.186 194255 88863.2205 257.73 806246.376 3128.25971 
2013 2.13 234079 109896.244 241.71 892890.506 3694.05695 
2014 2.237 223860 100071.524 227.9 949573.526 4166.62363 
Source: (PRC. National Bureau of Statistics, nd; US. Bureau of Labor Statistics, nd; World 
Bank, nd) 
 
Figure 6.8 Agriculture sector productivity, China and US, 2002-2014 
 
 
The general trend that can be observed from 2002 to 2014 is that the gap between the two 
countries is widening. One significant difference in this sector, and not shown in the previous 
two, is that China is maintaining a growth rate of 0.1-0.3%, whereas its counterpart the US is 
much more unstable, jumping between positive (0.2%) and negative (-0.1%) growth. It can be 
assumed that China’s growth in terms of labour productivity is higher than the US based on 
these numbers; however, with a much lower starting point, it would also take a longer period 
of time - than within the foreseeable future - for China to level with the US in the agricultural 
sector.  
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The fact is that although China’s total production and value-added in agricultural commodities 
are the highest in the world, Chinese production methods are still mainly based on rural family 
groups with small-sized lands as their ‘responsibility’. In very few cases, mainly in the east 
and central part of China, machinery has been introduced in agriculture production with support 
from collective groups or subsidies from the government (Fan, Zhang, and Robinson, 2003). 
With a large portion of the rural population still relying on human and animal labour, it is 
difficult to make a dramatic improvement in productivity. Furthermore, as the agricultural 
sector takes up merely a tiny portion of total GDP and is decreasing its share every year, any 
changes, regardless of improvement or downturn, would not be of great significance to the 
whole picture of China’s overall productivity. 
 
6.3.4. Summary 
 
Many existing reports and studies provide facts and insights into other aspects of China’s low 
productivity levels. For example, the Penn World Table 9.0 provides data on total factor 
productivity (TFP), along with an indicator called ‘TFP level at current PPPs (USA=1)’ (CTFP). 
This looks at TFP levels in relation to purchasing power when compared to the US. Between 
1950-2014, the numbers for China’s CTFP were under 0.5 at all times (PWT, 2017) compared 
to the US.  
 
The reason for China’s low productivity is two-fold – on the one hand, the Chinese production 
method is rather crude, mainly relying on the input of massive natural resources and the 
advantages of low land and labour costs with high energy consumption and much pollution 
(Sinton, Levine, and Qingyi, 1998). On the other hand, there is also a lack of technological 
innovation in China’s production structure, which falls behind the US, particularly regarding 
new material, heavy machinery manufacturing, and core technologies (Lu, 2005). These factors 
lead to a relatively low value being added to products during the production process. Though 
China participates in and occupies a large share of the global market, in fact, it occupies the 
lowest end of the whole industrial chain for certain kinds of products or services.  
 
In the aftermath of the ‘One-Child Policy’ which was initiated in the 1980s, China has become 
an ageing society. With the overall population continuing to expand, the overall labour force 
is experiencing a slow-down in growth. This means as the labour-population ratio reduces, the 
trend for the cost of labour is rising. The crude production method that relies so heavily on an 
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abundant and cheap labour force, once an advantage, is likely to create challenges for China’s 
production sector in the near future (Zhang, Yang, and Wang, 2011).  
 
Therefore, a further transformation of the sectoral composition is urgent for China to continue 
the industrial upgrade, from labour – and resource-oriented to technology-oriented, while 
promoting its own leading brands. Only with this can China close the gap with the US, and this 
cannot be achieved quickly. Without these problems being solved in the coming years, it would 
be unlikely for China’s production pillar to develop a healthier growth mode and surpass the 
US, let alone approach a hegemonic transition. 
 
Overall, through the analysis of this section, it is found that productivity is a major constraint 
on China’s economic power. Based on the current statistics, China’s production structure 
exhibits unbalanced development, lacks support from the most value-adding sectors, and shows 
no evidence that such economic foundation is capable of sustaining a rising hegemonic power. 
 
6.4. China’s Production Strategy and External Dependence 
 
As was introduced in the second section of this chapter, external activity is an important factor 
to consider when analysing the productive power of a country. Certain levels of external 
activity can be beneficial and even greatly enhance one’s economic performance, therefore 
creating the opportunity for hegemonic ascendancy. Meanwhile, excessive external 
dependence may lead to high vulnerability and consequently hamper or even undermine a 
country’s economic power. This section of the chapter explores China’s historical and current 
external activities to evaluate the level of external dependence, and determines whether this is 
likely to contribute or hinder China’s rising economic power.  
 
This section consists of two major topics, with existing literature suggesting that external 
dependence can relate to strategic weaknesses in relation both to investment and trade – that 
China’s production relies on foreign capitals and foreign markets (e.g. Lake, 2002; Gamble, 
2002; Norrlof, 2010). The paragraphs below first review the dynamics associated with China’s 
inward foreign direct investment, which shows the country’s production to be dependent on 
foreign capital. The other is exportation, which refers to China’s production output to other 
parts of the world and China’s increasing reliance on exportation. Together these two aspects 
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can indicate the level of dependence on external actors that are experienced by China’s 
production structure. By comparing it with previous hegemons, this section can, therefore, 
evaluate the advantages and vulnerability of China’s production, as well as its potential for 
hegemonic ascendancy.  
 
6.4.1. ‘Open Door’ Policy and FDI 
 
The opening up of the market was necessary in order for China to move on to transnational 
activities. China’s massive population, meaning cheap labour, and relatively abundant 
materials have become an attraction for many foreign companies. Many scholars have 
suggested that China’s spectacular growth rate is partly due to its ‘open door’ policy and 
surging FDI inflow (e.g. Prime, Subrahmanyam, and Lin, 2012; Braodman and Sun, 1997).  
 
During mid-1988, the No.7 Order of the State Council of China, also called Provisions on 
Encouraging Foreign Investment, laid down some general guidance on this issue with 
immediate effect. Apart from the cheap labour force, materials, and attractive market size that 
China naturally possesses, the No.7 Order also made several preferential policies for foreign 
investors looking to invest in enterprises that ‘produce to export…; or/and introduce advance 
scientific technology or are in the innovation industries’ (PRC. State Council, 1988). These 
preferential policies include discounts on administrative fees, social insurance responsibilities, 
taxation, and priority in registration. These policies are still in effect today. As a result of this 
‘open door’ policy, FDI received by China has tripled in the recent decade, from $37.521 
billion in 1995 to $119.562 billion in 2014 (PRC. National Bureau of Statistics, nd). 
Investments made in manufacture, though gradually reducing, have taken the biggest share of 
all, with real estate slowly expanding, while the situation for other industries is staying 
relatively stable. 
 
In the early 2000s, The Development Research Centre of the State Council of China concluded 
that foreign investment was an organic and healthy component of China’s economic 
development. It referred to IMF statistics showing that in relation to China’s 10.1% GDP 
growth rate in the 90s, FDI had contributed 3%. By introducing FDI into China’s production 
structure, there was a great benefit to the gross domestic capital formation (GCF), productivity 
and value-added, exportation, foreign exchange, employment, scientific advancement, and 
taxation (Chen, 2004; Sun, 2012; Qu et al., 2013).  
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In the latest report from China’s Bureau of Statistics, other researchers have suggested that 
China’s foreign investment is also growing steadily (Xu et al., 2016) – the industrial and 
regional structure of the foreign economy is constantly being optimised. Due to preferential 
policies, a technology spillover effect has begun, further improving the quality of China's 
foreign capital. Meanwhile, though FDI has been constantly increasing, its share in total 
domestic investment, as well as the number of registered enterprises and employment, are 
decreasing.  
 
More recently, the State Council made the decision to popularise and further simplify the 
governmental registration and administrative management of foreign-invested enterprises, 
after success in four ‘test areas’. Commentators believe that this will further promote China’s 
economic development, although it also means a challenge to the government’s management 
capacity (Zhu, 2016). 
 
Some studies have suggested that FDI could have a negative impact on production, depending 
on the type of investment, sector, scale, duration, location, and density of local firms. Therefore, 
a country should not blindly apply pro-FDI policies as ‘FDI might serve not only a way of 
doing money, but also a way of acquiring a certain control, both economic and political, in the 
host country’ (Žilinskė, 2010:335). Others have suggested that whether or not FDI will create 
a negative impact depends on the internal environment of the host country, as well as greenfield 
investment, meaning investing in an undeveloped area is more beneficial than investments 
made in the form of mergers and acquisitions (Moura and Forte, 2010).  
 
That is to say, the most positively effective way to use FDI is by focusing on the potential of 
technology, labour, and education spill-over. Applying these suggestions to the case of China, 
it can be assumed that China does indeed greatly benefit from the technological innovations of 
FDI. However, this effect has decreased, compared to the late 1990s and early 2000s when 
about 70% of FDI went to manufacturing industries.  
 
To date, the focus of FDI is shifting from manufacture to real estate and financial services. 
There is hardly any spill-over effect in the real estate industry despite 30% growth of total FDI. 
Meanwhile, the risk of foreign actors gaining control in a host country, and suggested by 
Žilinskė (2010), is unlikely to happen in China, either. As mentioned above, though with a 
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growing actual amount, the share of FDI among total investments, and the ratio between FDI 
and GDP are in fact decreasing.25 
 
As the World Bank has suggested, China’s approach in terms of introducing FDI to its 
production realm is successful and cautious, as it maintains a health synchronisation between 
foreign investment and institutional capacity (World Bank, 2010). In conclusion, in the case of 
China, foreign direct investment does not cause external China’s production structure to 
experience vulnerability or excessive dependence; neither does it generate great benefits that 
are enough to push it forward to hegemonic ascendancy because of the tiny portion it occupies 
in China’s overall production structure. 
 
6.4.2. Exportation 
 
Another widely acknowledged factor that boosted China’s production and economic growth is 
its intensive focus on exports. Besides the ‘open door’ policy which welcomes foreign 
investment in, a set of ‘going out’ strategies have also been encouraging exportation and 
outward investment since the late 1980s, providing exporting companies with preferential 
policies. This focus and reliance on exports reached a peak during the late 1990s when China 
saw massive growth in exportation and a plunge in its RMB exchange rate. To further boost 
sales overseas, the PBOC deliberately and unilaterally devalued the RMB in 1996-1998.  
 
The advantage of China’s exportation is founded on cost competitiveness. China’s huge 
population, massive landmass, relatively abundant resources, and the advantage of a 
depreciated currency mean that the cost for manufacturing and processing can be much lower 
than elsewhere. The Chinese economy has been described as benefitting from ‘export-oriented’ 
growth (Kahrl and Roland-Holst, 2008). 
 
At the China Economists Forum in 2009, scholars suggested that the ratio between exportation 
and GDP had become bigger than it should be – export volume grows at the speed 1.5 times as 
GDP growth and is not sustainable (Sina Finance, 2009). During the period 1980-2010, annual 
exportation growth was, on average, 1.5 times the annual GDP growth rate, while the highest 
record of exportation-GDP ratio was 35.65% in 2006 (iFeng, 2009). More recently, n 2015, the 
 
25 A mere 2.5% on average from 2005-2010 and still decreasing, see (World Bank, nd) 
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share of exportation for China’s GDP dropped to 22.37%. However, this number is nearly twice 
as much as that as the US (see Figure 6.9). It is also found that although China’s dependence 
on exporting labour-intensive products and services has relatively declined and that on 
electronic equipment has increased by the late 2000s (Xie and Zhao, 2014), China’s production 
is still heavily relying on foreign technology (Grimes and Sun, 2014). This signifies an 
unbalanced trade pattern with high value-added imports and low value-added exports (Liu et 
al., 2011). The value-added in China’s exportation remains rather low within the global value-
added chain. 
 
Figure 6.9 Export of goods and services (% of GDP) by country 
 
Source: (World Bank, nd) 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, hegemonic leadership needs to be founded on 
leadership in high value-added economic sectors. In the contemporary international political 
economy, manufacturing has been surpassed in this regard. It was also suggested by the Power 
Transition Theory that emerging powers must rise through ‘internal development’. These days, 
the focus of economic development is moving from traditional production to services, 
particularly financial activity. This makes an export-oriented economy even less likely to 
succeed in terms of hegemonic ascendancy.  
 
Further to the unlikeliness of hegemonic ascendancy, China’s export-oriented economy can be 
problematic. Indeed, it is questionable whether this growth model is sustainable. As the world’s 
total market capacity is limited and profit margins already low, it is hard for China to push its 
exportation further (Guo and N'Diaye, 2009). Some have spotted the disadvantage of China’s 
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economical over-reliance on an export market, considering it greatly imbalanced and 
‘increasingly jeopardized by its “excessive investment” and “over dependence on demand from 
other countries”’ (Hung, 2008:151).  
 
Being export-oriented indeed leads to vulnerability, for example, being passive and affected 
by other external factors such as exchange rate and global financial downturns which are often 
unpredictable. As shown in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis worldwide, with the US 
being especially affected, China’s 2009 exportation suffered a significant $244 billion decrease 
with negative 10.2% growth. Its annual GDP growth rate also dropped from 14.2% to below 
10%, according to the World Bank (Figure 6.1). Since the 2000s, appreciated currency and 
rising labour price made China’s products less attractive than those from other developing 
countries as they lose the price advantage (Ceglowski and Golub, 2012). Besides that, China 
is also facing an increasing number of challenges, including an anti-dumping policy posed by 
external actors (Zanardi, 2004; Prusa, 2005), requirements for policy transparency (Žilinskė, 
2010), and issues over intellectual property protection (Harris, 2008; Evans, 2002).  
 
It is impossible to confirm that there is any potential for hegemonic leadership due to China’s 
exportation; but rather the contrary, as China has been passively seeking solutions to promote 
and sustain its exportation and secure economic growth. There are also suggestions that China’s 
exportation should move away from the cheap labour-oriented and processing-oriented mode 
and instead towards service industries and technological innovation (Jarreau and Poncet, 2012). 
 
6.4.3. Summary 
 
By analysing the current situation of China’s inward FDI and exportation, the conclusion is 
that no significant evidence of potential hegemonic power can be found from the aspect of 
external reliance. China has been receiving sizable FDI, which contributed greatly to its 
economic growth during the early stages of economic reformation and liberalisation. By 
drawing the cautious strategy of introducing FDI, China’s economy does not seem excessively 
dependent on external actors; however, the effect of FDI is relatively small and continues to 
decline compared to the overall size of China’s economy. As for China’s exportation, there is 
a great level of dependence as historical data proves, echoing with theoretical analyses 
provided in the existing literature. Furthermore, scholars have observed incoming challenges 
for China in terms of further expanding its exportation; these make China’s hegemonic 
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ascendancy even less likely. Overall, while its ‘open door’ policy and inflowing FDI are no 
longer a significant factor in China’s economic development, excessive dependence on the 
export-driven economy is a major weakness of China’s rising economic power. 
 
6.5. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has analysed the potential of hegemonic transition regarding China’s production 
structure, using the aspects of production volume, productivity, and external dependence. 
These have been selected to be the indicators for analysing a country’s production structure 
according to existing literature and empirical cases studies on previous instances of hegemonic 
transition.  
 
Production volume allows for a broad overview of the expansion of economic activity, while 
the other two aspects explore more in-depth the potential and sustainability of China’s 
production structure. Generally, productivity reflects the ability of production by each unit of 
input which is used in many empirical analyses by scholars. External dependence is considered 
to be a factor that should be kept in balance, as certain levels of external activity can boost 
production whilst excessive external dependence may hinder and even undermine economic 
growth. 
 
The overall performance of China’s production structure, as reflected in its GDP and growth 
rate, is going through an astounding period of rapid development not being seen elsewhere. 
The reason for its outstanding production volume is, in short, a change in ideological guidance 
and liberalisation of the market. The reforms in the agricultural and industrial sectors have 
allowed China to take up a large share of the world’s total production in the corresponding 
sector. However, reforms in the service sector only started more recently. Although these 
achievements are great, there is neither facts nor significant potential that point to China 
surpassing its counterpart in the US. China’s total production volume, as reflected in GDP, still 
has a sizeable way to go to catch up, although its surprisingly high overall GDP annual growth 
rate adds a positive assumption.  
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As for productivity, there is a definite result from the quantitative analysis whereby China’s 
labour productivity is shown to be much lower than the US in all three production sectors. The 
growth of China’s labour productivity is also lower than in the US in general, especially within 
the service sector, which is considered increasingly vital to economic development. This 
conclusion of China’s low productivity is supported by not only labour productivity but also 
other related statistics, for example, total factor productivity. There are a number of 
governmental reports also urging China’s production structure to adopt more high-tech 
innovations and to keep shifting towards service sectors. At the moment, however, the chance 
of a US-China hegemonic transition regarding productivity seems very unlikely.  
 
Finally, China’s production structure experiences a certain level of external dependence due to 
the heavily export-oriented model of economic growth, although no dependence can be 
identified based on inward FDI. Exportation has taken a much greater share of China’s total 
GDP in comparison to the US. It has turned its early-stage advantage into a burden for the 
Chinese economy, which now has to maintain its high-speed growth and massive exportation 
levels. Scholars have questioned whether this growth mode is even ‘sustainable’.  
 
With a combined view using these three aspects, it is undoubted that there are still great gaps 
between China and the US from all three perspectives. Despite China’s higher growth rate, this 
is a growth rate that will gradually slow down and present an increasing amount of new 
challenges. It is unlikely that those gaps will be reduced within the foreseeable future. While 
internal reform and development have, overall, intensively promoted China’s economic power, 
low productivity and excessive reliance on exportation are a significant setback in relation to 
the production aspect of economic power. Therefore, China’s economic power based upon the 
production structure cannot move China towards a sufficient hegemonic rise.  
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7. External Development of the Production Pillar: Resource 
Diplomacy 
 
This chapter explores the external implications of China’s production structure through an 
analysis of its resource diplomacy. It is widely acknowledged that resources represent a 
fundamental part of the development of the economy and that stable access to raw materials 
provides a foundation of economic expansion from the perspective of production. Acquiring 
resources is also vital to the survival and sustainability of states. Buckley et al. (2010) also 
noted that China’s outward direct investment is significantly resource-seeking. Therefore, the 
ability to acquire stable access to resources is a significant source of strengthening China’s 
economic power for its hegemonic rise. 
 
Through this chapter, this thesis evaluates the extent to which China’s resource diplomacy has 
sustained the country’s production and economic development as it contributes to the political 
and economic dimensions of China’s hegemonic expansion. To do this, the chapter starts by 
providing a framework defining what indicators are to be looked at and in what way this study 
should be conducted. This section includes a review of current studies to establish an analytical 
framework identifying institutional foundation, trade volume, infrastructural development, and 
challenges to partnership sustainability as key indicators. Then, in order to gain a systematic 
overview of China’s approach to securing external access to material resources, interactions 
across the resource-rich regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America are considered.  
 
The overall observation indicates that China’s resource diplomacy in all three regions is 
significantly supporting China’s production and economic growth, and hence promoting 
China’s economic power in relation to the production structure from the external aspect. As is 
outlined below, important points of difference and similarity are displayed across these regions 
(Table 7.1). The three regions show different patterns of cooperation. ASEAN has the highest 
level of cooperation in all aspects, followed by LAC in second place, and then Africa. While 
trade volume of China in all three regions has declined in recent years, investment, especially 
investment in resource-related projects, has been increasing. As long as China keeps up its 
strategy of cooperation, rather than exploitation, and maximises mutual benefits, its resource 
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diplomacy is secured and promising in these three regions. The current status of China’s 
resource cooperation can thus continue to contribute to its rising power. 
 
Table 7.1 Key findings of China’s resource diplomacy, 2000-2015 
 Africa Latin America ASEAN 
Price Largely following rising international market prices, but with mitigating 
mechanisms to offset these rises 
Securing 
access 
Trade 
volume 
($billion) 
Low (Africa to China 
~50 in 2015; total ~200 
in 2012) 
Medium (LAC to China 
~80, China to LAC ~160 
in 2015) 
High (total ~472.16 in 
2015) 
Challenge Low risk (criticism on 
neo-colonialism) 
Medium risk (need 
industrial upgrade) 
Low risk (regional 
imbalance) 
Infrastructual Investment High (biggest 
infrastructure financier 
and aid) 
High ($22.1 billion fund 
in 2014, ~$10 billion / 
year FDI) 
High (accumulated $296 
billion worth projects till 
2017, AIIB established) 
Major commodity 
imported by China 
Energy, minerals Energy, minerals, 
agricultural goods 
Agricultural goods, 
natural rubber, minerals 
 
7.1. Operationalising the Study of the Production Pillar: Resource 
Diplomacy   
 
Within Strange’s conceptualisation of structural power and within associated IPE literature on 
hegemony, the issue of access to resources featured as a prominent focus of analysis. In the 
paragraphs below, the literature on the topic of external access to resources and power in IPE 
are engaged with, to identify and explain the dimensions that are focused on through this 
chapter. Overall, three topics are drawn from the existing literature. These, namely, are the 
relation between hegemonic power and resource, indicators to evaluate resource diplomacy, 
and the case selection of this chapter. 
 
As was established briefly in Chapter 3, predominant scholarship on hegemony and 
international political economy noted that access to material resources represents an important 
foundation of expanding power. Existing literature generally agree that early hegemons 
conquered vast lands for the significant purpose of taking resources from those lands to fuel 
their own domestic production.  
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The Romans built mines and started exploitation as soon as they had taken over Britain between 
AD 43 and 410 (Palmer and Palmer, 1992). For Spanish hegemony, gold and silver from Latin 
America were once one of its primary colonial targets (Tenace, 2003; Quijano, 2000). For the 
British Empire, importing massive amounts of raw materials was the essential method of 
building its hegemonic regime, as these materials supported the industrialisation of the nation, 
with its prospering fields of manufacturing and exportation (Lake, 2002).  
 
As the current world hegemon, the US might seem less interested in precious metals than its 
predecessors. Instead, its aim is energy and fuels, as these are the new lifeblood of industrial 
development, proven by its military strategy in the Persian Gulf (Bromley, 1998). China, 
currently one of the major countries seeking promotion on the political and economic world 
stage, has a huge demand for resources due to its massive population and fast-paced level of 
economic development (Kambara, 1992). In its pursuit of power, therefore, resource-related 
diplomatic activities are urged for the purpose of maintaining and upgrading its rapidly 
expanding production structure.  
 
Theoretically speaking, the relationship between resources and power has been identified and 
supported by several international political economy classics. The realist school believes that 
material, manifesting in the control and access of resources, is a direct indicator of state power 
(Krasner, 1976; Kitchen, 2010). Hegel considers property as the tool for defining dignity; with 
the ‘property’ in question considered equal to ‘material’ (Antonio, 1981; Stillman, 1988). 
Marxism and the later critical theories developed upon Hegelian materialism add that 
institutions that control the most resources possess the most power (Stillman, 1983; Migdal, 
Kohli and Shue, 1994). This was discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 that introduced the two-
pillar approach. The significance of repeatedly mentioning this relationship here in this chapter 
is to clarify how resources can affect a rising hegemonic power.  
 
Resources, here generally considered as natural resources, are exclusive and rivalrous (Grafton 
et al., 2004), because one player taking more resources can lead to less access for others, and 
one can forbid others from taking from the same supply. Due to this excludability and rivalry, 
there are naturally competitions between states over accessing resources. As for the question 
of hegemonic transition, the pre-existing hegemon would be threatened if a potential successor 
began seizing an increasing amount of resources and narrowing the capacity of the former’s 
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resource access. When this occurred, conflicts would become inevitable. Therefore, resources 
have a direct correlation with shifts in power.  
 
Although resources may be the cause of conflict, they do not always trigger a direct or 
immediate military reaction, especially in the circumstances when the two conflicting parties 
are super states and big powers. Rather, in the modern era, diplomacy is the most favoured 
method, and this is when ‘resource diplomacy’ comes into the picture. 
 
By taking ideas from existing literature below, this thesis has established a systematic approach 
to evaluate China’s resource diplomacy. The correlating factors are trade volume, institutional 
foundation of partnership, infrastructural investment, and potential challenges to sustainability, 
which will be reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
 
According to Zweig (2006:2), resource diplomacy can be defined as: 
 
… diplomatic activity designed to enhance a nation’s access to resources and its 
energy security … (1) insuring a stable supply of energy and resources; (2) 
keeping resource supplies at acceptable prices; and (3) being able to transfer 
those resources to fixed locations, not necessarily to the home country, where 
they are processed or consumed.  
 
This kind of activities will be the target of the analyses within this chapter. The major question 
now is how to analyse and evaluate a country’s resource diplomacy; while later, the question 
becomes how to analyse and evaluate China’s resource diplomacy for the purpose of answering 
if such activities are pushing forward a power shift.  
 
There are two distinct methods for analysing resource diplomacy, as Krasner (1976; 1978) 
considers it, the deductive approach and the inductive approach. The logical deductive 
approach simply analyses state behaviour based on theories that comply to some fundamental 
principles such as having ‘rational players’ in an ‘international system of interdependency and 
anarchy’ (Krasner, 1978). This approach can be applied when making general explanations and 
predictions, however, it struggles to make sense if the state behaves against a direct interest. 
This circumstance could happen when the various interests of the state, different external 
parties, and other internal players from within the national society, clash.  
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The empirical inductive approach, on the other hand, can solve this problem. National interests 
are often complex and possess more than one target. It is with the inductive approach that the 
rationale of state behaviour can be identified. The inductive approach can apprehend the top 
priority among different interests by studying historical state behaviours. Through studying 
cases of US resource diplomacy, Krasner concludes that generally, across time, there have 
always been three themes within resource diplomacy: 1) a continued relationship between 
resources and economic performance; 2) resource policy always relating to national defence; 
3) an individual’s wellbeing should always be reflected. In other words, the themes here are 
minimisation of price by maximisation of competitiveness, security of supply, and national 
security in the order of increasing importance (Krasner, 1978:52:331). 
 
Notably, one major difference between Krasner’s cases and China’s is that the US is defined 
as a ‘weak state’ while China is the opposite. A weak state means that governmental institutions 
not only meet difficulties from external players, but also need to cope with challenges from 
within their own society under a liberal-capitalism ideology. Firms and enterprises have greater 
leverage in counterbalancing state power and operating with greater freedom. This could 
complicate the case study due to the participation of non-state actors and private businesses.  
 
In contrast, China exerts highly concentrated central control over political and economic 
activities. With the government and enterprises’ behaviour strategically unified and usually 
acting as one, modern-day China is often referred to as an example of ‘state capitalism’ (Li, Li, 
and Zhang, 2000; Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011). Therefore, case studies on China’s resource 
diplomacy can, in fact, be simpler and more straightforward because individual utilities and 
preferences are of no concern. Krasner’s statist perspective can be applied to case studies of 
China with less problematic ‘internal interest clashes’ as individual wellbeing is considered 
included in and reflected by national interests.  
 
That is to say, a sensible way to study China’s resource diplomacy is to adopt largely the same 
manner – a deductive approach to existing cases to identify what is given as the priorities of 
national interest, while making an evaluation using an inductive analysis on how this has 
contributed or will contribute to China’s domestic economic performance, foreign relations, 
and international influence. 
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To sum up, a few parameters can be applied to evaluate resource diplomacy according to the 
existing literature. As Zweig (2006) has already pointed out, it concerns three elements: stable 
access, stable price, and the ability to physically transfer materials.  
 
During the case study, it is found that the price of materials purchased by China from overseas 
is mostly determined by the international market price except in some very rare occasions. A 
study on China’s impact on Latin America’s export shows that China’s ever greater demand 
for commodities has been constantly pushing up global commodity prices (Jenkins, 2011). For 
another example, the global oil price shock has impacted China’s manufacturing index and the 
stock price of oil companies, just as it did to other industrialised countries (Cong et al., 2008). 
In another observation, China’s demand for resources has also raised commodity prices 
exported by Africa, ‘particularly for oil and metals from Africa’ (Zafar, 2007).  
 
Figure 7.10 World Commodity Price Index, all index, 2000-2015 
 
 
Figure 7.11 Commodity Import Price Index, China, 2000-2015 
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Figure 7.12 World Commodity Price Index, by commodities, 2000-2015 
 
 
Figure 7.13 Key Commodity Import Price, China, 2000-2015 
 
Source: (PRC. National Bureau of Statistics, nd) 
 
Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11 present the commodity price index worldwide and import price 
index of China between 2000 and 2015 provided by the IMF, evidencing that the price at which 
China’s import of goods generally follows the global trend. A comparison of 
commodity/import price by commodities (Figure 7.12 and Figure 7.13) also shows that for 
some of the key products China import, it is unlikely that China can manipulate the price 
element. Through these existing researches, it can be concluded that China is not exempted 
from the demand-supply principle of the market and is not acquiring resources at a de facto 
much lower or favoured price.  
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This does not mean that China can only passively accept the price set by the global market. 
Instead, there are many mitigating mechanisms over price. China has been actively engaging 
with resource-rich countries on a state level or even regional level, building trade regimes and 
negotiating deals to bring down tariff and transactional cost (Ikenberry, 2008; Antkiewicz and 
Whalley, 2011; Song and Yuan, 2012; Kwei, 2013). Later part of this chapter found out that 
the trending approach of investing and carrying out joint ventures with resource-rich countries 
is gradually replacing the traditional buyer-seller relations. Rapport-building became crucial 
and can often bring down the total cost of acquiring resources.  
 
The element of transferring materials will be examined by looking at investment and 
infrastructure development. More specifically, this means looking at China’s investment in 
exporters’ infrastructure development, which aims to safeguard Chinese firms’ acquisitions 
and control over materials, as well as provide lower cost and a more convenient means by 
which to ‘transfer materials to fixed locations’. By participating in the local infrastructure 
development, China is able to safeguard the means to transport resource to where it is needed 
and to trade resource with infrastructure in some cases (Alves, 2013). Further to the purpose of 
transferring materials, China’s offshore infrastructural development projects are also vital to 
resolve domestic overcapacity and overstocking, which many economists already observe 
happening in China as mentioned in the previous chapter (Lin, Cai, and Li, 2003; Zhang, 2014; 
Yin, 2018). Statistical facts present a straightforward picture of the current condition of China’s 
trade and cooperation with target regions. 
 
Stable access to resources will be analysed from three aspects. First, it is evaluated through 
statistical data relating to trade volume. Trade volume is a direct indicator to review the 
intensity of resource-oriented diplomatic activity, as found in much of the existing literature 
on resource strategy (e.g. Søberg, 2000; Taylor, 2009; Zhang, 2016).  
 
Second, the nature of the inter-state agreements underpinning the resource flows is assessed. 
Specifically, this involves reviewing the institutional framework and exploring the political 
foundation of the partnership. It is about providing an understanding of the non-economic 
factors that facilitate cooperation, such as political alliances and free trade agreements at a 
governmental level. It is found in a range of existing literature that formalised political 
framework can effectively stabilise cooperative partnership (e.g. Pekkanen, Solís, and Katada, 
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2007; Gleason, 2010). To explore this factor, this chapter focuses on the development bilateral 
and regional trade framework between China and the target countries. Although multilaterial 
trade organisation is a undeniably a topic related to China’s trade and production structure, it 
remains a lesser focus for this chapter as scholars have pointed out China’s reluctance to be the 
leader of the WTO and a decline of multlaterial trade regime under the contemporary world 
politics context (Scott and Wilkinson, 2013; Bishop and Zhang, 2019). 
 
Third, sustainability of the partnership will be evaluated by focusing on potential challenges to 
the exiting trade partnership. Zhao (2008), with the example of Asia-Pacific relations, points 
out that China’s resource diplomacy not only means opportunity but also a source of conflict 
for its trade partners. These factors, according to the existing literature on China’s resource 
strategy, include, but are not limited to, concerns about neo-imperialism, moral standards, and 
balancing mutual interests (e.g. Taylor, 2007; Berger and Wissenbach, 2007; Cheru and Obi, 
2010).  
 
Through the main body of the chapter, this study applies the framework outlined above to 
China’s resource diplomacy in three regions: Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. 
Broadly speaking, these regions have been selected on the basis of being resource-rich 
developing regions. In the paragraphs below, this study expands upon this rationale. 
 
To date, diplomacy is often associated with the term ‘geo-political strategy’; therefore, it is a 
reasonable consideration to analyse resource diplomacy based on geographical locations. The 
selection of case studies for this chapter targeted developing countries and regions that are rich 
in natural resources and/or primary commodities, while also having developed a strategic 
partnership with China. The reasons are, on one hand, that the countries fulfilling this 
requirement have direct activities that involve trading in raw materials, and on the other, that 
being developing economies means most of these countries rely heavily on the exportation of 
raw materials to fuel their economic development, thus catering to China’s needs.  
 
The areas of interest include Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. This selection provides 
a straightforward description of China’s resource strategy. With these suitable cases, this 
research will be able to proceed to further analysis with updated information and materials, 
thus providing a more thorough overall understanding of China’s resource diplomacy. For 
rising powers like China, over-populated and seeking continuous growth, these three resource-
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rich regions are strategically significant in relation to economic development and political 
strength (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2016; Sachs and Warner, 1999).  
 
This research does not intend to include the Middle East in the analysis of this chapter, albeit 
China’s increasingly intense engagement with the Middle East since the OBOR initiative and 
President Xi’s first visit to the region (Luft, 2016). This is mainly because the case study areas 
were selected according to their significance to the time period. While China’s multilateral 
negotiation and a few rounds of strategic partnership dialogues with these oil-rich countries 
took place since 2010, effort to achieve a free trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council was fruitless. The negotiation only just restarted in 2016 and not yet produced any 
solid result as of mid-2019 (Qian and Fulton, 2017; Fulton, 2019). In contrast, steady progress 
on official and non-official forums, bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements, and 
significant outcome of infrastructure development could be found since the Millennium in 
other regions studied in this chapter. While acknowledging that China’s engagement with the 
Middle East is trending and promising, for the purpose of this chapter, the approach used in 
this chapter, and time period focused, analysis on China-Middle East resource cooperation is 
more speculation than evaluation. 
 
Some scholars have pointed out that since the end of the Cold War, China has been 
experiencing an increasing need to ‘secure natural resources and raw materials, most notably 
energy and minerals such as iron ore, copper, and aluminium’ (Friedberg, 2006:6). As a result, 
China’s central government has pursued a grand strategy to promote China’s foreign trade and 
thus acquire and secure access to an abundance of materials.  
 
For a long time now, scholars have been studying China’s grand strategy in Africa. The trend 
in recent years has resulted in stable but increasingly intense cooperation between the two. 
Besides metals and other minerals, China has a growing interest in obtaining oil from Africa. 
Western scholars consider this pursuit fuelled by two purposes: firstly, the securing of oil 
supply in the short term for national economic development, and; secondly, acquiring power 
and respect as a ‘great state’ on the global stage (Taylor, 2007). The China-Africa relationship 
was built upon two foundational elements. One is the large scale of investment and aid sent to 
Africa for constructing infrastructures as well as humanitarian aid, the other is a consensus on 
standing against Western ‘imperialism’ (Brookes and Shin, 2006); the latter gives China an 
advantage when competing with Western importers over African countries’ favours.  
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Meanwhile, China’s interest in Latin America has been emerging in recent years as well 
(Dumbaugh and Sullivan, 2005). Traditionally, Latin America has had close strategic 
cooperation with the US in terms of its supply of trade and raw material. With Brazil and 
Mexico as two major emerging economies, Latin America’s own foreign policies have 
gradually shifted focus and its cooperation with China is becoming increasingly more frequent. 
The population of China means a stable long-term demand for natural resources. Further to 
that, China’s foreign policy is run on a ‘non-interference’ principle, contrary to the US. For 
most emerging economies and developing countries, efficiency is often given the top priority; 
moreover, the non-interfering attitude taken by China is often welcomed by Latin American 
businesses (Domínguez, 2006). Therefore, regarding the acquisition of stable access to 
resources at a reasonable cost from overseas, this chapter will explore how China’s strategy 
can secure its access, to what extent such cooperation is open to expansion, and how this may 
implicate China’s economic development and, therefore, competitiveness, in terms of a 
potential power transition. 
 
The last case involves China’s relationship with its southeast neighbour, ASEAN. The China-
ASEAN free trade agreement is the only regional trade regime China has participated in. This 
establishment represents a frequent exchange of goods and strong interdependency. ASEAN 
member states, because of the countries’ geographic location and tropical climate, produce an 
abundant amount of mineral ores, natural rubber, and agricultural products which are all of 
interest to China.  
 
While trade and other forms of cooperation are climbing each year, some disputes have 
simultaneously emerged over the potentially resource-rich South China Sea. Many ASEAN 
member states are, at the same time, claimants of the disputed territory, among which the 
Philippines has already filed and won an arbitration case, along with support from the wider 
international society. It is intriguing to understand what the potential cause can be for this 
temporarily shelved dispute to be brought up at this point, and used against China, and the 
reaction from both sides. This incident signals that the pattern of China’s engagement with 
ASEAN countries, especially the Philippines, should be changed; at the same time, questions 
remain about what kind of adjustments should be made and how these adjustments may affect 
China’s future resource diplomacy in the ASEAN region. 
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To sum up, by synthesising indicators predominantly mentioned in the existing literature, this 
chapter studies China’s resource diplomacy in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia by 
exploring the existing institutional framework of China’s trading activities, statistics on trade 
volume, infrastructure development, and reflections on the sustainability of cooperation. The 
conclusion of this chapter will overall indicate the extent to which China’s resource diplomacy 
support its rising economic power.  
 
7.2. China’s Oil Strategy in Africa 
 
In order to understand China’s engagement with Africa in the pursuit of natural resources, this 
research has applied the framework outlined above. After a brief recap on the historical 
foundation of diplomatic relations, this section examines China’s strategy in Africa by looking 
at its institutional foundation, trade volume, infrastructural development, and sustainability. 
The suggestion is that China’s access to African raw material is overall stable. Although this 
cooperation has the least trade volume and institutional foundation among all three geographic 
regions studied, this region also has great potential and there is room for development. Besides 
this, China’s aid and infrastructural development in Africa offer the biggest advantage for 
consolidating the China-African partnership.  
 
China is involved in long term strategic cooperation with many African countries. And as stated 
by the government, China’s diplomatic activities are always carried out based on the ‘Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ and the ‘Eight Principles of China 's Foreign Assistance’. 
In the early stages of building this relationship, when Chinese politics was focused on class 
struggle – that is, before 1979 - the major purpose of establishing diplomatic relations was to 
obtain enough support to acquire a legitimate seat for the People’s Republic within the United 
Nations. Although it experienced difficulties in terms of restoring its national economy, China 
in return, provided both moral and material support for the liberation and development of 
African nations. Such cooperation was established upon the common ground of anti-
imperialism and decolonisation (PRC. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). 
 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the PRC, since its economic reform and 
opening-up, China has rapidly entered the era of rising power, with its strategy towards Africa 
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gradually shifting alongside. Themes of communication have become dynamic as various 
forms of trading, as well as cultural and educational cooperation, have taken place. To date, 
the diplomatic activities and cooperation between the two are becoming more entwined than 
ever, and one of the areas of interest is China’s resource strategy (Rotbery, 2009).  
 
In recent studies, scholars have noted that China possesses an increasing interest in the African 
oil industry. This is apart from traditional trade goods such as metal ores, as nine out of the top 
ten African partners trading with China have a dominant oil-oriented industry within their 
economies (Taylor, 2007). As oil products are the essentials that fuel industrialisation, it is 
particularly significant for China to acquire stable access to these and thus continue with its 
fast-paced economic development.  
 
Three decades ago, China was a large net oil exporter. The circumstances have been reversed 
as China has come to experience a rather severe form of import dependency regarding natural 
resources, especially oil (Wu and Storey, 2008). According to the National Bureau of Statistics 
and Chinese customs authority, China’s demand for imported crude oil in 2016 was 5.5 times 
what it was in 2000 (see figure 7.1). Such oil import dependency may greatly threaten China’s 
resource security.  
 
Figure 7.1 China’s import volume of selected commodities 1997-2016 
 
Source: (PRC National Bureau of Statistics, 2017) 
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Meanwhile, many oil resorts have been discovered on the continent of Africa with increasing 
production each year (Ka-Ho Yu and Zhou Yunheng, 2016). Hence, China’s diplomatic 
activities in Africa can be considered as strategically oil-oriented. In the relevant studies, 
scholars point that of China’s total imported oil, more than a quarter comes from Africa, a 
number that keeps climbing each year (Yan, 2007). This section examines China-Africa 
resource cooperation using its institutional foundation, statistics, infrastructure development, 
and the sustainability of such cooperation. 
 
7.2.1. Institutional Foundation of the China-Africa Resource Relationship 
 
From the literature reviewed above, institutional foundation was found to be an important 
dimension to resource diplomacy. The paragraphs below assess the foundations of the China-
Africa resource relationship, focusing specifically on the formation of state-level official 
cooperation frameworks. 
 
China was able to build on in order to maintain its cooperation with Africa through multiple 
channels of communication and cooperation. Throughout the history of China-Africa relation, 
China has maintained its ‘principles’ of diplomacy mentioned above. The core of these 
principles is an attitude of non-interference, which refers to mutual respect between 
sovereignties and territories, non-invasion, equality, and coexistence.  
 
Alongside the independence and decolonisation, African heads of states were experiencing 
pressure from the West, having to promote democracy and human rights as universal values 
and internal instability of social transition (Tull, 2006). The situation for China at that time was 
somehow similar, as the West considered the government’s conduct - in the form of its ‘class 
struggle’ – a serious violation of human rights. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
some common ground thus occurred between China and Africa, where anti-West consensus 
was constructed naturally (PRC. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000), with the West having 
‘thinly veiled imperialistic manoeuvres intent on interfering in the domestic politics of 
developing states, and undermining their stability and progress at large’ (Tull, 2006:461). As 
China presented itself as a country seeking development and holding a similar identity to 
African countries, the attitude of its ‘non-interference’ was particularly welcomed by African 
countries, contrary to that for the West. 
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In the first version of China’s Africa Policy Paper, published in 2006, resource cooperation 
was listed among other common courses. It declared the aim of ‘enhancing information 
exchange and cooperation between China and Africa regarding resources’, in a way where 
‘Chinese government encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to develop and 
rationally utilise resources in various forms of cooperating with African countries in 
accordance with the principles of mutual benefit and common development, so as to help 
African countries to transform their resources into competitiveness’ (PRC. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2006). More recently, in 2015, the second China’s Africa Policy Paper stated its 
intention of deepening cooperation in terms of resource extraction and infrastructure 
construction (PRC. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). The White Paper on China-Africa 
Economic and Trade Cooperation which was published in 2013 repeatedly emphasises the 
principle of mutual respect and the direction of future development.  
 
China’s pursuit of foreign oil may not only ease the crisis of domestic oil production and the 
upsurge in demand, but it is also an example of what Chinese political leaders consider as 
China’s ‘going out’ strategy. Despite the lack of an officially established trade regime between 
China and Africa, in 2001, the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was formed, 
with the participation of fifty-one African countries.  
 
The first ministerial meeting of the forum set up both an agreed cooperation programme and 
follow-up mechanism programme calling for three types of meeting – ministerial meetings 
every three years, senior officials’ follow-up meetings twice every three years, and an African 
embassy in China meeting with the Chinese Follow-up Committee secretariat twice a year. 
This forum extended China’s economic engagement with African countries from trade to other 
fields, such as investment in local the community, production, science, and education projects 
(FOCAC, 2013). A series of official documents were also produced to provide both long-term 
and short-term directions.  
 
A secondary forum – the Forum on China-Africa Local Government Cooperation was founded 
in 2012, and this focuses on the practical issues involved in operating joint projects. These two 
forums have come to form the institutional framework behind China’s cooperation with Africa. 
The frequent meetings correspond to the dynamic development of Africa allowing a certain 
level of flexibility and for prompt adjustments during the process of cooperation, while their 
 193 
officially set principles provide a solid foundation and wide recognition for their cooperative 
relationship. 
 
7.2.2. Trade Volume in China-Africa Resource Relationship 
 
Trading activity between China and Africa shows significant mutual benefit (Looy, 2006; 
Anshan, 2007). China occupies an increasing share of the African market and has become 
Africa’s second-largest trading partner following the US (Taylor, 2009). From 2009, China 
took over the first position, while in 2014, the trade volume of China-Africa reached $222 
billion, twenty times more than in 2000 (Hu, 2016).  
 
Figure 7.2 China-Africa Trade volume 2000-2012 
 
 
Source: (PRC. State Council, 2013) 
 
The beginning of this chapter mentions that China is facing industrial overcapacity and has a 
relatively high level of external dependency regarding its production structure. Conversely, 
African countries, as late starters to modernisation, have a great demand for manufactured 
goods and basic infrastructure, thus allowing them to progress further in terms of 
industrialisation. They also require access to sufficient levels of education, health, security, and 
technology. Manufactured products exported from China, from daily necessities to machines 
and high-tech devices, are supplied at a lower price and larger amount due to the labour-
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intensive style of its economy (Tull, 2006). The materialised benefits and amicable relationship 
that emerged thanks to the initial win-win situation, allowed cooperation to snowball; as a 
result, China-Africa trade volume rocketed, alongside a number of trade-related institutes, 
governmental or non-governmental, that were established in recent years. Detailed trade flows 
can be found in Figure 7.2 and 7.3. 
 
A negative balance of trade indicates that China’s demand for African resources is beyond the 
value of manufactured goods it sells to Africa. A detailed graph on China’s importation with 
its major African partners is shown below. According to the OEC database, 10 of the eighteen 
selected countries export a dominant proportion of petroleum products to China and seven of 
them export mainly metals, including iron ore, copper and refined copper, and precious metals. 
A few countries, like Kenya and Madagascar, experienced an obvious trend of growth in 
exporting to China and a switch from food, wood, and textile products to mining products. This 
means that China has been actively seeking resources in African countries as part of its energy 
security strategy.  
 
Figure 7.3. China’s Import Volume from Major African Partners, 2003-2015 
Source: (OEC, nd) 
 
In order to acquire access to resources, besides purchasing the end products directly, one major 
approach is for Chinese enterprises to form an alliance with local African oil corporations, with 
help and support from the Chinese central government. In some cases, China holds a large 
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share of the ownership of oil and gas-related investment projects in countries that include 
Algeria, Angola, Chad, Gabon, Nigeria, Sudan, and Equatorial Guinea (Yan, 2007). This is 
due to the fact that many African countries are still in the process of industrialisation and 
development and, therefore, have a rather limited ability to operate large oil extraction projects 
on their own; instead, Chinese companies, such as Sinopec, CNOOC and CNPC (PetroChina), 
which are large state-owned enterprises, capable of carrying out these projects, are used. 
 
The projects in Africa led by these three Chinese oil giants involve oilfield exploration, drilling, 
mining, crude oil supply, refining, transportation, and oilfield ownership (Yan, 2007:28). 
Scholars have pointed out that even though China does not possess cutting edge technology, 
what it has is sufficient and useful enough for African oil (Taylor, 2009). In addition to the 
relatively cheap equipment provided as well as the backdrop of governmental cooperation, 
Chinese companies, therefore, find it easy enough to obtain contracts with their African 
counterparts. 
 
7.2.3. China’s Infrastructure Development in Africa 
 
China’s African policy also contains a great amount of aid and investment, particularly in 
relation to infrastructure construction. China’s infrastructural aid covers a variety of sectors, 
including telecommunication, seaports, railroads, road networks, and power generation (Edoho, 
2011). More than 5000 kilometres of railways have been built in Africa due to China’s 
participation, and such projects have also provided the chance to train more than 160,000 
personnel. For another example, China also participated in building the Ofankor-Nsawam 
section of the Accra-Kumasi road and the National Theatre in Ghana (Tan-Mullins, Mohan, 
and Power, 2010). 
 
Among these infrastructure projects, the largest single projects include the railway between 
Addis Ababa and Djibouti, known as the Yaji Railway in Chinese. Another 480km connection 
between Nairobi and Mombasa was 90% financed by the Export-Import Bank of China (Li and 
Liu, 2017). Others include the Tanzania Zambia Railway, multiple projects in Nigeria, the 
Benguela railway, and the whole East African railway network. Other infrastructure 
development projects include construction regarding road traffic, harbours, schools and 
hospitals, making China the largest infrastructure financiers in Africa with an accumulated 
financial commitment of $15.968 billion up to 2007 (Foster et al., 2009:19).  
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More recently, Chinese scholars have suggested that China’s African infrastructure projects 
should gradually shift the focus to energy and electricity in order to catch up with the fast-pace 
of industrialisation and to aid the wellbeing of local communities (Liu, 2017). Such 
infrastructure development not only promotes people’s wellbeing, but it is also designed to 
provide safe and convenient conditions in which to transport goods in and out of Africa.  
 
Furthermore, by receiving aid for infrastructure development, the traditional and common 
practice is for African countries to provide the investors with the ‘right of use’ for certain 
natural resources. This practice dates back to as early as 1926 when Libya repaid a debt with 
access to its rubber plantations, which is still in use today (Wells, 2013). With China’s current 
role as being the biggest infrastructure financiers in Africa, this practice certainly contributes 
to its seeking access to resources for two reasons: one is trading infrastructure off for resource 
and the other is the creation of easier means for transporting resources.  
 
On the other hand, financial aid is provided in the form of low-interest loans and debt 
cancellation. Between January 2006 and July 2014, China’s indirect investment in Africa rose 
to $150.4 billion. During the 2015 Johannesburg Summit of FOCAC, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping announced a further three-year plan focusing on ten cooperative development projects 
with a total of $60 billion in funding. Of this, 5 billion would be used as direct aid and an 
interest-free loan, with another 35 billion for preferential loans and export credit (Xi, 2015). 
 
Notably, these ten projects include an initiative regarding poverty reduction and social 
welfare.26  Two hundred ‘Happy Life Projects’ where women and children are the major 
beneficiaries were allocated,  and in his Summit speech, Xi particularly confirmed the 
cancellation of debt of several poorly developed countries thus reducing the worries behind 
local infrastructure development – that is, worries of totally giving away the ‘right of use’ or, 
for example, some scholars’ concerns regarding the use of Kenya’s debt in exchange for the 
construction of the Nairobi-Mombasa railway (Onjala, 2017).  
 
 
26 All ten aspects include industrialisation, agriculture modernisation, infrastructure 
construction, financial cooperation, green development, investment and trade facilitation, 
poverty reduction and welfare, public health, cultural exchange, and peace and security. 
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Together with one strategic cooperation partnership and the five principles of China’s 
diplomacy, the upgraded China-Africa relationship that followed the 2015 Johannesburg 
Summit was concluded as the ‘1+5+10’ framework. Lin Songtian, director of the Africa 
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reviewed the Summit, commenting on the 
promising nature of such cooperation, and how a great number of results were achieved within 
the first year (Lin, 2016). Most significantly, a China-Africa Production Capacity Cooperation 
Fund with an initial capital of $10 billion was set up shortly after the Summit, in early 2016, 
representing the positive momentum achieved by continuous cooperation and bilateral rapport 
(PRC. PBOC, 2016b). 
 
7.2.4. Challenge to the China-Africa Resource Relationship – Neo-Colonialism? 
 
The paragraphs below review the biggest challenge to and suggestions of China-Africa 
relationship. Notably, opposite voices exist through China-Africa’s resource-oriented 
cooperation.  
 
Scholars, mainly from the West, consider China’s diplomatic activities in Africa as an example 
of neo-colonialism, using the ‘Angola model’ to illuminate the exploitation of local resources 
(Corkin, 2011; Lumumba-Kasongo; 2011; Mohan and Lampert, 2013). Furthermore, scholars 
from China and the West have both pointed out that to avoid criticism, China would have to 
spare more effort in supporting the progress of Africa’s industrialisation, in terms of providing 
technology, training, environmental protection, and so on (Taylor, 2009; Ofodile, 2008; Alden 
and Wu, 2016); that is, rather than committing predatory exploitation as happened during the 
old colonial period. Otherwise, the problem is that frustration will grow among local people 
who think such China-Africa oil deals jeopardise people’s welfare and manipulate local politics 
(Runge, 2016). 
 
Chinese think tanks consider that this speculation is merely made up of doubts produced by the 
Western media and is due to a lack of publicity from the Chinese perspective. Hu (2016) argues 
that so-called ‘neo-colonialism’ is in fact a financing method, which requires payment in oil 
for infrastructure construction projects. China particularly stresses that such payment is strictly 
pegged to the international market price of oil in addition to the large amount of investments 
put in for the construction of infrastructure; therefore, there is no room for unfair advantages. 
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This model has also been adopted by Western investors as well, and ‘China is merely one suitor 
among many’ (Frynas and Paulo, 2007:240). 
 
It is inappropriate to claim arbitrarily whether or not China’s diplomatic activities in Africa 
constitute ‘neo-colonialism’; neither is it simple to evaluate the situation based on who is the 
bigger winner or if someone is losing in the cooperation. Then it would be an even more 
complicated puzzle in terms of defining winning and losing. It is certain that Africa has a great 
need for social development and modernisation, which represents massive opportunities for 
itself and for those who are willing to participate and provide help. To an extent, China’s 
involvement in Africa has come about because ‘many African government appear 
fundamentally unable to manage their own resources’ (Taylor, 2009:55). 
 
It would be unfair to claim that China is the only player trying to ‘exploit’ Africa. As mentioned 
above, the resources in Africa are also of interest to others, such as ExxonMobil and BP who 
possess projects operating in South Africa and other East Africa countries. China’s strategy for 
African oil is to ‘go places for oil where [US] and European companies are not present’ 
(Washington Post, Dec 22, 2004, as cited in Taylor, 2009), which makes up a relatively small 
proportion of the total of African resources. On the other hand, whether or not cooperation can 
be sustained is supported by a number of different claims. If African governments sense 
unfairness or feel bitter about being ‘exploited’, they can always switch to other partners. This 
kind of situation has indeed happened, with some countries swinging between the People’s 
Republic and Taiwan in order to obtain a better aid or trade deal (Grimm, Kim, and Anthony, 
2007; He, 2007).  
 
Generally, the cooperation between China and Africa looks promising. Sudanese veteran 
political reporter Yahya Mustafa commented that China has great potential and capability for 
initiating developmental projects, not only in Africa but all over the world (FOCAC, 2017a). 
Namibian politician Elia Kaiyamo particularly points out that the era when Africa relied 
heavily on resource exportation has long gone, instead, countries are focusing more on the 
development of high value-added industries, technology development, and technology transfer; 
while ‘China and Africa have the willingness and have reached bilateral cooperation to share 
technology many times. and China's support for African development is not accompanied by 
any conditions’ (FOCAC, 2017b). 
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Since the Johannesburg Summit, China has adjusted and refined its Africa policy which aims 
to provide more diverse and comprehensive support and can be summarised as the ‘1+5+10’.27 
As pointed out previously, the cooperative framework between China and Africa not only 
officialises the cooperation, but more importantly, provides a flexible solution and direction 
for practical issues. Therefore, with frequent meetings and multiple channels of communication, 
whenever there are voices against China’s engagement that concern local African wellbeing, 
over time, certain adjustments can be made to maintain the cooperative rapport. 
 
7.2.5. Summary 
 
Africa is of strategic importance for China, both politically and economically. China-Africa 
cooperation was established alongside the founding of the People’s Republic and has recently 
been brought up to a new level, following the FOCAC 2015 Johannesburg Summit. Besides 
being a major customer for China’s manufacturing goods, Africa is a long-term supplier of raw 
materials and has been continuously providing the lifeblood to China’s fast-paced economic 
development. Traditionally, the African goods exported to China include metal ore, and 
recently, with increasing significance, crude oil and other oil products.  
 
There is an obvious trend whereby China’s increasing interest and diplomatic activities in 
Africa are oil oriented. A general model can be found in the China-Africa cooperation, where 
China provides financial aid, trained personnel, technology, and intellectual support for local 
projects such as infrastructural construction, health services, social welfare, and poverty 
reduction; and various forms of access to resources are provided to China in exchange.  
 
Some have described this model of cooperation as ‘link[ing] access to acreage [with] state-
backed financial deals, where acreage is provided in return for soft credit used to purchase 
Chinese goods and services’ (Tjønneland et al., 2006). The transparency of China’s decision-
making and project planning is questionable; however, it has been proven to be an advantage 
from the particular aspect of efficiency, just as it has been to China’s own economic 
development.  
 
 
27 One strategic cooperation partnership, five principles of China’s diplomacy, ten projects, 
introduced in the previous section. 
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Scholars have commented that the speed of Chinese aid materialising in the African landscape 
is beyond the capability of Western players and international institutions like the World Bank; 
for their aid or loans are often conditional, with limitations on the amount (Yan, 2007). This 
advantage has granted the Chinese government and enterprises priority status when accessing 
oil fields and obtaining contracts. Despite criticism from the West and some minor African 
entities, China’s access to African oil is generally secure as long as it is able to adjust its African 
strategy to meet current needs.  
 
In principle, China can largely avoid neo-colonialism by promoting certain areas of aid such 
as skilled worker training, knowledge transferring, and investment. Chinese authorities have 
acknowledged the need of strategic adjustment, as reflected in the Summit; and increasing 
significance has been shifted onto the sustainability of African development, as aid is coming 
in more diverse forms than the traditional method of simply giving away money.  
 
Furthermore, as China’s own oil giants participate in the process of fracking, extracting, and, 
in some cases, refining oil, the cost for China to acquire oil products can be greatly reduced – 
and even if it is not, as mentioned earlier, in some cases oil can be purchased with credit 
exchanged for construction aid at an international market price. Generally, it is extremely 
unlikely that China would have to face an outrageously higher oil price than others. Finally, 
with long-lasting China-Africa rapport and infrastructures such as railway systems and 
harbours developed by China, the transferability of African resources is significantly high.  
 
As a result, China’s resource diplomacy has unparalleled advantages and priorities within 
Africa. As long as China endeavour to promote the overall welfare of Africa rather than overtly 
exploit African resources, the China-Africa resource relationship can continue to fuel China’s 
rapidly growing production and be a stable source of China’s growing economic power. 
 
 
7.3. China’s Trade Strategy in Latin America 
 
Another dimension of China’s production structure extends to its increasingly intensive 
interactions with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries. Although Latin America has 
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been the ‘backyard’ of the US and historically a long-term supplier of many natural resources 
for the US, the abundance of this region’s resources can potentially attract the interest of many 
other great economies (Hakim, 2006).  
 
This section examines China’s economic engagement with Latin America. Following the 
analytical method defined in the opening of the chapter, this section will provide a thorough 
understanding of the current trade volume between China and LAC, the institutional foundation 
of the cooperation, and current investment and infrastructure development. Overall, it is 
suggested that the China-LAC partnership has made good progress on trade, as well as reaching 
a free trade agreement and carrying out infrastructural investment projects; on the other hand, 
both entities need an industrial upgrade for China to further consolidate its partnership with 
LAC. This is because China faces production overcapacity and some LAC countries are 
suffering from resource-driven vulnerability and poverty. 
 
It is estimated that Latin America possesses 13.5% of the world’s total oil reserve, for instance 
(Bajpaee, 2005). Apart from crude petroleum and mineral ore, agricultural products from LAC 
are also proven to be a significant part of China’s importation, supporting the lives of the 
latter’s huge population. China, on the other hand, has become the second biggest exporter to 
LAC, mainly of manufactured products (PRC. Ministry of Commerce, 2015a), which for China, 
is a key process in fuelling its continuous industrial development and wealth generation. 
Scholars believe that China’s grand strategy in Latin America is no less important than its 
interest in other regions, especially from the aspect of economic development – securing future 
access to vital resources and maintaining its global market share (Zweig and Bi, 2005). Further 
to that, it is also believed that the additional political alliance between China and LAC can 
significantly reshape power distribution across the globe. 
 
 
 
7.3.1. Institutional Foundation of the China-LAC Resource Relationship 
 
The following paragraphs analyse the China-LAC resource relationship from the aspect of 
institutional foundation, including state-level diplomatic activities and the creation of official 
cooperation frameworks, as an important dimension of China’s resource diplomacy. 
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One initial factor contributing to the China-LAC strategic partnership is politics. At the early 
stage of China’s foreign policy, mutual political interest played an important role. Similar to 
China’s relationship with Africa, its diplomatic interaction with Latin America was seeking, to 
a great extent, South-South cooperation and, in this case, to curb the US monopoly in many 
areas (Cheng, 2006).  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, left-wing parties in Latin America contributed significantly to the 
social transformation of LAC, expelling the dictatorship (Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter, 2010). 
In the 90s, a leftist leadership came into power in many LAC due to public opposition to the 
free market and repugnancy regarding US ‘manipulation’, despite the downfall of the Soviet 
Union (Castañeda, 2006). China, meanwhile, as the only communist oriented country in the 
UNSC, aimed to win support from a ‘Third World alliance’. This situation promoted 
communication between China and many LAC, in addition to the economic interest, and later 
began to safeguard the partnership from a political perspective. 
 
In 2009, China was among the top five exporters for most LAC (Berger, 2012). Further to the 
soaring volume of trade between China and LAC, it is worth mentioning that China has also 
been working on free trade agreements with its partners, aiming to lower tariffs in order to 
further boost trading activities.  
 
To date, China has already established a bilateral free trade agreement with Peru, Chile, and 
Costa Rica, and Chinese think tanks are researching how to ‘upgrade’ the existing agreements 
and arrange free trade with Colombia as their most recent target (PRC. Ministry of Commerce, 
nd). These free trade agreements lay down regulations regarding several aspects, including 
tariff deduction on different categories of goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, sanitary 
and phytosanitary, protections of intellectual property, and dispute settlement mechanisms. The 
setting up of these mechanisms has provided convenience and protection for importers and 
exporters, attracting trade activities with these countries to flourish. More importantly, it has 
also sets up some good examples and future references by which other Latin American 
countries may also establish trading bonds with China. 
 
Besides the free trade agreement with a small number of individual countries, a China-CELAC 
Forum was officially founded in 2015, signifying a deepened and comprehensive partnership 
established to promote equality, mutual benefit, and common development (PRC. Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs, 2017). CELAC stands for the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States, which consists of 33 countries in total, including 20 South American countries.  
 
This forum contains a few different levels of meetings and communication – ministerial 
meetings, dialogue between foreign ministers of China and the ‘Quartet’ of CELAC, and the 
meeting of national coordinators (China-LAC Forum, 2015). Apart from the official meetings, 
a series of specialist forums and meetings using the China-CELAC Forum framework, are also 
aiming to provide practical approaches to operationalise cooperation from various business 
viewpoints: infrastructure development, social research, scientific research, and local 
community bonding. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the leading Chinese think tank, 
is one of the participants in these specialist forums. There is also the call for further 
multilateralization and regionalisation of China-LAC cooperation following a similar approach 
of existing platforms, such as the Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, to further formalise 
relevant rules (Melguizo, 2017).  
 
7.3.2. Trade Volume in China-LAC Resource Relationship 
 
China’s trade and cooperation with Latin America scaled up dramatically in the very late 1980s. 
During this period, China’s financial reformation and market opening-up were fully activated. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, freeing capital allowed small to medium-sized companies 
to emerge on a large scale. Hence, high demand for industrial raw materials made China the 
‘most sought-after market’ in the world; and it is believed that a strategy of some LAC, 
including Brazil and Mexico, was to set up a trade route to China (Mora, 1997:35-36).  
 
In spite of a setback regarding China’s exportation to LAC in 2009, potentially due to the 
worldwide financial crisis, trade volume on commodities between China and LAC has grown 
sharply each year (Berger, 2012). This is especially the case for the volume of products 
exported from LAC to China. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, in 2014, trade 
volume between China and Latin America, including Caribbean countries, was $269 billion. 
Detailed graphs on the history of China-LAC import and export volumes are shown as follows 
(Figure 7.4 and 7.5). 
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Figure 7.4 Major LAC Countries Export Volume to China, 2003-2015 
 
Source: (OEC, nd) 
 
Figure 7.5 Major LAC Countries Import Volume from China, 2003-2015 
 
Source: (OEC, nd) 
 
According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity database (OEC, nd), the top five 
commodities exported from LAC to China were soybeans, iron minerals, crude petroleum, 
cooper minerals, and refined copper; whereas the majority of imported goods from China were 
machines, textiles, and transportation vehicles. The database also reveals that many small 
countries, such as Bolivia and Panama, who traditionally exported agricultural products, have 
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gradually switched to exporting petroleum and other mining products as major commodities. 
In short, according to the Ministry of Commerce, China has not only become the third biggest 
buyer of Latin America’s raw materials, but also the second-largest exporter to LAC (PRC. 
Ministry of Commerce, 2015a). 
 
7.3.3. China’s Infrastructure Development in LAC 
 
The major factor facilitating China-LAC cooperation is mutual economic benefits. The 
traditional exchange of material with China, the ‘most sought-after market’, accelerated the 
accumulation of wealth for LAC, when raw materials turned into cash with little effort in terms 
of processing; from there on, exportation to China provided the initial funding needed by LAC 
for proceeding into the industrial age. On the other hand, scholars have pointed out that one 
key strategy of China, as a supersized entity, is to guarantee an abundance of raw materials and 
agricultural products in order to sustain its own industrial development and the wellbeing of its 
population (Ferchen, 2011).  
 
To achieve the goal of promoting infrastructure, one approach is to construct infrastructures 
including harbours, roads and railways for the exporter, in order to provide greater convenience 
and reliability in transporting trade goods. For example, in Argentina, China confirmed an 
investment of $25 million for building transportation hubs aim at transporting crops, and 
another 250 million on roads between Argentina and Chile so that raw materials from 
Argentina can eventually be shipped from Chilean harbours to China via a waterway (Santiso, 
Blázquez, and Rodríguez, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, when loans are difficult to acquire from international organisations or other major 
Western countries due to bad credit ratings, China still offered more than $100 billion loans to 
LAC between 2005 and 2013, including Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador (Hill, 
2014). Financial assistance in other forms is also available, for example, when funding goes 
directly via Chinese enterprises to fund local production projects. 
 
To date, China’s policy banks are the biggest financier of LAC. Funds provided by China in 
2014, $22.1 billion, were more than the finance provided by the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank combined (Gallagher and Yuan, 2015, as cited in Ray and 
Gallagher, 2015:16). During the period, 2010 to 2014, China provided a total of $93.7 billion 
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in loans to LAC, most of it to be spent on infrastructural development including transportation 
(16.5%), hydropower (12.4%), mining (10.1%), housing (4.1), other energy (11.5%), and other 
infrastructures (29.5%) (Gallagher and Myers, 2014, as cited in Ray and Gallagher, 2015:17).  
 
Through the 2000s, the China-LAC partnership reached a higher level and formed multiple 
channels of cooperative projects besides traditional material trading. Besides providing direct 
loans, one significant new channel of cooperation became investment, including methods of 
acquisition, merging, cooperatives, and joint projects, mostly resource related.  
 
Up until 2001, China had invested more than $1 billion in Latin America in the form of about 
300 enterprises and businesses. The largest single investment was carried out by Baosteel, 
China’s leading iron and steel company, to Brazil with a funding of $1.5 billion. It is also 
reported that in 2016, $8.4 billion worth of Chinese projects in Brazil were confirmed 
compared to the $7.4 billion of 2015 (CEBC, 2016). China’s investment has also reached Peru, 
in the case of iron minerals, Ecuador, for petroleum, and Venezuela, for fuel and gold mines 
(Santiso, Blázquez, and Rodríguez, 2006).  
 
According to the statistics, during the period 1990 to 2009, $7 billion of China’s investment 
landed in Latin America; nonetheless, 2010 was the watershed when a total of more than $14 
billion worth of investments were allocated to LAC (PRC. Ministry of Commerce, 2015b). 
These investments took up 11% of the total inflow FDI Latin America received that year and 
were twice as much as in the past two decades together. It is also reported that three quarters 
of the total investments were taken by two major petroleum projects in Argentina operated by 
Sinopec and CNOOC. Nowadays, LAC receive around $10 billion worth of Chinese 
investments each year according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, for example $9.7 
billion in 2013, which took up 5-6% of the Latin America region’s total inflow FDI (Ibid.).  
 
Among all investments, four leading areas of interest can be identified: natural resources, 
infrastructure, agriculture, and light industry manufacture. Around 90% of China’s outflow 
FDI to Latin America is targeting projects involving raw materials, including petroleum and 
metal ore – these projects are mostly in the forms of mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and 
occasionally, sole proprietorships (CNPC, nd.; Chen, 2017; Zhao, 2009). Meanwhile, China’s 
state-owned agricultural enterprises, for example, the Chongqing Food Group and the 
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Heilongjiang Reclamation Group, have been opening up plantations in Argentina besides 
providing machinery and technology. 
 
The Chinese government and businesses generally believe that investments in extracting 
natural resources, agriculture, and infrastructure construction are necessary to secure China’s 
access to local raw materials as well as to boost Latin America’s exportation (García-Herrero 
and Santabárbara, 2007).  Lastly, light industry manufacture as a more recently developed 
direction, takes up an insignificant proportion of China’s outflow investment to LAC; however, 
some suggest that it can potentially become the platform for China to access the US market to 
a greater extent (Feng, 2015).   
 
This pattern of partnership can also be found in China’s engagement in Africa, as mentioned 
previously, and other regions. China’s investments, both in industrial development and 
infrastructure construction, have more recently provided a platform for industrial upgrades in 
LAC, while also providing reliable production volume and transportation for Chinese firms. 
 
Theoretically, the existence of these infrastructures can consequently promote industrial 
deepening in LAC and encourage the emergence of high value-added industries. Such 
cooperation can potentially prevent countries from becoming over-dependent on primary 
products trading as their major income and avoid the negative impact of the volatile 
international market price of raw materials (Ray et al., 2017). However, in practice, not all 
partnerships can be carried out strictly following the ideal model. Some studies argue that the 
trap is whether LAC aim for long-term development or short-term flourishes, because wealth 
can be easily acquired by exporting primary products in bulk rather than building higher value-
added processing lines from scratch (Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2008). Among many LAC 
countries, Venezuela is most representative of a single-product economy leading to an 
economic recession. Despite China’s investment in transportation and refinery infrastructures 
(Bajpaee, 2005), an extreme imbalance in sectoral composition eventually contributed to 
Venezuela’s economic failure.  
 
7.3.4. Challenge to the China-LAC Resource Relationship: Industrial Transform? 
 
Current statistics show a decrease in trade volume between China and Latin America. 
Importation from LAC to China dropped by 10% in 2014 whilst China’s exportation to Latin 
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America increased by 3% (PRC. Ministry of Commerce, 2015a). This phenomenon 
corresponds to China’s overcapacity issue, as stated in the previous chapter. Reduction in the 
demand for raw material been driven by overcapacity in industries involving steel, coal, 
aluminium, and cement, where capacity utilisation is below 70% (PRC. State Council, 2016) 
– greatly affecting the exportation volume of iron ore and iron oxides from Brazil and Honduras, 
and aluminium oxides from Brazil, as well as petroleum from Venezuela, Argentina, and 
Colombia, which are needed to operate machines in the process of production.  
 
China’s production volume for these overcapacity goods is greatly beyond the capacity of 
domestic consumption; furthermore, due to the worldwide economic downturn and price drop 
within the international market, China’s state council has ordered that certain industries be 
slashed as they are facing significant overcapacity. Indeed, the Chinese government is calling 
for further reformation of sectoral composition and initiating ‘Made in China 2025’, which is 
a Chinese vision by Industry 4.0 that aims to optimise production methods, resource allocation, 
and environmental protection (PRC. State Council, 2015). 
 
Generally, for Latin America, too much reliance on China will not accelerate the industrial 
advancement of these countries, because they need to seek transformation in terms of sectoral 
composition while China is perusing a further industrial upgrade. As soon as China pushes into 
the Industry 4.0 era on full power and becomes less reliant on raw material, it will be 
devastating for countries relying on commodity exportation.  
 
Scholars researching this area specifically point out that ‘as China’s economy slows, this 
[dependency] will have repercussions on Latin American exporters, and countries could see a 
fall in their exports by volume as well as deterioration in their terms of trade on the back of 
lower commodity prices’ (Casanova, Xia, and Ferreira, 2016:15). Instead, they suggest that 
Latin America could utilise its geopolitical significance as leverage to direct China-LAC 
partnerships into making more investments into industrial upgrades. 
 
The concerns raised from this political alliance are mainly about the recent social instability 
and economic recessions in some LAC. Due to China’s great demand, international market 
prices of many commodities soared shortly after the millennia. Some LAC governments had 
prioritised mining and exporting raw materials rather than considering a potential price drop 
and environmental destruction (Wang, 2016b). Western scholars and media have severely 
 209 
criticised the resource management of Latin American leftists and their dependence on China; 
problems identified due to poverty and the dissatisfaction of locals have also led to issues of 
political and social instability (Locatelli, 2011).  
 
In responses to the situation, the mainstream opinion in China is rather optimistic. For example, 
in the case of Venezuela, the Chinese think tank predicts that debt default is unlikely to happen; 
and it is also reported that the Chinese government is considering delivery of further financial 
aid, including loans and investment (Lu, 2016). Some others believe cooperation with China, 
the second-largest world economy, is, in any event, very attractive. Besides this, political or 
ideological recognition is not necessarily the vital foundation of an economic partnership – 
China’s pragmatic foreign policy and strategy are generally welcomed by both Latin American 
leftists and their opponents (Wang, 2016b).  
 
Nevertheless, it is fair to argue that reformation and transformation are necessary for any future 
China-LAC cooperation, particularly in terms of governmental transparency and local 
policymaking when introducing new investment projects. 
 
In addition to political instability, however, there are also a few other social problems arising 
from China’s activities in Latin America that concern the future of this partnership. Criticism 
mainly comes from Western scholarship, suggesting a lack of moral sense within Chinese 
business in other developing countries. Similar to the criticism regarding China’s activities in 
Africa, it is considered that China exploits local resources in an unsustainable manner – quick 
money coming at the price of deforestation (Ray et al., 2017). China’s huge population means 
that its inflexible demands for agricultural products will remain a key commodity for Latin 
American exporters; meanwhile, seeking industrialisation, many LAC countries are 
transforming areas of rainforest into sawmills and factories with funding from foreign 
investment. 
 
Moreover, Chinese firms investing in Latin America usually set rather low or no requirements 
regarding human right protections when choosing their local contractors. Some firms bring 
along their own employees from China and worsen the local unemployment situation, as 
reported in some studies, although this problem is not universally acknowledged. More recent 
evidence shows that, for example, Shougang Hierro, one of China’s steel giant branches in 
Peru, performs no worse than its US counterparts in Latin America in terms of labour and 
 210 
environmental practices (Irwin and Gallagher, 2013). The concerns regarding the environment 
and human rights could be raised against any foreign investment project, including but not 
limited to China. 
 
Regardless of nationality, the common practice of business is to achieve the maximum profit 
within the limits of regulations. Hence, the key to solve this issue is not by requiring actions 
from the Chinese government or business, but is up to the local Latin American governments 
in setting firmer rules and regulations when soliciting partnership. 
 
7.3.5. Summary 
 
To sum up, China’s economic cooperation with Latin America became increasingly heated in 
recent years when China quickly raised to the top among LAC trade partners. China’s resource 
diplomacy is overall successful in this region. Trade volume soared intensively especially since 
the 2000s, and China is seeking to construct further free trade agreements with more LAC 
countries, besides the three existing ones and the regional forums. Latin America has also 
become the new attraction for Chinese infrastructural loans and investments. This cooperation 
has greatly supported China’s continuous production growth and enhanced its international 
influence, although reforms are still needed on both sides.  
 
There are two key themes relating to economic activities within this relationship – one is the 
traditional one of export and import, the other is investment. Initially, communication between 
China and LAC intensified when results from China’s economic reformation emerged and 
China became the most wanted foreign market for raw materials from Latin America (Santiso, 
2007). Since the millennia, hoping to further secure its access to resources, China initiated a 
series of investment projects focused at the oil industry and infrastructure, as well as 
infrastructural development in Latin America, through the provision of significant financial 
assistance for better transportation and energy services. 
 
The many concerns raised against the China-LAC partnership can be concluded into simply 
one general question – how will China’s impact in Latin America affect the direction of future 
cooperation? The opportunities for Latin America exporters to access the Chinese market often 
come alongside challenges as dependency on exportation can also lead to vulnerability, a lesson 
the Chinese manufacturing industry learned a few decades ago. With an economic and political 
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crisis hitting some LAC countries, how can the situation be fixed and what role can China play 
in it? 
 
Nowadays, the focus of the China-LAC partnership has gradually shifted from commodity 
trade to industrial and infrastructure investment. By doing so, the upgraded partnership can 
comprehensively and theoretically promote industrialisation in those Latin American countries, 
and help them to escape the vicious circle of dependency on exporting raw material. Although 
in practice, there is huge room for improvement regarding local policemaking, governmental 
transparency, human rights protection, and environmental protection, such cooperation can be 
considered beneficial both in the short and long term.  
 
Overall, China’s resource diplomacy in Latin American countries sufficiently stable access to 
materials necessary for sustaining China’s industrial production, including minerals and 
petroleum products. Chinese investment has also contributed to some infrastructural 
development projects, mostly resource-related projects, in Latin America to further consolidate 
the trade partnership. The China-LAC resource relationship has been an important component 
of China’s rising economic power. 
 
7.4. China’s Resource Strategy in Southeast Asia 
 
China-ASEAN cooperation offers a similar case as for the other regions mentioned previously, 
in which China acquires raw materials in exchange for investment in local industrial 
development and infrastructure construction. The free trade agreement between China and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) forms the third biggest regional trade regime 
with the largest population involved. However, China’s diplomatic activities have not always 
been carried out smoothly, especially when they involve territorial disputes with much more at 
stake.  
 
This section explores the foundation and trajectory of how the China-ASEAN cooperation was 
developed by looking at the structure of the free trade agreement, trade volumes, infrastructure 
development, and the sustainability of cooperation. The first part includes an overview of the 
set up of the free trade regime as an institutional foundation of China-ASEAN cooperation. 
The second and third parts present the numbers and status of trade and investment, reflecting 
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on the degree of interdependency. The last part aims to reflect on the sustainability of this 
relationship by looking at current issues of regional imbalance that can potentially harm the 
development of cooperation.  
 
The overall suggestion is that China has the most intense economic cooperation in all aspects, 
with ASEAN countries among the three regions examined in this chapter. China benefits from 
a continuously upgrading partnership which continues to support its rapid economic growth 
and growing influence. As noted below, these relationships across the ASEAN region provide 
an important pillar of China’s economic power in the contemporary era. 
 
7.4.1. Institutional Foundation of the China-ASEAN Resource Relationship 
 
As noted previously, institutional foundation plays an important role in China’s resource 
diplomacy as the safeguard to trade activities. The paragraphs below examine the institutional 
foundation of the China-ASEAN relationship, mainly focusing on the governmental level 
framework and the formation of free trade agreements. 
 
China’s partnership with ASEAN can be considered a great success in terms of regional 
economic cooperation. In 2002, China and the ten members of ASEAN signed the Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation (the Framework Agreement) which 
came into force in 2003, followed by detailed agreements regarding trade in goods, trade in 
services, and investment activated in 2004, 2007, and 2009, respectively. The free trade 
agreement between China and ASEAN is the first and only agreement with a regional 
organisation that China has ever engaged in.  
 
Southeast Asia’s unique climate and strong tradition of cultivation allows ASEAN member 
states to specialise in a wide range of agricultural products. Initially, when signing the free 
trade agreement, ASEAN countries believed it would give them preferential access to the 
Chinese market in addition to pre-existing frequent trading; whereas, for China, the ongoing 
transformation of sectoral composition led to a continuing decrease in the proportion of the 
primary sector, meaning that China will have a growing demand for planted products as a result 
of its industrial upgrade.  
 
 213 
Natural rubber is one of the leading commodities that Southeast Asia exports to China, as well 
as other crops and food such as rice, tropical fruits, and sugar (Tongzon, 2005). Moreover, 
Southeast Asia also possesses a considerable quantity of natural minerals which have drawn 
China’s attention. Along with its progress of industrialisation, ASEAN has started exporting 
mineral ore, processed metal parts, and petroleum products to China in more recent years, 
whereas China is seeking economic gain from exporting affordable light industry manufactures.  
 
The establishment of the China-ASEAN free trade agreement (CAFTA) followed a few steps 
in order to become accomplished. Upon the Agreement entering into force, the WTO MFN 
tariff rate was applied, signifying that an official trading channel had been created to regulate 
trading activities between China and ASEAN countries. After a few years of adjustment and 
deduction, by 2006, a zero-tariff was applied to agricultural products within the CAFTA. In 
2010, between China and ASEAN founding member states, the tariff for ‘common products’28 
was eliminated, whilst newer members aimed to achieve a zero tariff by 2015.29  
 
The benefit of CAFTA is not only to boost exports and imports by bringing down tariff, but 
also includes a protection mechanism. If any member state considers its interests threated by 
dumping, a criticism often received by China, this member can activate emergency anti-
dumping duty. Overall, the CAFTA has provided a fair playground where participants can 
benefit from mutual economic interests (Song and Wu, 2006). The total trade volume of 
CAFTA in 2014 reached $480 billion, almost four times as much as it was in 2005 ($130 billion) 
during the early stages of the free trade regime. Despite the setback in 2009, potentially the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the trade volume between China and ASEAN has become 
one of stable growth. 
 
7.4.2. Trade Volume in China-ASEAN Resource Relationship 
 
The Chinese media reported an aspiring 18.5% growth rate for trade volume within the CAFTA 
during the period 1991 to 2015. Figure 7.6 shows the statistics of China-ASEAN trade volume 
 
28 Any product unless specified as ‘sensitive’ in the annex. Each country can submit a list of 
sensitive products that apply to a special tariff. 
29 See Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation Annex I, available at http://www.cn-
asean.org/uploadfile/2016/0523/20160523093023858.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2018] 
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between 2005 and 2014, which presents an overall trend of expansion. However, trade volume 
in 2015 was, notably, $472.16 billion – a few billion short compared to the year before. The 
latest statistics show that a decrease in trade is trending – according to the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce, between January and May 2016, the trade volume of the CAFTA was $173.57 
billion, a 7.1% decrease compared to the same period in 2015. Experts suggested that the 
China-ASEAN trade would drop by 2.6% in the first half of 2016 (People.cn, 2016); as it turned 
out, the trade volume for the whole of 2016 dropped by 4.2% compared to 2015 (China News, 
2017). 
 
Figure 7.6 China-ASEAN Trade Volume 2005-2014 
 
Source: (PRC. National Bureau of Statistics, nd) 
 
This is not necessarily a negative outcome and there are a few reasons contributing to this result. 
First of all, China’s production structure relies heavily on the labour-intense manufacturing 
industry, including cheap end products and parts, as its current status. It also has a great external 
dependency, as analysed in the previous chapter, meaning that when external demand decreases 
China will experience lower demand for raw materials.  
 
Secondly, ASEAN countries are seeking industrial development and have adopted restrictions 
on the exportation of certain materials. For example, in 2014, for the purpose of promoting 
domestic industries using processed metal products, the Indonesian government banned 
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exportation of several minerals and ores, which were either not allowed to be exported or were 
subject to higher duty (CNBC, 2014). This led to a certain decrease in trade volume and caused 
a shock to the global market as Indonesia is a leading exporter of nickel and bauxite; fortunately, 
Indonesia has amended this rushed decision and eased the exportation ban in 2017 (Asmarini 
and Munthe, 2017).  
 
Thirdly, since 2014, reduced trade volume could be subject to the decreasing international 
market price for raw materials and a climbing USD price. Therefore, even if the amount of 
materials traded stayed the same, trade volume could decrease in number.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, Chinese companies pursuing the ‘going out’ strategy may be 
the key reason for the decreased trade volume. Southeast Asia has a similar condition for 
industrialisation as China had where a huge population leads to cheaper labour; whereas China, 
to date, is facing the aftermath of the One-Child Policy. China’s working population is 
lessening while wages are going up. More Chinese companies are choosing to invest overseas, 
especially in neighbouring Southeast Asia. While trade volume decreases, investments grow. 
What was previously classified as trade is now included in a different category – returns of 
investment. As Figure 7.7 shows, there is a booming trend in China’s outflow direct 
investments and these are growing at a much faster manner compared to inflow investment. 
The China-ASEAN free trade regime is turning into an example of investment-oriented 
cooperation. With both parties seeking the optimal allocation and utilisation of resources 
through new forms of cooperation, this regional partnership may bring further mutual benefits 
and higher efficiency. 
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Figure 7.7 ASEAN-China FDI, 2005-2014 
 
Source: (CN-ASEAN.org, 2016) 
 
7.4.3. China’s Infrastructure Development in ASEAN 
 
Among all China’s trade partners, since it is geographically linked, China-ASEAN should have 
the great advantage of low transportation costs. China shares borders with Vietnam, Laos, and 
Myanmar, whose railway and highway systems are, however, the least developed (Park, Park, 
and Estrada, 2009). At the early stage of the CAFTA, the infrastructure condition between 
China and ASEAN, as well as within ASEAN, was awaiting improvement because it was 
believed that ‘infrastructural development will lead to a reduction in the economic distance 
between the integrating countries… [and] reduces trade costs by 5% [that] would lead to a 
resulting increase in intra CAFTA trade of 5%’ (Roberts, 2004:349).  
 
Echoing the academic suggestion, in 2012, China took infrastructure development in ASEAN 
as a significant goal by forming a China-ASEAN Infrastructure Cooperation Forum under the 
framework of the China-ASEAN Exposition. This, with the participation of governmental 
officials, has brought the issue of infrastructure to a higher level, the state level; while previous 
to this, Chinese contractors had already spent more than ten years working on ASEAN 
construction projects.  
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For example, in 2011, revenue for Chinese construction in ASEAN and the value of new 
contracts signed were $21.5 billion and $16.6 billion respectively, taking up 21% and 11.7% 
of the corresponding figures for China’s total number of overseas construction projects (China-
ASEAN EXPO, 2012). By 2014, China’s infrastructure contracts in ASEAN had reached an 
accumulated value of $180 billion and a $125 billion revenue, with most projects involving 
energy and transportation (China-ASEAN EXPO, 2014). By May 2017, the total value of 
China’s infrastructure contracts in ASEAN climbed to $296.27 billion, and $204 billion worth 
of projects have been accomplished (Wang, 2017). During the most recent forum meeting in 
September 2017, ASEAN officials and counsellors released a series of new contracts, including 
11.3-14.6 billion Singaporean dollar worth of civil engineering projects in Singapore (China-
ASEAN EXOP, 2017). 
 
On the other hand, and as proposed by China, the newly founded Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank has the aim of helping ASEAN countries’ infrastructure projects in terms of 
supplying financial means. The mechanism of this institution is still under negotiation and will 
be analysed in the chapter on China’s external finance structure. 
 
Overall, by providing funding for infrastructure projects and undertaking construction 
contracts, China’s participation in ASEAN development has turned out to be fruitful. The 
mutual benefits include convenient transportation with lower costs and industrial upgrades for 
local areas. For China, taking infrastructure contracts in neighbouring countries is also a great 
solution for consumer products that are facing domestic overcapacity. With this aspect of 
resource diplomacy flourishing, China-ASEAN trade activities also have promising prospects. 
 
7.4.4. Challenge to the China-ASEAN resource relationship: Regional rebalancing 
 
In 2016, the arbitration case over the South China Sea brought up by the Philippines set off a 
wave of discussion on how the future relationship between China and Southeast Asia may turn 
out. Moreover, many appeared to be seeking solutions to resolve the issue or to rebalance the 
distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific region. The case triggered heated discussion on 
the tensions and future in this region. The dispute not only concerned China and the Philippines, 
but also a few other ASEAN countries as they can claim sovereignty over disputed territory. 
The US also voiced its support to the verdict of the arbitration by sending navy vessels into the 
nearby waters.  
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The political tension between China and ASEAN claimants over the South China Sea is 
certainly a point of interest and much analysis has been done on this topic since the dispute 
emerged in the 1970s (e.g. Rowan, 2005; Storey, 1999; Yu, 2016; Fravel, 2012); however, this 
part of the section will analyse the issue from an economic perspective to provide alternative 
insights into power rebalancing within the China-ASEAN partnership. 
 
Economic factors may have played a dominant role in the Philippines filing an arbitration case. 
Disputes over the South China Sea have a decades’ long history but were eased in 2002 with 
the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (the 
Declaration), with peaceful negotiation as the chosen solution. The Declaration also paved the 
way for regional economic cooperation between China and ASEAN, such as the Framework 
Agreement. 
 
When the arbitration case was filed in early 2013, a few years after the financial crisis, the 
Philippine’s cooperation with China had not yet recovered. Looking back at the graph of trade 
volume between China and ASEAN member states (Figure 7.6), prior to 2008, the Philippines 
was in fourth place. It was also the member state whose trade revenue suffered the most during 
the 2008 financial crisis. By 2010 and up until 2014, its trading activity with China had 
recovered but was eventually outrun by Indonesia and Vietnam. By 2014, most ASEAN 
members had seen their trade volumes double compared to pre-2008 whilst the Philippines, for 
some reason, had failed to catch up. Further to the ASEAN economic setback, China came to 
experience relatively stable and faster economic growth when compared to ASEAN states, 
although the financial crisis did slow down the growth rate of China’s GDP (Figure 7.8 and 
7.9).  
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Figure 7.8 GDP, China and ASEAN, 2005-2014 
 
Source: (CN-ASEAN.org, 2016) 
 
Figure 7.9 GDP growth rate, China and ASEAN, 2005-2014 
 
Source: (CN-ASEAN.org, 2016) 
 
In general, the economic imbalance has emerged in spite of the mutual development promised 
by the free trade agreement and other forms of cooperation. Therefore, it can be identified as 
reasonable for small and less developed states to bring up historical issues as leverage against 
a great power. In this case, the South China Sea dispute, with the support of the International 
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Arbitration Tribunal and the US, offered ideal leverage for bargaining with China for more 
economic benefits. The South China Sea possesses vast amounts of unexploited oil reserves in 
addition to other rich marine resources, which is strategically significant for states in the 
contemporary global structure as oil and relevant products are considered the lifeblood of 
industrialisation (Buszynski and Sazlan, 2007).  
 
For any party involved in this dispute as well as other claimants, the resources held in the South 
China Sea are great national interests that one should defend. The action from the US can also 
be explained through the economic aspects. Besides its long-term competition with China over 
the power of global influence, the US is the biggest trade partner with ASEAN (Buszynski, 
2012). If the case eventually settles with a result in the Philippines favour, as a major economic 
ally of the Philippines, the US can potentially take a share of its resources.  
 
It is not to say that there are no political factors at all involved in the South China Sea issue – 
indeed, the solution is often seen as political. The dispute cannot be settled with the verdict of 
arbitration because international society has no authority to enforce the tribunal’s decision. 
China has taken a very tough stance of non-acceptance and non-participation in the dispute 
with support from the national navy. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also 
emphasised the legally binding nature of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 
Declaration, insisting that arbitration is void and the dispute should be resolved via negotiation 
(Wang, 2016a; PRC. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Furthermore, despite an arbitration 
verdict was made, international society does not have the power to enforce the result, making 
the verdict a mere formality. 
 
Gao (1994) has pointed out much before the arbitration took place that instead of conflict, there 
would always be the possibility for China to jointly develop the natural resources in the 
disputed territory. As expected, the Philippines new president Duterte has taken a rather 
different attitude than his predecessor by showing willingness for further cooperation with 
China (Beech, 2016). The verdict of this arbitration, as an example of economic leverage, in 
fact, has urged more negotiation between China and ASEAN in terms of fairer trade deals and 
investment.  
 
For example, most recently, Duterte expressed the idea of fair joint gas exploration in disputed 
waters surrounding the Spratly Islands which was appreciated by Wang Yi, the Chinese 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mogota, 2017). With the Philippines as a precedent and with the 
backing from the arbitration verdict, other ASEAN claimants can also ask for the same fairness 
in issues of future cooperation. As China and ASEAN becoming increasingly interdependent, 
continuous conflict can only turn out to be a no-win situation (Hong, 2013). If China wishes 
not to completely lose its interests in the South China Sea and its economic cooperation with 
ASEAN, the only option is to allow a bigger share to be given to claimants, thus producing a 
win-win solution.  
 
7.4.5. Summary 
 
To sum up, trade and cooperation between China and ASEAN countries have a long history 
and both been booming in the recent two decades according to statistics tracking trade flow. 
The profound institutional foundation, including several tiers of regional agreements, and 
China’s heavy investment in ASEAN infrastructure have further consolidated the partnership. 
Although minor episodes of disputes have occurred, overall, China’s resource diplomacy with 
ASEAN is successful and promising. A few factors contribute to this thriving partnership. 
 
Firstly, the establishment of regional free trade agreements in the early 2000s has lowered trade 
barriers with means such as tariff deduction. It also created the conditions for standardised and 
regulated trading activities by setting up principles and practices related to customs, intellectual 
property rights, anti-dumping protection, and dispute settlement.  
 
Secondly, China has been the biggest contractor for ASEAN’s infrastructure upgrade. This 
cooperation on construction is now also carried out under certain institutional frameworks 
relating to governmental level forums. This undertaking not only benefits China with 
contractual revenue and is a solution to overcapacity, but also provides further reductions in 
transportation costs and time, thus increasing trade volume for both parties.  
 
Lastly, the tension between China and ASEAN over the South China Sea issue could be the 
major setback in maintaining the trade partnership. Economically, the previous easing of 
tension was due to a regional imbalance that followed the 2008 global financial crisis. Overall, 
ASEAN countries experience much slower economic growth than China and trade volume has 
also decreased, reportedly due to China’s industrial reform. The territorial issue raised China’s 
awareness of creating a fairer ground for the continuing partnership, initiating a joint resource 
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exploiting project and making better deals when distributing interests. The political tension can 
be interpreted as a bargaining chip for weaker states to safeguard their benefits but does not 
necessarily signify a definite breakdown of the partnership.  
 
In short, with its institutional foundation and frequent communication at all levels, China-
ASEAN’s cooperation is likely to be maintained, and with magnificent prospects as long as 
fair conditions are provided. This cooperation is a significant cornerstone of China’s external 
influence through the production pillar and an important source of China’s rising economic 
power. 
 
7.5. Chapter Summary 
 
The analysis above has demonstrated that, across the three regions studied, China’s external 
dependence on resource flows has increased substantially. By exploring the institutional 
foundation, trade volume, infrastructural development, and potential challenges of these 
developing relationships, it has been shown that overall that this dependence has not translated 
into vulnerability. China’s resource diplomacy has effectively supported its continuing pursuit 
of economic power from the production perspective. Beneath this headline observation, 
interesting patterns of similarity and difference across the regions can be observed. These 
similarities and differences are captured in Table 7.1 at the beginning of this chapter, which is 
reviewed below.  
 
China has been maintaining a long term diplomatic rapport and cooperative relationship with 
African countries, providing the latter with capital and technology for the construction of local 
infrastructure; in return, these African countries are China’s stable access to the petroleum and 
minerals sustaining China’s domestic economic development. The cooperation between China 
and Latin American countries has also intensified recently, particularly with other emerging 
economies, such as Brazil and Venezuela, who was once considered the ‘backyard’ of US 
hegemony. As for Southeast Asia (or ASEAN), the focus is on China’s long-term strategic 
partnership in trade and investment versus its territorial disputes with ASEAN claimants over 
the South China Seas involvement in potential oil deposits. 
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By looking systematically at the three case studies on China’s resource diplomacy from the 
aspects of institutional foundation, trade volume, infrastructure development, and 
sustainability, a few patterns can be discerned.  
 
The track of trade flow shows that China saw fast-paced growth in trade volume with all three 
regions up until 2015, with ASEAN being the top trade partner followed by LAC and then 
Africa. In general, the growth in trade volume corresponds to China’s GDP growth, with the 
expanding capacity of the Chinese market brought about by this growth attracting further 
trading activities. The decreased trade volume in 2015 can be explained in two ways: firstly, 
in relation to China’s decision to optimise sectoral composition for tackling the overcapacity 
issue as mentioned in the previous chapter; secondly, is the strategy switch from trade to direct 
investment which belongs to a different revenue catalogue. However, it is not evident that 
China is losing access to resources in those regions based merely on the statistics.  
 
In all three regions, China has established different institutional foundation extents for its 
resource diplomacy. China’s cooperation with ASEAN, due to geographic proximity, has a 
long history providing the conditions for forming a regional free trade agreement. Bilateral free 
trade agreements have also been established between China and individual Latin American 
countries, including Peru, Chile, and Costa Rica, besides a China-Colombia free trade 
agreement that is still under negotiation. Free trade agreements are an instrument for facilitating 
trading activities by laying down standardised rules and regulations to safeguard the legitimate 
interests of trade partners.  
 
China has also formed regional cooperation forums with all three regions. These forums are 
channels of communication where detailed and practical cooperative strategies are jointly made. 
The framework of these forums extends from trade to other areas of cooperation, such as 
infrastructure development, education and vocational training, as well as direct investment. It 
does not directly facilitate trade, but its dynamic themes and flexible operation can effectively 
tighten the bond between China and its partners from multiple aspects, eventually benefitting 
China’s resource strategy. 
 
Furthermore, China has actively participated in local infrastructure development across all 
three regions. In African and ASEAN countries, China has been the leading developer of civil 
engineering projects, including railways, roads, and ports, besides other development in energy, 
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telecommunication, and community facilities. The unique Chinese economic model is highly 
efficient at fundraising and operation in comparison to many Western investors and 
international institutions like the World Bank. These projects greatly enhance the condition of 
local transportation, not only for the wellbeing of locals but also for the benefit of trading 
activities that depend on cheaper and faster transportation. Moreover, in the specific case of 
Africa, some local governments have received Chinese construction help in exchange for 
access to resources at the construction site.  
 
Meanwhile, Chinese infrastructural projects in Latin America are relatively less significant. 
The China-LAC infrastructure cooperation forum has three years of history, so is much 
younger in comparison to China’s engagement with ASEAN, for instance. In Latin America, 
China provides approximately $20 billion in loans for infrastructural construction every year. 
There is also another $10 billion investment in resource-related projects, mainly industrial 
facilities which directly involve a production process for petroleum and metal products. The 
scale of this involvement may not be as much as China’s engagement in ASEAN and Africa, 
nonetheless, the Chinese bank has become the biggest infrastructure financier for Latin 
America. 
 
Through the study of these cases, it is found that many concerns and obstacles that may become 
setbacks in terms of China’s resource diplomacy. Arguments are seen to emerge in a few key 
areas of interest, mainly in regard to fairness throughout the cooperative relationship. It is 
suggested that China’s engagement with these resource-rich regions is excessive and is 
potentially or repugnantly harmful to the local economy.  
 
Governments of these resource-rich countries may be tempted by immediate interests in 
exporting raw materials and turning their nation into a heavily dependent mono-economy. Such 
an economy is vulnerable to many situations such as a price drop of the key commodity or 
decreased demands by importers. The economic crisis of Venezuela can be taken as an 
illustration as well as the widely criticised ‘Angola mode’. It is of great significance for 
countries relying on resource exportation to reform and diversify the economic composition. 
Regarding this concern, financial aid from China as well as improved infrastructure can, in fact, 
provide conditions and funding for industrialisation in underdeveloped areas.  
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Furthermore, the distribution of interests can often lead to controversy. Western scholars have 
criticised China’s acquisition of resources as an instance of neo-colonialism that does not 
provide long-term solutions for local underdevelopment or address issues of poverty (Sautman 
and Yan, 2007; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011). To different extents, it is thus exploitative rather 
than mutually beneficial. For example, some believe that Chinese firms in Africa and Latin 
America employ a very limited local labour force, it does not reveal necessary technological 
support and training, neither does it provide necessary human rights protection.  
 
In ASEAN, the Philippines raising the territorial dispute over the South China Seas can be seen 
as a consequence of suffering an economic downturn and regional imbalance. However, there 
is no recognised standard defining the boundary between exploitation and cooperation. It is 
also found that Chinese firms perform no worse than other leading Western players on the same 
field, as businesses will always seek maximum profit within the limits of the law. Therefore, 
to solve this issue, the effort of local government to set up rules on resource-related cooperation 
projects, is suggested; for example, detailed requirements on training, technology sharing, and 
contributing to the local employment rate. Certain levels of negotiation can also ease the issues 
caused by unfairness. The regional forums between China and its partners allow government 
officials and business representatives to discuss relevant policymaking and can potentially 
smooth the way towards mutual interests.  
 
In short, the attraction of the Chinese market should not be underestimated, as proven by its 
trade volume; so long as China can adjust its strategy and adapt to the changing demand of its 
partners by different means, such as via forums, agreements, and policymaking, the 
maintenance of long-term partnerships looks promising. These lasting partnerships allow 
China to keep on fuelling its production output and exportation, which eventually contribute to 
the growth of China’s economic power in relation to the production structure. 
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8. Conclusion: Structural Power and the Rise of China 
 
This thesis has examined China’s rising power from the perspective of its finance and 
production structures, aiming to answer whether China’s power can be described as a ‘rising 
hegemonic power’. By referring to Susan Strange’s theory of structural power (Strange, 2015b), 
the study identifies finance and production as the two primary disaggregated structures of 
China’s rising power, in order to conduct a systematic analysis on China’s variegated 
development.  
 
The contribution from this thesis has been to amend Susan Strange’s structural power approach 
to the study of hegemony and IPE, and use the conceptualisation developed as a framework 
with which to organise a broad range of existing literature and new resources. In her work, 
Strange notes the need for analytic flexibility to adopt the concept of structural power to 
circumstances under investigation. This study represents an exercise in applying Strange’s 
flexible approach to the study of IPE to the important and prominent contemporary topic of the 
economic rise of China. 
 
New primary data has also been presented relating in particular to domestic financial sector 
transformation, domestic production sectoral transformations and relative labour productivity, 
and the shifting nature of external resource dependence as measured by institutional foundation, 
trade volume, infrastructural development and potential challenges. This primary data has 
taken the form in particular of official statistics from the Bureau of Statistics of China, US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the OECD, and World Bank, and from the compendium of trade 
statistics provided by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Observatory of Economic 
Complexity. Official reports and archives of legislative output from the government of China 
have provided additional new empirical material.  
 
By bringing together these materials with the structural power perspective, each of the previous 
four chapters has provided an analysis of the foundations of China’s economic power and to 
what extent can this foundation develop into a source of hegemonic power. Through this final 
chapter, these insights are brought together. The overall position reached is that evidence 
assessed demonstrates that there are significant shortcomings in the hegemonic power of China. 
While this overall position has been reached elsewhere in the existing literature (e.g. Callahan, 
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2005; Ikenberry, 2008; Yan, 2011; Breslin, 2007; deLisle and Goldstein, 2017), here the 
economic power perspective has been used to identify specific elements of the internal and 
external transformations in the production and financial structure that inhibit the extent of 
economic power. 
 
The overall conclusion reached is that of the four dimensions studied, China’s resource 
diplomacy is the most fully developed. In relation to the internal development of the finance 
and production structures and China’s engagement with international financial institutions, 
there are clearer weaknesses and vulnerabilities underpinning the rise of China. In spite of a 
great improvement compared to half a century ago, the development of China’s financial 
structure is incomplete and still undergoing reform, as the capital market remains unstable as 
well as significantly lacking in scientific regulations. The current result of financial reform has 
led to a certain level of financial deepening, with China showing limited hegemonic power in 
regional, rather than global, financial institutions. Within its production structure, sector 
composition, productivity, and external dependency are all obstacles China must overcome in 
order to become an advanced economy, although overall, China has been successful in carrying 
out resource diplomacy with other developing regions, and thus acquiring materials for 
continuous production and economic growth. It will thus take a considerably longer period of 
time before China is ‘hegemonically ready’. 
 
8.1. Existing Overview of the Rise of China 
 
An extensive range of literature has used various perspectives to discuss China’s rising power 
and its implications on the fast-changing world of global politics. From the economic viewpoint, 
the majority of the previous research has tried to find the forces driving China’s economic 
surge. Scholars have identified factors such as SOE reform, township and collectively owned 
businesses, and export-driven economic strategy as the major contributors to China’s growing 
power (Goodhart and Xu, 1996; Yan, 2014; Wang, Liu, and Qi, 2014). Others have pointed 
out the drawbacks and challenges in China’s current economic model, such as over-
accumulation and overcapacity (Hung, 2008). It is also stated that the economic growth of 
China can point to both opportunities and challenges, as well as competition with other 
countries, regardless developed and developing (Ahn, 2004; Athukorala, 2009; Kumar, 
DuFresne, and Hahler, 2007). 
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The most concerning discussion on China’s rising power involves the security aspect, with 
debates regularly occurring to ask whether China is a security threat to the US, its Asian 
neighbours, and the existing global order (e.g. Chung, 2009; Callahan, 2005; Banlaoi, 2003; 
Kim and Gates, 2015).  As shown by its economic strength, China can afford an increasing 
amount of military expenditure, which is worrying for other players in the global regime. 
Particularly for the US and US-allied Asian countries, China’s growing power can be seen to 
introduce a new equilibrium to the existing system.  
 
Among this strand from the literature, writing on offensive realism suggests that the US should 
proactively take action to suppress China’s growth, while others debate over China’s intention 
(Johnston, 2003). Is it a status quo or revisionist country, as defined in power transition theory, 
and will China overthrow the established US hegemonic regime? There are also a number of 
empirical studies analysing East Asian countries’ reaction to China’s growing power. Although 
opinions vary due to the different approaches adopted, this research largely agrees that the 
economic mutual benefits China brings cancel out the security threat it poses, especially 
combined with China’s pragmatic attitude (e.g. Brzezinski, 2013; White, 2005; Nanto and 
Chanlett-Avery, 2006; Shambaugh, 2004). 
 
The rest of the existing literature focuses on the ideological impact of China’s growth, mainly 
through the structure of international organisations and regimes (e.g. Art, 2010). Some of the 
existing literature identifies values and ideologies as key elements of US hegemonic success, 
pointing out that Bretton Woods institutions were built particularly for the purpose of 
promoting the values of a liberal capitalist regime (Robinson, 2011). There is some evidence 
that China’s mode of economic growth and the Beijing Consensus seem appealing to 
developing countries, leading to speculation on whether China will establish a new global 
institution using its own set of values (Hung, 2008). On the other hand, some scholars have 
denied this possibility, stating that China is committed to the Western regime, rather than intent 
on developing a mature set of values applicable to the world (Ikenberry, 2008). This means a 
win-win situation for both China and the rest of the world because China embracing the 
Western liberal system facilitates further economic cooperation with other countries. 
 
The existing literature shows competing conclusion on the status of China’s rising power and 
its implications for the world without clearly defining the term ‘power’ or ‘hegemonic power’. 
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In this existing literature, understanding of the different dimensions of China’s power is 
scattered and inconsistent due to the fact that China is a peculiar case of development 
containing variegated pattern in different sectors and aspects. Therefore, this research offers an 
analysis of the variegated aspects of China’s economic power with updated data and materials 
on the basis of a systematic conceptualisation of hegemonic power. 
 
8.2. Disaggregating Power and China’s Hegemonic Rise 
 
Understanding power is the foundation of this study. Without properly defining hegemonic 
power, it is difficult to set up the parameters for evaluating power. A few theoretical schools, 
including both mainstream IPE approaches and critical theory, conceptualise hegemony based 
on cases of previous and current hegemonic power. These theories observe how power is 
manifested through the performance and behaviour of hegemons; however, they have not 
provided a practical approach for analysing power or to clearly identify the components of 
power.  
 
In this case, Susan Strange’s theory of structural power is introduced in order to construct the 
analytical framework for this study. As a major contribution to the existing IPE scholarship, 
the core of this theory suggests that power should be disaggregated into different structures. 
Strange’s original suggestion covers four primary structures: finance, security, production, and 
intelligence (Strange, 2015b).  Strange also points out that structural power theory is a flexible 
approach. A study is free to select the structures suitable for the research in accordance with 
the contemporary global political environment.  
 
Following Strange’s conceptualisation of disaggregated power, this study focused on two 
structures from Strange’s theory, finance and production, to identify and examine China’s 
variegated and uneven development. As the existing literature on the rise of China has pointed 
out, China’s growth is rooted in the economic aspects. It was after the surge of GDP growth 
and accumulation of wealth in the 1990s and early 21st century that China’s impact on security, 
global leadership, and other political aspects began to materialise. Case studies on US foreign 
policy, as well as other countries’ reaction to the rise of China, show that hostility due to 
China’s pursuit of political power is often compromised by the economic benefits China brings 
(Brzezinski, 2013; White, 2005; Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, 2006; Kirshner, 2012). Therefore, 
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within the limited time span and length of this thesis, the research focuses on finance and 
production structure as the two most fundamental elements of China’s economic power. 
 
Chapter 4 and 5 explore China’s development in terms of its financial structure, internally and 
externally. Chapter 4 examines the result of China’s financial reform from two perspectives 
defined by Strange: the ability to generate credit and the ability to manage monetary stability. 
The reform started with the modernisation of China’s banking system when roles of the central 
and commercial banks were clearly separated. More recently, a range of financial instruments 
were introduced to further deepen China’s financial structure. Overall, although great 
achievements have been made, the Chinese financial structure is rather shallow, according to 
the standards of hegemonic power. 
 
As the reform initiated, the PBOC began to function as the central bank, responsible for making 
policy decisions from the macro level, for example, decisions on the interest rate and the 
exchange rate; the ‘Big Four’ leading state-owned commercial banks were liberalised and 
effectively reduced the amount of bad SOE loans. This ‘dual-track’ system that followed the 
banking reform introduced a certain level of freedom to the capital market, and commercial 
banks became the major financer for small and medium companies.  However, such market 
liberalisation was limited as the government and PBOC continue to maintain a high level of 
central control due to ideological restrictions.  
 
Other forms of financial instruments, such as the stock exchange and credit rating system, came 
into existence in the 1990s. Total market capitalisation has shown exponential growth since 
the opening of the Chinese stock exchange. It also experienced a few major setbacks over the 
past three decades, exposing deficiencies in the system. The credit rating system emerged even 
more recently. The relevant Chinese authority has established interim regulations for this new 
instrument merely on the use of personnel and basic principles, with very few detailed rules of 
operation introduced. The actual method of credit rating is left blank, with rating agencies 
defining their own rules. It is confirmed by scholars that credit rating, as a protection 
mechanism, is beneficial to the development of Chinese bonds and the security market, but it 
will take time before such a system is properly established. These instruments are still under 
development as these industries significantly lack scientific management and regulation. 
Through these instruments, it can be observed that China’s financial deepening remains rather 
shallow at this point. 
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The socialist ‘dual-track’ system, a balancing act between macro-control and liberalised 
institutions, has proven to be effective when managing China’s monetary stability. While 
opening up its capital market, the relatively high level of macro-control enabled China to 
withstand the Asian Financial Crisis. A similar strategy was imposed on Hong Kong’s return. 
With the mainland under a Chinese socialist market economy, Hong Kong was allowed to 
maintain its status quo financial system for a smooth economic, financial, and political 
transition on both sides. As China’s ability to manage monetary stability improved, the status 
of the Chinese currency was also promoted. The RMB is now the second most frequently used 
currency in international trade settlements and has become part of the SDR basket; however, 
due to its limited convertibility and liquidity, it is far from being the leading reserve currency 
in comparison to the use of the US dollar. 
 
Through the series of internal financial development, China obtained enhanced ability to 
generate credit, to manage monetary stability, and to promote the use of its currency overseas. 
However, the progress of financial deepening is shallow due to immature regulation and 
restrained currency policy. Therefore, China’s economic power remains insufficient for a 
hegemonic rise. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the external aspect of China’s financial structure, examining China’s 
influence through its engagement with international financial institutions, including both 
Bretton Woods institutions under US hegemony and the newly established China-led 
institutions.  
 
By studying the formal governance structure and informal influence mechanism of the IMF 
and the World Bank, it is concluded that China has incremental control over US-led institutions. 
There is also evidence that China is committed to US-led institutions due to the potential mutual 
benefit and stability. The overall position of China in these institutions places it in the process 
of slowly shifting from passive borrower to a mixed role of borrower and lender. Through 
voice reform and the call for a fairer playing field, G7 leadership was able to expand into G20. 
Since then, China has been able to exert more power on institutions; however, this increase in 
China’s power is very limited as the US remains in possession of the power of veto over major 
decisions. 
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Meanwhile, China can be found playing a leading role in new institutions, including the Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multilateralization, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the New 
Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank. In all these new 
institutions, China is the biggest or one of the biggest shareholder(s), taking the largest share 
of the decision-making power. It is fair to suggest that China demonstrates a regional 
hegemonic power through these new institutions, as it takes up a large share of the 
responsibility for maintaining regional monetary stability and funding infrastructural 
development projects in developing countries. Furthermore, these new institutions do not pose 
a challenge to the existing US-led institutions. The establishment of the AIIB and CMIM, for 
example, are complements to the existing order, rather than competitors. Overall then, China’s 
power within the international financial regime is insufficient as a global hegemonic candidate. 
 
The incremental growth of China’s influence within existing US-led international financial 
institutions and the relatively minor role of new China-led institutions indicate that China’s 
economic power is limited in the context of hegemonic transition. 
 
Chapter 6 and 7 analyse the power embedded in China’s production structure. Chapter 5 looks 
at the internal development of China’s production. The overall findings suggest that a 
successful resource strategy has been supportive to a production surge; meanwhile, China’s 
production structure requires further optimisation in terms of sector composition and 
productivity in order to catch up with other leading world economies. 
 
Chapter 6 identifies three elements as major indicators of China’s production structure: 
production volume of each sector, productivity of each sector, and external dependency. The 
economic and market reform that occurred during the late 20th century adopted a series of 
arrangements, such as the Household Responsibility System for the agricultural sector and 
encouragement of private businesses, which greatly boosted China’s production volume. 
Despite China taking second place on the world stage regarding GDP in recent years, its 
production volume is heavily attributed to the industrial sector – manufacturing, to be more 
precise. Industry is a sector contributing much less value-added than the service sector. In most 
advanced economies, the service sector takes up the biggest share of domestic production, for 
instance, more than three quarters in the US. In China, the service and industry sectors take up 
48% and 43% of total value-added, respectively, and the Chinese government has continuingly 
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promoted the status of the service sector. It would take a reasonable period of time for China’s 
production structure to be upgraded into an advanced form.  
 
The chapter also found that the productivity of all sectors of China’s production structure, also 
await improvement. China’s labour productivity is much lower than that of the US. Besides, 
the Penn World Table 9.0 indicates that China’s total factor productivity level in relation to 
purchasing power is achieving only a fraction of that of the US and is much lower than most 
Western countries. 
 
A further discussion on the external dependency of China’s production explores the effect of 
inflow FDI and exportation. Although existing literature has partially attributed China’s 
production surge to inflow FDI during the late 20th century, the effect of FDI on China’s 
production to date has gradually diminished as China’s economy has taken off. On the other 
hand, China’s exportation remains the lifeblood of its production structure. Its reliance on 
exporting manufacturing goods also brings vulnerability because if demand from the 
international market reduces, China may face problems such as overcapacity. Overall then, 
China shows little convincing hegemonic power through its production structure. 
 
Generally, it is clear that China’s production structure requires a further update in order to catch 
up with Western leading countries, especially the US as the current hegemon. From the 
perspective of internal development of the production structure, China’s economic power is 
insignificant with a relatively weak foundation.  
 
Chapter 7 explores China’s resource diplomacy using three resource-rich regions, Africa, Latin 
America, and Southeast Asia as the external aspect of its production structure. Resources are 
identified as a key element of China’s production because they are considered closely related 
to hegemonic ascendency, according to cases of both previous and present hegemonic power. 
Particularly for China, acquiring adequate resources is fundamental in order to fuel its 
continuous production activities. Therefore, accessing and securing resources can be a measure 
of the external aspect of China’s production structure; while overall, China’s resource 
diplomacy has proven to be both effective and successful.  
 
Three elements are considered to be essential in determining resource diplomacy:  price, access, 
and transferability. As in the case of China, price is no longer a major concern, and access is 
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measured by trade volume, institutional foundations, and challenges to partnership 
sustainability. Transferability is represented by infrastructure development. 
 
China is the most sought-after market for many resource-rich countries. It has the most frequent 
and voluminous trade with Southeast Asia, followed by Latin America and then Africa. The 
institutional foundation aspect echoes trade volume. China has established a regional 
cooperation framework and regional FTA with ASEAN, bilateral FTA with three LAC 
countries, and a mere cooperation forum with African countries. The major challenge to 
China’s resource strategy is that the huge demand for resources leads to ‘exploitation’ of others. 
The problems may appear differently in different regions and countries, but overall the 
observation is that China’s seeking of resources can, to different extents, hinder the industrial 
upgrade of these resource-rich developing countries. As long as both China and its partners 
proactively seek industrial upgrading, instead of following short-term profits, in principle, this 
problem can be overcome. 
 
It is also found that China has been investing extensively in infrastructures, such as roads, 
railways, energy stations, and resource-related projects. China is the biggest infrastructure 
financer in all three regions. Such investments provide an easier method for extracting and 
transferring resources. Giving out financial aid and easily-acquired loans is also part of China’s 
strategy of building rapport with these resource-rich developing regions.  
 
Therefore, China’s resource diplomacy is overall successful in terms of securing raw materials, 
sustaining rapid production growth, and forming long-term strategic partnerships. Such 
conducts are essential elements for China to pursue further economic growth and power. From 
this perspective, China’s economic power shows a positive sign of continuous enhancement 
for a potential hegemonic rise. 
 
Overall, by synthesising the internal and external development of China’s finance and 
production pillars, this study concludes that it is not likely for China to acquire hegemonic 
status based on Strange’s conceptualisation of power. Undeniably, since 1978, China has been 
carrying out multi-dimensional economic reform, including reform of the financial system and 
production-related institutions, and has achieved some astounding outcome. Financial reform 
has freed capitals and created new means of financing, igniting the production boom, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector. As domestic economy flourishes due to production 
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surge and the emergence of new financial instruments, such as stocks and security transaction, 
China’s status within international regimes has been promoted correspondingly, besides the 
urge of seeking overseas resource and overseas market. However, there are problems found 
within China’s domestic economic development, such as excessive financial control, low 
productivity, and heavy external dependence, which have determined its inability of becoming 
the global leader in the contemporary world. 
 
8.3. Directions for Future Research 
 
This study focuses on analysing China’s rising power. The basis of this research lies in 
exploring the components of China’s structural power, building from the framework introduced 
by Strange. This framework has allowed for an assessment to take place of the strength of the 
internal and external foundations of the political-economic power of China. 
 
This study does not analyse the current status of the US hegemon and is unable to answer if a 
hegemonic transition is indeed happening. Although initially, it intended to explore the 
dynamics between China and the US in terms of hegemonic competition, due to the limited 
time and length of this thesis this became impossible.  
 
A major extension of this work would be to place the study in comparative perspective. This 
study has argued that while dramatic transformations have taken place in China, some 
significant structural weakness remains. To gain a sense of where these transformations place 
China as a global power relative to other players, such a shift towards comparative analysis 
would be required. Hegemonic transition involves two parties – a relatively growing emerging 
power and a relatively declining current hegemon. A comparison could be toward the declining 
power, or to other rising powers.  
 
Besides, a much more complicated set of variables needs to be defined in order to study a 
transition, because transitions are a process in which time, space, and subjects are constantly 
changing. It is also very difficult to answer to what extent power has been shifting – it is not 
like transferring water from bucket to bucket, which can be calculated objectively by volume. 
After all, there is no consensus on whether we should observe power as relative or absolute. 
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This is an ongoing debate between realist and liberal theories (Rana, 2015; O’Brien and 
Williams, 2016). The question then becomes a question of epistemology. 
 
Moreover, this research cannot make a prediction as to what is coming next regarding China’s 
economic growth or China’s pursuit of hegemonic power. Because of the changing nature of 
international politics, there is a possibility that the world is shifting into a multi-polar regime 
rather than being hegemonic. This is, in fact, another heated topic of debate (e.g. Wilkinson, 
1999; Hurrell, 2006; Amin, 2013; Pieterse, 2017; Voskressenski, 2017). This study has not 
considered this possibility. Base on the analysis of the current status of China’s economic 
power, future research on international relations can discuss if the rise of China is pushing 
towards multi-polarity instead of a hegemonic transition. 
 
Most recently, the world has begun to see unforeseen changes in ideology, in the way people 
understand international politics. Just as Susan Strange has suggested, the world has changed 
and will keep on changing. The mainstream approaches used today may not be mainstream in 
the future. At the moment, it is largely true that China poses great economic attraction to the 
world, and that this can cancel out the political and military hostility ranged against it. However, 
this situation may change, and economic attraction might no longer be the trump card China 
holds.  
 
Contemporary global politics indicates that debate over the rise of China will continue for the 
foreseeable future. Under President Trump, it appears likely that a more adversarial trade 
policy may develop, framed in relation to the threat represented by the rise of China and by the 
‘bad deals’ from previous US administrations that have supported this rise. The failure of the 
US to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership also signals that the political-economic relationship 
between the US, China, and the Pacific region will remain dynamic. 
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